A VIEW of the EVIDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

CONDUCT

OF THE

AMERICAN WAR

UNDER

SIR WILLIAM HOWE,
LORD VISCOUNT HOWE,
AND
GENERAL BURGOYNE;

AS GIVEN BEFORE A

COMMITTEE of the HOUSE of COMMONS

Laſt SESSION of PARLIAMENT.

To which is added

A COLLECTION

OF THE CELEBRATED

FUGITIVE PIECES

That are ſaid to have given riſe to that

Important Enquiry.

Collecta revireſcunt.

LONDON.

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*** The failure of ſucceſs in the American war having deeply engaged the Public attention, the following collection has been made of the Evidence given at the bar of the Houſe of Commons, of the charges in and out of Parliament that are ſaid to have given riſe to the Enquiry into the Conduct of the war, and of the ſtrictures that have occaſionally been made during the courſe of that Enquiry, in order to lay before the Public a comprehenſive view of that moſt important Queſtion. The Fugitive Pieces will be found to bear hard upon the Commanders in Chief, which ſhould not be attributed to any partiality in the Collector, but to the nature of the ſubject; as almoſt every Eſſay that has appeared in the Public Prints, containing either *Reaſoning* or *Facts*, has been a ſevere cenſure on the conduct of the War.

SUMMARY.

EVIDENCE of LIEUTENANT GENERAL EARL CORNWALLIS. High character of General Howe; America in a military view; progreſs of the army from battle of Brooklyn; conceals the motives againſt attacking at White Plains; adviſes occupying Trenton; cauſe of Rhall's defeat; wont ſay moving to Pennſylvania a diverſion in favour of General Burgoyne; greatneſs of the Brandywine manœuvres; Lord Howe's great character; why the purſuit diſcontinued at Brunſwic; knew of no promiſes from Pennſylvania to Gen. Howe; will not anſwer if Sir Henry Clinton was againſt the Pennſylvania expedition; Donop's orders not to ſacrifice the troops, yet to BRUSQUER L'AFFAIRE; wont ſay the Heſſians refuſed to charge at White Plains, but wont give a reaſon; General Howe eſteemed by the army.

EVIDENCE of MAJOR GENERAL GREY. Expence, trouble, hazard, and danger of military operations in America; the Pennſylvania expedition preferable to a co-operation with Burgoyne; danger of acting on the North River; the attack at Middlebrook impracticable; danger of landing in the Delaware; General Howe's manœuvres at Brandywine the greateſt he ever knew; no force we can ſpare equal to the conqueſt of America.

EVIDENCE of SIR ANDREW SNAPE HAMMOND, Captain in the Navy. Imminent danger of landing in the Delaware; very favourable to General Howe; highly compliments Lord Howe.

EVIDENCE of CAPTAIN MONTRESOR. Rebel lines finely deſigned, but not judiciouſly executed; could not be taken by ſtorm; danger of attacking at Quibbleton; did not know the navigation of the North River; Red Bank well planned and conſtructed.

EVIDENCE of CAPTAIN MACKENZIE Secretary to GENERAL HOWE. Letter from General Burgoyne before the grand army embarked for the ſouthward; letter from General Clinton; General Howe's anſwers to theſe letters.

EVIDENCE of COLONEL SIR GEORGE OSBORNE. Evening before the battle of Germantown General Howe informs him when he will be attacked; ſtrongly in favour of General Howe; converſation with Donop relating to Rhall's neglect and diſobedience.

EVIDENCE of LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR GUY CARLETON. Will not give an opinion if General Burgoyne's orders were peremptory; on the Train; at laſt gives his opinion that the orders were peremptory.

EVIDENCE of LIEUTENANT COLONEL EARL of BALCARRAS. Character of General Frazer; General Frazer approved paſſing the Hudſon; artillery of great ſervice; battle of Stillwater September 19th; battle of Beaumont's Edge October 7th; General Burgoyne rejects General Gates' firſt terms; rebel force 12 or 14,000 men; underſtood a co-operation was expected; General Burgoyne in all ſituations the confidence of his army.

EVIDENCE of CAPTAIN MONEY, DEPUTY QUARTER-MASTER GENERAL. On the route; heavy artillery; tranſporting proviſions; bloody conflict at Stillwater September 19th; three regiments ſuffer much; ſtrong poſition of the rebels October 7th at Beaumont's Edge; a battalion of Germans run without having a man killed or wounded; would never come forward again; their cowardice the loſs of a victory, and finally of the whole army; General Arnold's military conduct, and gallantry; much in favour of General Burgoyne; compliments General Howe; General Howe objects to aſking opinions of officers on his expedition ſouthward.

EVIDENCE of EARL of HARRINGTON. Cruelty of the Savages under St. Luc la Corne; army delayed for want of proviſions; cauſe of defeat at Bennington; neceſſity of moving on to Stillwater; order of battle; General Burgoyne at the head of three regiments ſuſtains the weight of the battle; ſlowneſs of the Germans in taking their poſition renders the victory incomplete;

incomplete; deſcription of rebel intrenched camp; army had great confidence in General Burgoyne; Gen. Frazer's high opinion of Gen. Burgoyne.

EVIDENCE of MAJOR BALL. At Stillwater the Germans not covering the left of the Britiſh, five regiments ſuffer greatly; wounded early.

EVIDENCE of CAPTAIN BLOOMFIELD of the ARTILLERY. Very diſtinct account of the order of battle at Beaumont's Edge, October 7th; rebels firſt repulſed by the Britiſh; but forming again, they attack the Germans who run; this flight loſes the battle; he is wounded and taken.

EVIDENCE of COLONEL KINGSTON ADJUTANT-GENERAL. Motives for Bennington expedition; Savages of diſſervice; General Frazer warmly approved paſſing the Hudſon; moſt correct account of the action at Stillwater; four regiments ſuſtain the whole action; one third of them killed and wounded; the whole for ſeveral days incapable of ſervice; battle of Beaumount's Edge; rebel army 19,383 men; Britiſh 3,986 men; General Burgoyne ſurrounded without a poſſibility of retreat; the rebel poſitions deſcribed; ſerenity of a Clergyman in the midſt of danger; German officers could not anſwer for their troops; On horſes, dragoons, and the ladies; number of women; if Sir William Howe had co-operated, Gates muſt have retired; diſintereſtedneſs and generoſity of General Burgoyne; military cheſt; General Frazer for employing Britiſh not Germans at Bennington.

LORD GEORGE GERMAIN's SPEECH. Great expectation of accurate and important information from General Robertſon.

EVIDENCE of MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON. In America 24 years; in general people loyal; our army in that country always adequate to the deſigned ſervice; rebels never more than 16,000; General Howe in 1777 40,870 effective men; military deſcription of America; not a difficult country for military operations; no want of intelligence; battle on Long Iſland; operations on the N. River eaſy; thinks Gen. Burgoyne ruined for want of a co-operation; knows the N. River navigation; army could be tranſported to Albany from N. York in 2 days in defiance of all oppoſition; Gen. Howe could have ſpared 5000 men to attack N. England; half rebel army Iriſh; treaty with France its effects; General Howe not fettered by orders from home; great quantity of woollens and other goods abandoned to the rebels at Boſton; a hundred veſſels alſo abandoned; battle of Brooklyn; had lines been ſtormed, Putnam could not have collected 300 men to reſiſt; rebels embarked only one mile and a half from our troops; their retreat and magazines might have been cut off, which would have ended the rebellion; Waſhington's manner of ſupplying his army; General Howe's diſtance from the Delaware by land only 25 miles; route from the Elk to Philadelphia more difficult; deſcription of North River route by land; nothing material to defeat a water conveyance; America might be brought back to obedience if old experienced officers commanded; character of General Grey; total effective men 1777 32,000; immediately under General Howe 27,000 fit for actual ſervice; rebels ſhould have been intercepted in the Jerſeys; men carry ten days proviſions on their backs; want of pontoons and craft no excuſe for not paſſing the Delaware; how it might have been paſt; curious interrogatories and anſwers; from Sandy Hook to Albany 170 miles, has run it in 16 hours; no batteries could annoy them much.

EVIDENCE of JOSEPH GALLOWAY, Eſq; Bred to the law; offers a plan of reconciliation to Congreſs; the rebel conſtitution; unfair method of voting in Congreſs; Waſhington not fifteen thouſand men, 1000 of them unarmed; Sir William Howe equal in numbers, ſuperior in diſcipline; opinion of the four Lower Counties; loyal but want protection; people of the Jerſeys deſerted by Sir William Howe fearful of ever ſhewing themſelves friendly to Great Britain; loſt 40,000l. by the rebels; curious converſation between him and Lord Howe.

FUGITIVE PIECES that are ſaid to have GIVEN RISE to the ENQUIRY into the CONDUCT of the AMERICAN WAR.

LORD HOWE's SPEECH.

LETTER

SUMMARY.

LETTER from BOSTON, July 6th, 1775. Rebel plan to cut off the army diſcovered; battle of Concord; our wounded ſcalped, ears cut off, and eyes put out by the rebels; deſcription of the rebel redoubt and lines on Bunkers Hill; General Howe's plan of attack; attack of the graſs fence on our right; light infantry and Grenadiers moſtly cut off; Pigot ſtaggered on our left; redoubt at laſt carried; account of Warren the rebel commander; the rebels might have been diſlodged, or taken, or blown to pieces, or their works ſtormed with a tenth of the loſs; Clinton ſaved us; the amours of an artillery officer the cauſe of the artillery blunder; excellency of General Gage's intelligence, but no uſe made of it; brave men's lives wantonly thrown away.

LETTER from NEW YORK, March 9th, 1777. Opinions on General Gage and General Howe; real character of Howe; Boſton evacuated by a ſecret capitulation; our not poſſeſſing the heights of Dorcheſter the cauſe of our flight; immenſe quantity of woollens and linens left the rebels; General Sullivan's odd ſcheme; not ſecuring the harbour loſes us 700 men; at Brooklyn the rebel army eſcape; a ſtrong inſtance of the rebels diſmay and trepidation; Lord Howe lets the rebels eſcape by ſea; why the rebellion continues; profuſion of the Sultana and her huſband.

REMARKS on GENERAL HOWE's own account of the BATTLE of BROOKLYN. Anecdotes of Mr. Pitt; a good plan and ſufficient force the Miniſter's duty; the executive part the General's duty; rebels defeated; General Howe's calling off the troops and not puſhing his victory, not the Miniſter's fault; examples of ſtronger lines, precipices, and forts ſtormed, by Marlborough, Clinton, and the Heſſians; Lord Howe's miſconduct; if Lord Howe could not intercept them at ſea, General Howe ſhould not have permitted them to eſcape at land.

LETTERS from NEW YORK. Burgoyne's ruin imputed to the Howe's; military diviſion of America; voyage to Cheſapeak confirms the rebellion; ſacrifices the Canada army; Muſgrave ſaves Howe's army when ſurpriſed; General Howe's indifference on Burgoyne's diſaſter; curious anecdotes of Tryon; reaſons why our native troops are ſuperior to foreigners; North River and Lakes the Key of America; Howe confounded; fettered to Philadelphia; rebels will keep Burgoyne; reſentment of the army on ſhipping them for the ſouthward; Howe's conqueſts 1777 about 5 miles by 2; army opinion of Howe; his plan proved his own by his letters; general deſpondence on his going ſouthward; lamented for the torture he muſt feel on the honours and glory he has loſt; rebels ridicule him for deſerting Burgoyne; character of Lord Howe; his ſtrange reply to the refugees; an excellent moral character; vanity of Tryon; gaming and the ladies; if independency granted, we loſe our Newfoundland fiſhery and all our Weſt India iſlands; the danger to all maritime ſtates; to Britain in particular; exertion and conqueſt, or ruin and contempt.

MATTER of FACT. Faction at home tutors the Congreſs; miſconduct in allowing the rebels to eſcape at Long Iſland, New York, White Plains, and Jerſeys; our aſtoniſhment ſuffers no reſt; Gen. Howe retreats from Jerſey without recovering his honour; the people ſhould never be deceived; gaming a pernicious example in a General; loyaliſts plundered; curious fact of General de Heiſter; of a Britiſh military genius; Albany defenceleſs; frigates can go within 12 miles of it; diſadvantage of the ſouthern voyage; battle of Germantown; ſucceſs certain had we attacked at White Marſh, or remained in the rebel rear only two days; on a change of commanders; abſurdity of the ſouthern expedition; folly of occupying Philadelphia; the Gen. at his wits end; offers terms diſgraceful to us; his negociator impriſoned; oppreſſion of Commiſſaries; character of a military Governor; an indolent diſſipated General; a licentious army; a regiment of Commiſſaries; indulgence to favourites.

OBSERVATIONS on SIR ANDREW SNAPE HAMMOND's EVIDENCE. Partiality of his evidence; the Cheſapeak voyage Sir Andrew's own advice; two months loſt by it; the ſuppoſed danger in the Dela-

ware

ware refuted; proofs given from Sir Andrew's own actions; Red Bank fortified before the General's face; rebels allowed to finish it; then it is attacked and 400 of our men killed, &c. and two men of war and 100 feamen deftroyed.

GOVERNOR JOHNSTONE's SPEECH. Lord Howe reinforced with two 64 gun ships; did not collect his force though he had two month's notice; d'Eftaing could not have fucceeded on the Delaware; Admiral Barrington given as a noble example; on two Admirals; they are too high for the State; naval virtue fpirit and abilities enough to repel our enemies if thefe two were no more; his Lordfhip fulfomely flattered; lift of both fleets; proofs that Lord Howe did not think himfelf too weak; an Englifh 50 beats a French 74; he trifles away eight days when fuperior, and d'Eftaing lying difmafted within 20 leagues of him; method of bringing frigates into a general action; Englifh 64 and 50 equal to a French 74 and 64; recent gallant examples in Captains Rayner and Reynolds; had Lord Howe fought he would have beaten d'Eftaing.

ENQUIRY into SIR WILLIAM HOWE's CONDUCT. Strong proofs that both King and Minifter, by the moft flattering attentions, and unafked honours, did every thing that could be done to keep him in good humour, and engage him to do his duty; his ridiculous fpeech that the Minifter ought to have vindicated him againft the public cenfure; very convenient for themfelves if they had fuch a power; has loft us Burgoyne's army and brought on the French war; General Howe's ill founded promifes; Minifter juftified from Howe and Burgoyne's letters; Howe's letter expreffing his amazement at the maflerly ftrokes and vigorous conduct of the Minifter for America; 1776 General Howe 30,000, Waffhington only 16,000; his written and verbal excufes refuted; neglects Boflon harbour; has left the rebellion ftronger than he found it.

STRICTURES on SIR WILLIAM HOWE's MISCHIANZA or TRIUMPH on leaving AMERICA UNCONQUERED, with his CHARACTER from the AMERICAN CRISIS publifhed by the CONGRESS. A feries of ill conduct and difgraces, for which crowned with laurels never won; his romantic triumph, not after victories, but after Thirteen Provinces wretchedly loft.

ÆMILIUS SCAURUS on the CANADA ARMY. Quantity of artillery and choice of the route retarded the army; General Burgoyne's reafons infufficient; his letters and evidence in oppofition; army halts a month; rebels weak in Auguft; ingenuity in vindicating mifconduct; Bennington; General Frazer againft it; General Burgoyne's reply; firft miftake; then a fecond; both parties retreat; the German cannon not taken by the rebels for four days; new mode of juftification.

REVIEW of the WAR. Effrontery and malignity of public delinquents; lofs at Bunkers hill by defpifing fituation; fecret hiftory of the capitulation at Boflon; 100 cannon, 100 fhips, and two years fupply of linens and woollens abandoned; Howe wifhes to be attacked; is attacked and flies; receives mortifying difpatches in his flight; curious opinions of General Howe and Admiral Graves for and againft reinforcing Quebec; conduct and character of Lord and General Howe; intereffing military particulars of Brooklyn battle; Gen Robertfon palliates General Howe's conduct; our odd fituation on Frog's Neck; ridiculous obftinacy; Clergyman murdered; our defeat at Trenton; dead Rhall blamed; the evidence dead Donop; General Howe nearly taken prifoner; General Vaughan not for nurfing a rebellion; gloom and refentment of the army on fhipping them to the fouthward; defpondence and execration at New York on deferting Burgoyne; the army in fetters at Philadelphia; the Brandywine manœuvres from Saxe's Reveries; Saxe's opinion of Generals who neglect decifive opportunities; individuals from the army reach Philadelphia the night of the battle; our army only in 15 days; hears of Burgoyne's ruin; inftantly retreats and writes to be recalled; enumeration of our loffes and difficulties; a radical weakneff in the conftitution of the ftate or in the minds of the people.

EVIDENCE

RESPECTING THE

American War, &c.

IN the following evidence the queſtions are moſtly omitted, as they would extend this work to a great bulk; yet whenever it is requiſite for the more clearly underſtanding the anſwers, they are inſerted.

May 6th, 1779.

Committee of the HOUSE *of* COMMONS *to examine into the conduct of Sir William Howe, Lord Howe, and General Burgoyne,*

FREDERICK MONTAGUE, Eſq; in the Chair.

EARL CORNWALLIS.

Examined by Sir William Howe.

I am happy to take this public opportunity to declare my great regard and veneration for the character of Sir William Howe, I think he has deſerved greatly of his country; I think he has ſerved his country with fidelity, aſſiduity, and with great ability. After having given this public teſtimony of my opinion of the General's conduct, I beg this Houſe will underſtand that I do not come here to anſwer queſtions of opinion, but merely queſtions of matter of fact; the private opinions of a ſubordinate officer can give very little ſatisfaction to this Houſe; they may poſſibly not do juſtice to the character of the honourable General, or my own. I therefore truſt in the candour of this Houſe, that they will put no queſtions to me, but ſuch as relate to matter of fact.

L. C's high character of G. H.

Will not anſwer queſt. of opinion.

The knowledge of the face of the country of America, for military purpoſes, extremely difficult to be obtained from the inhabitants.

America in a military view.

The country in general ſo covered with wood, and ſo favour-

able to ambuſcades, that but an imperfect knowledge of it can be obtained from reconnoitering.

I never ſaw a ſtronger country, or one better calculated for the defenſive.

The movements of the King's army much embarraſſed and retarded by the difficulty of getting proviſions when in the field, and from the cloſeneſs of the country.

On the left at the bat. of Brooklyn

I did not ſee the enemy's lines at Brooklyn during the action 27th Auguſt 1776 with any accuracy; I was on the left with the ſecond battalion of grenadiers, and could form no judgment.

I never did hear it ſuggeſted by any one that thoſe lines could have been carried by aſſault.

It was univerſally ſuppoſed that the enemy's principal ſtrength was at that time on York Iſland.

I do not know that any time was loſt in making preparations for the landing on York Iſland: the preparations were of a complicated nature, and depended, in ſome degree, on the naval department.

No delay in the motions of the army.

I did obſerve no avoidable delay, prior to the movement of the army from York Iſland; and from the particular employment I had at that time in ſuperintending the works thrown up for the defenſive army that was to remain on York Iſland, I think there was no avoidable delay.

Will not diſcov. G. H's reaſons for not attacking the rebels at White Plains.

I was acquainted with Sir William Howe's reaſons for not attacking the enemy's entrenchments at White Plains on the 28th October, after the defeat of the corps on the enemy's right.

From political motives it is impoſſible either for the General or myſelf to explain thoſe reaſons. If they could be explained to the Houſe, it muſt appear evidently that the attack was impoſſible.

The country in the rear of the enemy did appear very ſtrong.

I am on the preſent occaſion free to ſay, that I could not have purſued the enemy from Brunſwick with any proſpect of material advantage, or without greatly diſtreſſing the troops under my command.

Delaware not fordable and no boats to paſs.

The night that the General arrived at Trenton, he detached me with a conſiderable corps of troops from Maidenhead to Corriel's Ferry, where we had ſome hopes, from previous meaſures taken by the General, that we ſhould have found boats to croſs the river; our expectations were diſappointed, and we found no boats.

As the Delaware was not fordable, and we could get no boats, it was certainly impracticable to croſs at that time.

Adviſes taking poſt at Trenton.

As I believe that I was the perſon that firſt ſuggeſted the idea to the General of taking Trenton and Burdenton into the chain of his cantonments, I think myſelf in honour bound to anſwer for it. The advantage that muſt naturally ariſe from holding ſo large a part of the Jerſeys, the great encouragement we met with

with from the inhabitants, *three* or *four hundred* of whom came in and took the oaths *every day for at leaſt ten days*, the great advantage we ſhould derive from obtaining forage and proviſions, made me think it adviſeable to riſk that extended cantonment. Human prudence could not foreſee the fatal event of the ſurrender of Colonel Rhall's brigade. I apprehended no danger, but the chance of having our quarters beat up in the winter, and the object in my opinion, towards finiſhing the war, was of greater conſequence than two or three victories. In regard to what the General mentions of poſting the Heſſians on the left of the cantonments, I muſt ſay, I ever had, and ſtill have the higheſt opinion of thoſe brave troops. The misfortune at Trenton was owing entirely to the imprudence and negligence of the commanding officer; on all other occaſions the troops ever have behaved, and I dare ſay ever will behave, with the greateſt courage and intrepidity. The behaviour on the attack of Fort Waſhington of this very brigade of Colonel Rhall's, was the admiration of the whole army.

Near 4000 take the oaths.

Negligence of Rhall cauſe of the defeat.

Sir William Howe, in the beginning of the campaign 1777, took great pains to inform himſelf of the ſituation of the enemy's camp at Middle Brook, and the intelligence he received was by no means encouraging.

Diſcouraging intelligence.

There were certainly many ſolid reaſons againſt attempting the paſſage of the Delaware through Jerſey at that time.

I did not obſerve any unneceſſary delay in moving the army from the Jerſeys, for the embarkation from Staten Iſland.

I think we embarked three or four days after we arrived, and we could not have embarked ſooner.

As any reference to any private conferences or conſultations that I was honoured with by Sir William Howe, may involve me in matters of great intricacy, I muſt decline giving any evidence to this houſe concerning it.

Will not ſtate his conſultations with G. Howe.

Q. Did not the expedition to Pennſylvania prove a powerful diverſion in favour of the Northern army.

A. I likewiſe apprehend that to be a matter of opinion, and decline anſwering it.

Nor ſay moving to Penn. a diverſion in favour of Burgoyne.

Q. Whether the rebel main army did not march into Pennſylvania to oppoſe the corps on that ſervice?

A. I apprehend the main army did; that is, the army commanded by General Waſhington, and it was underſtood the greateſt part, if not the whole, did.

I recollect hearing that a body of about two thouſand men marched from the high lands under the command of the rebel general Maxwell, to reinforce General Waſhington's army immediately after the battle of Brandywine.

The manœuvre that brought on the action at Brandywine, certainly reflects the higheſt honour on the General; as I have already refuſed to inform this Houſe whether I concurred in

His concurrence at the Brandw.

other operations, I have no right to take any merit from concurring in this.

The Schuylkill is not fordable by the Derby route; and as we underſtood that the bridge was broke, it would not have been very eaſy to have paſſed there.

C. Donop's deſire to diſtinguiſh himſelf.

Soon after the army landed at the head of the Elke, Colonel Donop wrote to me to deſire me to repreſent to the General that he thought he had not been ſufficiently conſidered, that he had no ſeparate command, and conſequently had no opportunity of diſtinguiſhing himſelf: Sir William Howe then, I think, directed me to aſſure him, that he would take the firſt opportunity of giving him a ſuitable ſeparate command.

His orders diſcretionary.

I had the honour of communicating to Colonel Donop, Sir William Howe's orders for the attack of Red Bank, and they were entirely diſcretionary.

Colonel Donop appeared to me perfectly ſatisfied with his orders, and much pleaſed with his command.

I never heard Lieutenant General Knyphauſen was diſſatisfied with the orders given to Colonel Donop.

Colonel Stirling, who croſſed the Delaware at Cheſter with three battalions, to take poſſeſſion of Billingſport, was directed by the General to make his report to me at Philadelphia; he repreſented to me that he could not proceed to Red Bank without a conſiderable reinforcement.

Rains retard attack on Mud Iſl.

We were much retarded in the attack of the fort on Mud Iſland by an extraordinary ſtorm of rain, which broke down the dykes, and did great damage to the works.

Q. Does your Lordſhip recollect any inſtance of Sir William Howe's omitting any opportunity of attacking the enemy when it could be done with a reaſonable proſpect of advantage, conſidering all reſpective ſituations and circumſtances at the time?

Clears G. H. of any omiſſions.

A. I have already, and I hope very fully, declared to this Houſe the high opinion I entertained of that honourable gentleman; I ſhould not have entertained that opinion of him, if he had been guilty of any ſuch omiſſions.

Examined by Lord Howe.

When I mentioned that the operation of landing on York Iſland depended in a great meaſure on the naval department, I did not I am ſure mean to hint, that there was any unneceſſary delay in that department; I can with truth aſſure the Houſe, that during the whole time that that noble Lord commanded the naval department in America, as well whilſt Sir William Howe commanded the army as afterwards, the troops met with all poſſible aſſiſtance and co-operation from the navy, and that the greateſt harmony ſubſiſted between them, and that that noble Lord's character cannot be more revered by the ſeamen, than it is by the ſoldiers of the American army. The reaſon

Great character of Lord Howe.

for

for my having mentioned the naval department before, was, that I was not a competent judge.

Examined by other members of the Committee.

Q. Were the lines at Brooklyn, after General Clinton had turned the left of the enemy, and got into their rear, and was advancing to the enemy's lines, were they manned, or was the enemy retiring from them?

A. As I was not with Sir Henry Clinton, I cannot anſwer that queſtion. I never heard that the enemy were retiring. At Brookl. never heard the enemy were retiring.

Q. Was there a poſſibility of getting behind the enemies lines without forcing them? *A.* Undoubtedly not.

I do not know whether the enemy's lines at Brooklyn were complete; I have already ſaid I did not ſee them during the action. I was detached to Newtown, and had no opportunity of going to Brooklyn till the lines were nearly demoliſhed.

I cannot tell the ſtrength of the enemies lines as to numbers. It was reported they had ſix or eight thouſand men on Long Iſland. 6 or 8000 of the enemy at battle of Brooklyn.

I really do not know the principal ſtrength of the enemy on York Iſland more than commmon report.

Q. In what reſpect would the purſuit of the enemy from Brunſwick have diſtreſſed the troops under your command?

A. We arrived at Brunſwick the night of the firſt of December: we had marched that day twenty miles through exceeding bad roads: we ſubſiſted only on the flour we found in the country: and, as the troops had been conſtantly marching ever ſince their firſt entry into the Jerſeys, they had no time to bake their flour: the artillery horſes and baggage horſes of the army were quite tired: that ſufficiently proves we were not in a good condition to undertake a long march. The bridge over the Rariton was broken, which cauſed a neceſſary delay of one day: if the enemy could not have paſſed at Trenton, they might have marched down the eaſt ſide of the Delaware. What I have ſaid I believe is ſufficient to prove that we could not reap any conſiderable advantage from ſuch a purſuit. Reaſons for diſcontinuing purſuit at Brunſw.

I took no notes or memorandums of troops that arrived the firſt day at Brunſwick. I think two battalions of the light infantry, two battalions of Britiſh grenadiers, three battalions of Heſſian grenadiers, and I believe the forty ſecond and thirty third regiments, but I am not quite clear. The fourth brigade under General Grant were halted at Bonham Town, about ſeven miles in our rear. There were likewiſe two companies of Heſſian Yagers, and the ſixteenth regiment of light dragoons. I do remember Colonel Griffin, an Adjutant General of the rebel army met me on the march, and I was unwilling he ſhould ſee the troops as they were ſo few. L. Cornw. corps 9 battalions.

Q. Were

Could have gone on before the 6th

Q. Were the troops under the command of your Lordſhip in a condition to have marched forward before the ſixth?

A. The troops would have been ſo undoubtedly.

Q. At what hour on the ſeventh did the King's troops reach Prince Town?

A. The left column came an hour before ſunſet, the ſecond column between nine and ten at night.

I underſtand, I cannot ſpeak with certainty, that a detachment of the enemy quitted Prince Town that morning, what time I do not know.

Enemy no artillery or baggage.

I do not know what the number of the enemy was; they were repreſented to us to be without artillery or baggage. The number of the King's troops I do not recollect, it may eaſily be aſcertained if material.

I cannot ſpeak as to the enemy's rear guard paſſing the Delaware on the 8th; they kept a ſmall detachment in Trenton till our troops got near it. I do not apprehend the enemy's rear guard was in any danger from our troops that day.

Q. What was the impediment to purſuing the march from Brunſwick, as your Lordſhip ſays the troops were undoubtedly able before the ſixth?

A. As the enemy had ſo much the ſtart of us, I do not ſee there was any great object for the march. We wanted reinforcement in order to leave troops for the communication between Brunſwick and Amboy. It was likeways neceſſary to pay ſome attention to a conſiderable body of troops then paſſing the North River under General Lee.

Knew of no promiſes to G. Howe from Pennſylv.

I did not know of any offers or promiſes of any of the chiefs, or men of conſiderable intereſt among the rebels in Pennſylvania, made to General Howe on or about the 20th December 1776, for furniſhing him with any aid or aſſiſtance, in caſe of his entering Pennſylvania with his army.

No friendly diſpoſition there to Great Britain.

I knew of no circumſtances exiſting on or about the 20th December 1776, which could warrant a confidence of a peaceable or friendly diſpoſition in any very conſiderable part of the Pennſylvanians towards Great Britain.

I can only ſay that America is a very ſtrong country, very rugged, very hilly, and very woody.

This deſcription not equally applicable to all parts of the country in which I have ſerved, but in ſome degree to all.

I had very little opportunity of knowing any thing about the raiſing the provincial troops.

Sound 1000 or 1200 yards wide

I believe the breadth of the ſound between Long Iſland and New York was about a thouſand or twelve hundred yards. I can ſpeak with no accuracy.

The army was encamped a little out of cannon ſhot of the lines after the action. I know of no place where they could have

have taken poſt ſo as to diſcern what was paſſing at Brooklyn Ferry.

Q. Has your Lordſhip not heard as a fact, that Sir Henry Clinton declared that he did not believe ſuch a movement as Sir William Howe's carrying the army ſouthward *poſſible*, and that he took the communication of it, when made to him, as a feint to cover ſome deſign either to the eaſtward or up the North River.

Aſked if Sir H. C. was not againſt the Penn. exped.

A. I never heard that Sir William Howe aſked any public opinion of Sir Henry Clinton, and I do not think this a proper place to repeat private converſations in.

Will not give priv. converſat.

I have been twice up and down the Delaware, but both times in the night.

The army was well ſupplied with proviſions on the march from the head of the Elk to Philadelphia, partly by what was carried in the proviſion train, and partly by the cattle and flour we found in the country.

We received no proviſion from the Delaware till the army had reached Philadelphia.

Q. Whether the lines at Brooklyn on the left were brought down ſo near the water's edge as to preclude the paſſage of the troops between the ſhore and the lines, ſo as to come on the back of the lines?

A. I have ſaid I know ſo little of the lines at Brooklyn, that I can ſay nothing with accuracy about them; but I believe I can with certainty ſay, that there was no ſuch opening as the queſtion ſuppoſes.

No opening on the left of the rebel lines at Brooklyn.

As the order for the attack of Red Bank was given verbally, it is impoſſible to recollect all the words exactly. I recollect perfectly well that I began with telling Colonel Donop that Sir William Howe by no means wiſhed him to ſacrifice the troops under his command; that if he found the Red Bank could not eaſily be carried, that he would give notice to Sir William Howe, and that proper meaſures ſhould be taken to ſend him reinforcements and artillery; that if he found that Red Bank could be eaſily carried by aſſault, that the General was very deſirous of putting an end to that buſineſs, and wiſhed him to *bruſquer l'affaire*: I believe this was nearly what I told him, I told it to Sir William Howe the ſame evening.

Orders to Donop not to ſacrifice the troops yet to BRUSQUER L'AFFAIRE.

Q. How near were the thirty third regiment and the grenadiers to the enemies lines at Brooklyn.

A. I have already ſaid I was on the left with the ſecond battalion of grenadiers, and therefore cannot anſwer that.

Q. Whether the grenadiers and the thirty third regiment did not purſue the enemy ſo cloſe to their redoubt, that it required repeated orders to prevail on them to deſiſt from taking it by ſtorm?

Does not know grenadiers &c. were called off.

A. I have already ſaid that I do not know. There is an honourable

nourable member preſent who commanded one of theſe battalions, he can anſwer it: Colonel Stuart.

A ſtorm prevents an attack on the enemy.

After the enemy fell back to the heighths near North Caſtle, they left an advanced corps on the heighths of the White Plains; there were orders given for an attack of that corps, which was prevented by a violent rain. We did not lay upon our arms.

I do not apprehend that the attack was prevented by the ſtorm of rain being in either of our faces; there are other effects of a ſtorm of rain, ſuch as ſpoiling the roads, and preventing the drawing the artillery up ſteep hills.

Q. Whether if the powder was wet on both ſides, the attack might not have been made with bayonets?

A. I do not recollect that I ſaid the powder was wet.

Q. Whether you knew before the ſailing from Sandy Hook of any letter received by Sir William Howe from General Burgoyne?

G. Howe made no public communication of G. Burgoyne's letter.

A. General Howe made no public communication to me of any ſuch letter; I include all letters privately ſhewn to me under the idea of conferences and conſultations.

Q. Has not the war been a war of poſts?

A. I apprehend the hiſtory of the war will anſwer that queſtion.

On a war of poſts

Q. Whether a war of poſts is not tedious and expenſive?

A. I apprehend this to be a general propoſition, which the honourable Gentleman, as a member of this Aſſembly may anſwer as well as I.

Q. How many days proviſions could the troops carry without inconvenience, each ſoldier on his back?

Men carry 3 or 4 days proviſ. on their backs.

A. We generally carried three, it might poſſibly be, on particular occaſions, four.

Q. How many days proviſions could be carried for the army in the beginning of the year 1777, by land carriage, waggons and horſes only?

In waggons, 22 days rum, 6 days pork, 12 or 14 days bread.

A. I cannot anſwer that queſtion with preciſion; we could carry more in Penſylvania, becauſe we truſted there to find flour and cattle in the country. I think in Penſylvania we carried about twenty two days rum, about ſix days pork, and twelve or fourteen days bread. In the Jerſeys we ſhould have been obliged to carry a larger proportion of meat, conſequently a ſmaller proportion of bread and rum.

Q. Whether your Lordſhip ſees any proſpect of an end to this war, with the force now employed on that ſervice?

A. I cannot ſuppoſe the honourable Gentleman really expects that I ſhould anſwer the laſt queſtion.

Refuſes again G. H's reaſons againſt attacking

[Then the former part of Lord Cornwallis's evidence, in which he ſaid, that from political motives it was impoſſible, either for the General or himſelf, to explain the reaſons for [illegible] the attack at the White Plains on the 28th of October,

ber, was read; and being aſked what he meant by political motives? his Lordſhip ſaid, what I call political reaſons relates to no orders from hence, or any thing in which Engliſh politics are concerned; perhaps the word political is not a proper one, but I do not know what word to ſubſtitute in its place.

Q. Did the Heſſian infantry refuſe to charge? Did the Heſſians refuſe to charge.

A. In anſwer to this queſtion, I muſt again repeat the higheſt encomiums on the valour of the Heſſian troops; on that particular day the regiment of Loſberg, one of Colonel Rhall's brigade, greatly diſtinguiſhed itſelf. I cannot ſatisfy the honourable Gentleman's curioſity, but I will venture to aſſure him upon my honour, that if he knew the reaſons he would be perfectly ſatisfied. Does not anſwer the queſtion, but praiſes the Heſſ.

Q. In what ſort of opinion, and in what ſort of character did Sir William Howe ſtand in with the officers and ſoldiers of his army?

A. Sir William Howe was highly eſteemed by the officers and ſoldiers of his army. Gen. H. eſteem'd by the army.

Q. Do you know what reinforcements were demanded by the General for the year 1777?

A. I know nothing of any requiſitions made by the General, nor of his correſpondence till it came on this table.

Q. Did you ſtop at Brunſwick from the firſt to the ſixth in conſequence of orders?

A. I underſtood it to be the General's directions that I ſhould halt at Brunſwick; but had I ſeen that I could have ſtruck a material ſtroke by moving forward, I certainly ſhould have taken upon me to have done it. G. H's orders to halt at Brunſw.

Q. Did you receive no orders after you arrived at Brunſwick?

A. I had a conſtant correſpondence with Sir William Howe; I reported my ſituation to him, and from time to time received his directions.

Q. Did you receive any reinforcement between the firſt and the ſixth at Brunſwick? *A.* I think not.

Q. Was it in conſequence of orders that you marched on after the ſixth?

A. Sir William Howe came up to join me on the ſixth with the fourth brigade, and then I went on under his orders. Gen. H. joins him the 6th.

Q. Whether Sir William Howe conſulted with you on his expedition to Philadelphia?

A. I apprehend I have given a ſatisfactory anſwer to that queſtion in the former part of my evidence.

MAJOR-GENERAL GREY.

He was indulged with a chair, without the bar; and on the firſt queſtion being put to him, ſaid he looked upon himſelf General Grey called in.

bound upon every principle of juſtice, to give anſwers to queſtions of opinion as well as fact.

The difficulty, danger, trouble, and expence of military operations in Amer.

Said the country of America differed from every other he ever ſaw; it was the moſt difficult to make war in; it was full of hills and paſſes, covered with woods and interſected by numerous and rapid rivers; that from the nature of the country, and the diſpoſition of the inhabitants, it was impoſſible to obtain that degree of intelligence neceſſary to carry on military operations with ſucceſs; and, in ſhort, a war there to ſucceed, muſt be a war of poſts, carried on by very ſuperior numbers, and at a very enormous expence, and with infinite trouble, hazard, and danger.

Arrived June 5, reaſons for not open. the campaign earlier.

He arrived at New-York on the 5th of June, 1777, and joined the grand army in a day or two after. The campaign could not be opened earlier for two reaſons; becauſe kettles, cantines, and tents were wanting, each of which were extremely neceſſary, in order to preſerve the health and ſpirits of the army; yet ſuch was the ardour and zeal of the troops, that even thoſe difficulties might be got over; but by all he could learn from his ſervice in Germany, and elſewhere, the field could not be properly taken till the ground was covered with verdure.

The S. expedition preferable to the North River.

He thought that the ſouthern operations were much preferable to removing the ſeat of war to the banks of the North River, in order to co-operate with the Canada army; his principal reaſons were, that Waſhington would either have ſent ſo great a force to the Highlands, as muſt have engaged Sir William's *whole attention*, and have prevented him from forming a junction with General Burgoyne; or ſuppoſing that the Commander in Chief would have been able to have forced his way through the Highlands to Albany, then Waſhington would have been enabled to totally cut him off from his communication with New-York, and with his magazines, proviſions, recruits, &c. Nay it was more than poſſible, it was probable, that Waſhington would have been able to retard his progreſs through the Highlands, by a proper diſtribution of his force, and at the ſame time cut off his communication with the water-ſide. But taking the matter as one uniform meaſure, on the part of Waſhington, that of preventing a junction, Sir William Howe muſt have divided his force, ſo as to have commanded both ſides of the North River. If one bank was in poſſeſſion of Waſhington no ſupplies could come up, or follow the army with ſafety; and if the Britiſh force was divided, it would have been a moſt dangerous ſituation for either part; which, in that event, would have to contend with the whole of the grand rebel army: ſo that conſidering it in any or either light, the meaſure was big with hazard and danger; and if adopted would have portended ruin; whether the whole of the rebel army took ſtrong poſts in the Highlands; whether it poſſeſſed itſelf of one bank of the river;

whether

whether it took a poſition between the main army and New-York; or whether a reſiſtance in the Highlands, and the intercepting the ſupplies from the water ſide, ſhould be adopted as a mixed meaſure. Waſhington had one bank of the North River open to him; he might paſs at King's Ferry, and take his option on either bank; and he might, whenever he pleaſed fall back into the cultivated country, where he could have every ſupply of proviſions he wanted; while the Britiſh army muſt be obliged to depend upon the precarious ſupply from New-York.

The above was the ſubſtance of two hours examination. On the expedition to Pennſylvania, for the reaſons already given, though not conſulted by the General, he ſaid, it was in every point of view the moſt eligible. The attack at Middlebrook was utterly impracticable with any proſpect of advantage: the native ſtrength of the country, the innumerable number of poſts and defences which it preſented, forbid any ſuch attempt; and the making our way to Philadelphia, without giving a deciſive defeat to Waſhington, muſt have been the laſt ſtage of fool hardineſs.

Attack at Middlebr. impractic.

No time was loſt till the embarkation at Staten Iſland took place; and the only probable means of ſucceſs was to land at the head of the Elk in Cheſapeak, and not attempt the Delaware.

Better to land in Elke than Dela.

Had we landed at Newcaſtle in the Delaware, we would have had much more numerous difficulties to encounter with. If we landed higher, the attempt would be attended with imminent danger, nor could we have forced our way, or ventured to meet the annoyance and actual obſtruction we ſhould have meet with from gallies, fire-rafts, fire-ſhips, from ſtrong tides and rapid ſtreams, which conveyed down a rapid ſtream, would render our whole tranſport fleet ſubject to a conflagration; beſides, while the enemy, ſuppoſing we had been able to effect a landing, would lie upon our left flank, our right next the river would lie expoſed to the fire of the enemy's frigates and gallies. In this route too we ſhould have nine creeks and rapid ſtreams to paſs, every one of which we avoided by landing at Elke, and marching round the head of them.

Imminent danger if they land in the Delaware.

He gave an account of the manœuvres that brought on the attack at Brandywine, which he extolled as the greateſt he ever knew; and ſpoke to every ſubſequent ſtep, which had been taken as long as the General retained his command in terms equally warm and commendatory.

Greatneſs of the manœv. at Brand.

From the circumſtances ſo often repeated by him, he was of opinion, that all had been done which could be expected from the higheſt exertions of military ſkill, wiſdom, and zeal for the ſervice; and aſſirmed, that it was impoſſible for ſuch a force to ſucceed in the ſubduing of America. It was totally unequal and inadequate to the taſk, and carried diſappoint-

Milit. ſkill, wiſdom and zeal of G. Howe.

ment and want of ſucceſs in the very principle of it; nor did he now think the conqueſt of America was practicable with any force we could ſend. The force in 1777 and 1778, was inadequate for the effecting that purpoſe; the force of 1779 was likewiſe ſo. Being aſked whether he thought 6000 recruits, and the troops at St. Lucia, if recalled, along with the force now under Sir Henry Clinton, would be equal? He replied not, nor any other force we could ſpare from the home defence, or that of our dependencies and diſtant poſſeſſions.

Force in 1777, 78, and 79 inadequate, nor any force we could ſpare equal to the conq. of Amer.

Attack at Vall. Forge impractic.

An attack upon Waſhington at Valley Forge was impracticable; the enemy were too much in force, and too advantageouſly poſted. The Provincials were not a contemptible enemy; they had given repeated proofs of their ſkill and bravery. A ſingle defeat availed very little over ſuch a people in ſuch a country, almoſt united as they were, and a better proof need not be given than that after the defeat at Brandy-wine, drove as they were from the capital, they had the confidence to attack a victorious army, in a few days after they had loſt every advantage then enjoyed by a conquering enemy.

Armies in Penn. 16,000 each.

He ſtated the force under Sir William Howe and Waſhington, as to veteran troops, to be nearly equal, about 16,000 each, beſides the Provincial militia. Being aſked by Lord North what they were reſpectively at the engagement in the Jerſies? He replied, that the rebel force which attacked Sir Henry Clinton, was from 4 to 6000 men.

Clinton attack'd by 6000 under Lee.

Q. What was the whole force if it had come up?

A. About 14,000; 6000 under General Lee, and 8000, the main body, under Waſhington, which did not engage.

SIR ANDREW SNAPE HAMMOND.

May 11th, 1779.

Sir A. S. Hammond, Capt. in the Navy, call'd in; danger of landing in the Delaware.

Sir A. Snape Hammond's examination was chiefly confined to the eligibility of debarking the grand army, under Sir William Howe, in ſome part of the Delaware, in preference to going round by Cheſapeak, and landing at the head of the Elke.

After he had been at the bar upwards of an hour, and was preparing to retire from it, Sir Richard Sutton, Mr. Eden, and Governor Johnſtone, put a great number of queſtions to him, particularly reſpecting the rapidity of the tides in the Delaware, and the ability of being able to make a landing good near Newcaſtle, or higher up. He was clear he ſaid, that the army muſt have met with very ſingular, if not inſurmountable difficulties, in one event; and if they attempted a deſcent nearer to the town, the whole fleet would have been expoſed to the gallies, fire-rafts, and fire-ſhips; which, favoured by the wind, and by the rapidity of the ſtream, might, in ſpite of the greateſt efforts,

efforts to the contrary, prove the deſtruction of the whole fleet. He declined to anſwer ſeveral queſtions of opinion put to him, relative to the operations upon land. His examination was very favourable to Sir William Howe; and in the courſe of it he took frequent opportunities of paying the higheſt compliments to the great zeal, good conduct, and profeſſional ability of the noble Lord his brother.

Highly compli. Lord Howe.

CAPTAIN MONTRESOR.

At half after ſeven o'clock, Capt. Montreſor, who acted as chief engineer in America was called; and, as it is impoſſible to follow the infinity of queſtions that were put to him, we ſhall juſt ſtate the particular ſubjects on which he was interrogated.

Capt. Montreſor called in.

On the lines on Long-Iſland, he ſaid, they were ſo very ſtrong, that the morning they were evacuated, it was with great difficulty that he and a corporal's patrole, of ſix men, could get into them to view them. They were finely deſigned, ſo were all the works he ſaw raiſed by the rebels, but not judiciouſly executed. The works could not be taken by aſſault or ſtorm; they called, from their nature, for regular approaches. It would be a forlorn hope to commit naked men to ſtorm redoubts, without faſcines, ſcaling ladders, &c. If they had attempted, and got poſſeſſion of the intermediate part of the lines, they could not live an inſtant in them, ſo long as the redoubts on the flanks were held by the enemy. They extended in front about two thouſand yards, from the ſwamp on the left to the water. It was aſked, if the 33d regiment and grenadiers of the army, might have penetrated? he ſaid, there was not room for a ſingle man to paſs between the end of the line and the ſwamp: but if the ſwamp had not been impaſſable, there would be no living for naked troops, under the fire of the redoubt. The lines were evacuated on the night of the 28th, and he diſcovered it at four o'clock the next morning with the patrole already mentioned. He ſaw the rear embarking, and ſeveral boats (four or five) paſſing over to York-Iſland. The bringing up faſcines, ladders, &c. would have been the work of ſome hours; and if they were at hand, did not think that the lines could be taken by aſſault without hazarding a defeat, or at leaſt purchaſing victory very dearly, and by a great loſs of lives: nor in any way, in his opinion, but by regular approaches.

Lines on Long Iſland finely deſigned; very ſtr. danger of ſtorming them; not to be taken aſſault.

Relative to Waſhington's poſition in the mountain above Quibbleton, he did not think it adviſeable to force his camp. He did not pretend to be a judge; but, as far as the knowledge of the particular part of the military profeſſion he was bred to, enabled him to give an opinion, he thought the riſk and danger greatly outweighed the probability of ſucceſs. He had been

Riſk of attack. at Quibbleton.

been to reconnoitre the rebel camp on the mountain, at two miles diſtance; and though he could not particularly deſcribe the ground, he looked upon it to be a very ſtrong natural fortreſs, rendered ſtill more ſo by art. The General could take no new poſition, to draw Waſhington from his camp, without manifeſt hazard; the expoſing of New-York, or of being cut off from his communication both with that city and the North River.

Did not know N. River naviga.

He did not know the navigation of the North River. Waſhington might paſs over at King's-ferry. The Highlands were impenetrable, if defended by an enemy in force. Waſhington could not paſs at King's-ferry, if both banks were in our poſſeſſion; nor could operations be carried up the river, if the Britiſh had not poſſeſſion of both banks, which would of courſe amount to the temporary loſs of one half the army; operations up the North River, in order to keep open the commucation with the fleet and New-York, would have weakened the grand army greatly; and the loſs of one important poſt in the line of poſts and commucations might, in ſome events, be the loſs of the whole, and the army be thereby cut off from all ſupplies.

Impracticable to penetrate from Middlebrook or Quibble. to Red Bank on the Delaw. diſt. 45 mil.

It was about 45 miles from Middlebrook and Quibbleton to Red-Bank: it was impracticable to penetrate that way; and if it were not the enemy would have it in their power to take a ſtronger poſition for the defence of Philadelphia.

Red Bank well-conſtruct. width of the Delaware

Red-Bank was judiciouſly planned, well-conſtructed, and the attack of it, while Waſhington was hanging on our rear and flanks, would force the grand army into a ſituation, perhaps, extremely dangerous, both reſpecting proviſions, and being compelled to fight upon very diſadvantageous terms. Mud-Iſland covered the environs next the river; the Delaware was there 2600 yards wide; 1700 from the Jerſey ſide to Mud-Iſland, and 900 from the iſland ſide to the main land, on the other ſide. Red-Bank had been reconnoitered; he thought, till Red-Bank was taken, it would not be adviſeable to land the troops high up the river. He was not Engineer-General; his rank was that of Captain, and he only acted without pay, in the abſence of Major Dixon.

CAPTAIN ROBERT M'KENZIE.

Private Secretary to Sir William Howe.

May 18*th*, 1779.

Saw a letter from G. Burgoyne to G. Howe, received at New-York, July 15, and the Anſwer.

He was aſked whether he had ever ſeen a letter from General Burgoyne to Sir William Howe?—Anſwered, he had ſeen one, dated Tinconderoga, July 2, 1777, and received July the 15th at New-York, the day but one before the grand army embarked for the ſouthward.

Q. Whether he had ſeen the anſwer?

A. He

A. He had; dated July the 16th from New-York.

Q. Had he ſeen a letter dated New-York, July the 25th, and written by Sir Henry Clinton to Sir William Howe?

A. Had ſeen a letter from aboard the Eagle, in the Delaware, from Sir William Howe to Sir Henry Clinton, dated July the 30th.

Produced the letters alluded to, and being aſked whether they were copies or extracts?---Anſwered, No. 1 and 2 were originals; the letter from Sir Henry Clinton was an extract copy; and the letter from Sir William Howe was a copy. The letters, extract, and copy, delivered in at the table, and read by the Clerk.

The letter from General Burgoyne contained an account of his arrival and capture of Ticonderoga, and of his intention of proceeding on for Albany as ſoon as the neceſſary ſteps were taken for that purpoſe; referring more at large for his plan of operations to his letter from Plymouth, dated March 26, and another from Quebec, dated May the 16th.

G. H's. Anſw.

Gen. Howe's anſwer was, that he was then preparing for an expedition to the ſouthward; that he underſtood that Putnam was at the head of 4000 men in the Highlands; but that he would leave direction with Sir Henry Clinton, who was to command in his abſence, to give him every aſſiſtance in his power.

Gen. Clinton's Letters.

Sir Henry Clinton's letter to Sir William Howe contained an account, that he underſtood that Waſhington was in the neighbourhood of Morris-town, in order to cover Philadelphia; that ——— in ———, an officer in the rebel army, was a great rogue, but was the more likely to be of ſervice to him.

G. H's. anſw. to make a diverſion in favour of G. Burgoyne.

Sir William Howe's anſwer was, that he would take proper notice of his information; and deſiring Sir Henry to do every thing in his power by making a diverſion in the Highlands to favour the operations of General Burgoyne; and to enable him the better to perform this ſervice, he told him he might, if he thought proper to withdraw the twelve hundred regulars ſtationed on Long Iſland, and leave the defence of it to the Provincial corps.

SIR GEORGE OSBORNE.

Muſter-Maſter General.

Col. Oſborne called in, G. H. at German-to. informs him when he'll be attack'd

He ſaid, that on the evening before the battle of German Town, having the command of the grenadiers and light infantry of the guards, Sir William Howe came to him in the houſe where he was poſted, and told him to move forwards and take poſt about half a mile towards the enemy, for that the rebels would make an attack at ſuch an hour next morning. He poſted

poſted himſelf accordingly, and was attacked much about the hour Sir William Howe informed him.

Strongly in favour of G. H.

He went through a very long examination, in the courſe of which he ſeemed extremely favourable to the Commander in Chief, and returned very dry anſwers to thoſe who interrogated him on the part of adminiſtration, particularly to Mr. Eden, Sir Richard Sutton, and Governor Johnſtone. Among other very ſtrong circumſtances in Sir W. Howe's favour, he related a converſation which paſſed between him and Col. Donop, in which that officer told him that the General gave it to him in orders to direct Col. Rhall to raiſe defences, and fortify a houſe or houſes at Trenton; that in caſe an attack ſhould be made on that poſt by the rebels, the brigade ſhould be able to defend themſelves till reinforced from Burdenton by Colonel Donop. Donop ſaid that Rhall had neglected to obey the orders which he had conveyed to him from the General, and that was the cauſe of the fatal ſurprize and diſaſter which afterwards followed.

Rhall's neglect and diſobedience the cauſe of his defeat.

General Howe then acquainted the Houſe, that he had cloſed his evidence for the preſent, but that he meant, ſhould he think it neceſſary to bring other witneſſes hereafter, to move for having them called, in order to be examined.

SIR GUY CARLETON.

Reſpecting General Burgoyne.

Q. Whether he thought that the Canada expedition was to be executed peremptorily for forcing the way to Albany?

Will not anſw. if G. Burgoyne's orders were peremptory.

A. That was a matter of opinion which he did not think himſelf obliged to anſwer.

Q. Whether he thought the train of heavy or field artillery diſproportioned to the ſervice?

A. He could not ſay any thing reſpecting that, becauſe he was unacquainted with the ſervice to be performed after paſſing Ticonderoga; but he was inclined to think that an heavy train was neceſſary till Ticonderoga was reduced, and put into a tenable ſtate.

On the train of artillery.

Q. Whether the heavy train was not the ſame as accompanied the army, when the witneſs commanded the expedition in 1776? *A.* He believed it was.

Q. Whether the arrangement of both trains was not formed in concert with General Phillips?

A. He believed it might within the province, but could not ſay what paſſed upon the ſubject, after the Generals had taken poſſeſſion of Ticonderago.

Q. Did not the witneſs think that the field train deſcribed by the Hon. General was neceſſary to the effecting the operations he was charged with?

A. He

A. He could give no direct opinion, as that muſt have depended upon circumſtances with which he profeſſed himſelf entirely unacquainted.

Q. Had not Sir Guy Carleton carried on a correſpondence with Lord George Germaine, reſpecting the conduct of the Northern expedition ?

A. He would rather wiſh to decline giving an anſwer ; he did not chuſe to give one. Not anſw. if he correſpond. with L. G. Germain.

Q. Were not all diſpatches forwarded for the General, thro' the witneſs, and was not he the perſon to whom they were firſt communicated ?

A. He was ; but when General Burgoyne left the limits of his government, he had no more to do than to forward them.

Q. Did the witneſs look upon himſelf to have any controul or direction over the expedition ?

A. So long as Gen. Burgoyne remained in Canada he thought he certainly had.

Q. Was it the witneſs that collected the force, and ſettled the diſtribution, and took all the neceſſary meaſures for forwarding the expedition ?

A. It was he made the neceſſary preparations before the arrival of the General ; but afterwards, in order to expedite and forward the operations, and to ſave the time which might be ſpent in applications for freſh orders, he committed the whole management to the General himſelf.

Examined by Col. Barre.

Q. Whether, if acquainted that the General was likely to meet with great difficulties from the enemy, ſuch as being ſtrongly poſted in the line of communication, he (the witneſs) looked upon himſelf ſufficiently authoriſed to countermand him and prevent him from proceeding ?

A. If under his command he moſt certainly ſhould.

Q. If the witneſs had learned that the enemy was in force on the frontier, &c. would he think himſelf warranted in ſuſpending the operations ?

A. If the rebels were in the province he ſhould collect the whole force of the province to expel them.

Q. Not an anſwer ; it was not to know what he would do in caſe of invaſion within the province, but ſuppoſing that the northern army had reached the frontier of the province, and that an account of the ſtrength of the enemy, and the difficulty of diſlodging them had reached him, in that caſe would he look upon himſelf authoriſed by his commiſſion and inſtructions from the Secretary of State to put a ſtop to the expedition, or ſo bound to the peremptory orders under which he acted, as to permit the northern army to proceed ? If he thought Gen. B's orders peremptory.

A. If within the limits of his government, where he was

competent ſolely to command; but after the northern army paſſed the frontier, moſt certainly the General who commanded muſt act upon his own judgment.

Q. But ſuppoſing that the order was peremptory to proceed, would he think he had a right to controul or depart from thoſe peremptory orders.

A. The General's inſtructions and his were of equal authority. While the General remained within the limits of the province of Quebec, his own authority was defined; when the General paſſed them, the ſame authority veſted in the General an equal power, which could not be controuled by any authority ſhort of that which delegated it, namely the noble Lord who gave it. A great number of queſtions to the ſame purport were put, in which it was plain that the witneſs avoided all in his power (and with great dexterity) to give a direct anſwer.

Q. Would the witneſs be warranted, upon being informed before the General had paſſed the frontier, that there was a very formidable body of the enemy ſtrongly poſted in the line of communication with Albany, to exerciſe the power veſted in him as Commander in Chief, within the province, to prevent the General paſſing the frontier, in the execution of the meaſures with which the General was charged, by his inſtructions from the Secretary of State?

Thinks the orders peremptory.

A. I think I would not be authoriſed to ſtop the General; I think he was bound by his inſtructions to carry his Majeſty's orders into execution, to the utmoſt of his power. I think further, that if I had information that there were 20,000 men ſtrongly poſted in the line of communication, I would not be warranted in countermanding the Northern expedition. I do not pretend to ſpeak to all poſſible circumſtances. I am convinced what a delicate and trying ſituation a General muſt ſtand in, who is charged with the execution of a certain definite meaſure; and how much he muſt feel in his own breaſt between his duty and his judgment. I did not wiſh to evade or avoid giving an anſwer to the queſtions put to me by the Right Hon. Gentleman. I ſtand myſelf, for reaſons, in a very delicate ſituation at this bar. I wiſh to decline giving any opinion. As I have been called upon for one by the Committee, I thought it my duty to comply; otherwiſe, I muſt confeſs, I ſhould have rather avoided to give an anſwer to a queſtion which I did not clearly underſtand, nor if I had, could not have given a deciſive opinion. This was the ſubſtance of his anſwer, not the words.

A variety of other queſtions of leſs moment were afterwards put to him, ſuch as his making a requiſition for a reinforcement of 4000 men; it being complied with but in a very ſmall part, and part of that ſmall not arriving till late in the ſeaſon; the

the greater part of the diſtribution of the force, for the internal defence of the province, being ſent out to him by the Secretary of State; accounts having been received, that great numbers of the inhabitants in the General's route were well affected to his Majeſty, and would take up arms and join the Britiſh forces, &c.—Mr. Eden moved, that the latter part of the evidence might be expunged from the minutes, as it might materially injure the perſons alluded to.

EARL *of* BALCARRAS.

May 27th, 1779.

General Burgoyne moved, that Lord Balcarras be called in. E. of Balcarras called in.

The following leading queſtions and anſwers are ſelected, out of an examination of upwards of four hours.

Examined by General Burgoyne.

Q. What capacity did the noble Lord act in, or what was his poſt?

A. He commanded the grenadiers and light infantry of the right wing, under the late Brigadier General Frazer. Commanded the Grenadiers and Light Infantry.

He had the honour of an intimacy, and had the confidence of that officer, being the next in command.

He always imagined that General Frazer and General Burgoyne ſtood upon the moſt friendly terms imaginable.

General Frazer was of an open, candid diſpoſition, ready to declare his ſentiments on all ordinary occaſions and common occurrences; but in matters which required ſecrecy no man could be more reſerved, or knew better what was, or was not proper to be communicated. Gener. Frazer's character.

He never heard or learned that General Frazer diſapproved of paſſing Hudſon's River; on the contrary, when he was obliged to repaſs it early in the campaign (7th or 9th of July) on account of the communication being broke with the army under General Burgoyne, he did it with apparent reluctance. Did not diſapprove paſſing the Hudſon.

His Lordſhip thought that the route by Skeneſborough was preferable to that of Lake George, it appearing to him to be more expeditious.

As far as he could judge from his knowledge of the country, the march by Fort Edward, Fort Anne, and Skeeneſborough, and the line of communication opened thereby, in its conſequences muſt have induced the garriſon of Fort George to abandon that place, being cut off from all intercourſe with the main rebel army. L. Balcarras approves of Gen. B's. route.

He could not ſpeak with preciſion; but he believed if the army had paſſed Lake George, the garriſon at Fort George might have eluded a ſurprize, and have made an effectual retreat to

the main body, in ſpite of every precaution of the King's forces to prevent ſuch a retreat.

The part of the army under General Frazer did not arrive at the general rendezvous till the 9th of July, two days later than the main body under General Burgoyne.

His Lordſhip could not recollect the expreſs dates; but General Burgoyne ſaid, the journal, or general orders, would fully prove the fact.

He did not think, that any further immediate advantage could be drawn from the ſucceſs at Huberton, the neceſſary proviſions, ſtores, &c. not being come up, ſo as to enable the army to make a movement forward, with ſafety or propriety.

There was a bridge of boats thrown acroſs Hudſon's River, on which the body under the command of General Frazer paſſed to the weſtern ſide of that river.

The bridge was broke down by a great flood, occaſioned by heavy rains, &c.

General Fraſer repaſſed it in boats, under the protection of the heavy cannon, without loſs or obſtruction.

G. Frazer did not complain of the weight of the train.

General Frazer never complained in his hearing, or to his knowledge, that the weight or the number of the artillery was diſproportioned to the objects of the intended ſervice.

The part of the army under General Frazer had they been attacked in force, muſt have been cut off, had they not had the protection of the heavy and field artillery, in repaſſing Hudſon's River.

Artillery of great ſervice.

The heavy artillery and field pieces were found, by experience, during every part of the campaign, to be of infinite ſervice, both from the nature of the country, the works thrown up by the enemy, and the great number of lives it muſt have ſaved, in every operation where the enemy were intrenched, or had taken ſtrong poſitions of art or nature.

Lord B. no opinion on paſſing the Hudſon.

He could not ſay, whether the paſſing Hudſon's River was, or was not a proper meaſure. He could only ſpeak to matters which he was entitled to judge of from his rank in the ſervice; ſo far he could ſpeak to the beſt of his judgment; farther than that, he wiſhed to decline anſwering queſtions of opinion.

We muſt have fallen back to Ticonderoga, or have croſſed Hudſon's River,

At the affair at Stillwater, the rebels diſputed the ground for ſeveral hours with great obſtinacy; they were often obliged to give way, but they as often rallied, nor did not give up the conteſt till it was almoſt dark.

The Britiſh troops ſuffered greatly on that day, particularly three regiments.

Battle Oct. 7th.

He could not pretend to ſay, whether the King's army was in a condition immediately to improve the advantages gained on

on the 19th of September, becauſe he was not acquainted with the ſtate of each particular corps.

He believed the troops were much fatigued, and the number on account of killed and wounded conſiderably decreaſed.

On the 7th of October the rebels marched down to attack the Britiſh entrenchments, with great ſteadineſs and reſolution, though oppoſed by a heavy and well-directed fire of our heavy cannon and field pieces, and beat back part of the left wing. They continued to fight with great obſtinacy after frequent repulſes, and withdrew with remarkable order, conſidering the great loſs they had ſuſtained.

On the night of the 7th the whole of the King's forces evacuated their entrenchments, and took a new poſition at Saratoga, without any loſs.

On the 8th they were greatly annoyed by the heavy artillery and rifle fire of the rebels. He was preſent in the General's tent when a ball paſſed over the table while they were at dinner, A ball paſſes the table during din.

On the 9th when the Officers of certain ranks and the commanders of corps were convened, there was not a ſpot within the whole camp in which they could deliberate in perſonal ſafety.

When the propoſition of a ſurrender was firſt made, there was not a ſingle diſſenting voice; the ſituation of the army was ſuch as rendered it impoſſible to quit the camp without inevitable deſtruction, or to remain longer in it without being ſacrificed by a conſtant cannonade, or falling by famine. No diſſent. voice to ſurrender.

The General, on the firſt propoſition made by General Gates, for the army to lay down their arms in the trenches, and ſurrender priſoners of war, declared in the ſecond council, that he would ſooner periſh with his ſword in his hand, than accede to ſuch ignominious and diſgraceful terms. Gen. B. rejects Gates's terms.

The ſtrength of the rebels the day they paſſed in review in the preſence of Generals Burgoyne and Phillips, ſeemed to amount to between twelve and fourteen thouſand men. They ſeemed well formed, marched in ſilence, and had every exterior appearance of being well diſciplined. Rebel force 12 or 14000.

He underſtood early, that a co-operation from the grand army was expected. He never heard that the army under Sir Henry Clinton was in the Highlands till the 3d of October, when that news was firſt communicated in general orders to the whole army. Underſtood a co-operation was expected.

In the conſultation between the 9th and 11th, the burning Æſopus, &c. was ſtated by the General, and a queſtion put by him to the officers, &c. whether it would be proper to wait and delay ſigning the treaty, till it ſhould be known if the detachment coming up the North River would be able to force their way to Albany; but it was thought, conſidering all the circumſtances and uncertainty of ſuch a co-operation, that it would be more

more adviſable to accept of the convention; and this was at length unanimouſly determined on.

Examined by Colonel Barre.

Gen. B. in all ſituat. the confid. of his army.

The General had the full confidence of his army from the day in which he was inveſted with the ſupreme command; that they were perfectly ſatisfied with his zeal and ability; that as well after as before the convention, he was equally dear to them; that in all difficulties and trying ſituations, the General had always poſſeſſed himſelf; that the army approved of the General's return to Europe, as they looked upon a man who had all along ſhared the common dangers, afflictions, and diſtreſſes with the private centinel, to be the fitteſt perſon to recommend them to the notice of their Sovereign; that in the diſtribution of promotion, which has ſince generally taken place, they had every reaſon and good ground to hope, that the repreſentation of their Commander in Chief would ſtrongly plead in their favour; and that, whether in England or America, General Burgoyne would have proved the beſt friend and moſt proper advocate for the Officers and brave men who had ſerved under him.

Examined by Governor Johnſtone.

Cannot ſtate the conſequence of a co-operation.

His lordſhip could not undertake to ſay what might have been the conſequence of a co-operation of Sir William Howe's army up the North River. He had, it was true, given opinions in the courſe of his examination; yet none, he truſted, but ſuch as clearly aroſe from facts, or from matters of which his rank and ſituation in the army entitled him to give. Farther than that he muſt decline. An intended co-operation was firſt expected, and it was not till the third of October that the motions of Sir Henry Clinton in the Highlands gave any certain aſſurance of a co-operation up the North River.

After ſeveral queſtions being aſked by Mr. Burke, Colonel Onſlow, and Sir Richard Sutton, Mr. Eden deſired to know, if the Officers in general approved of Sir William Howe's expedition by the way of Cheſapeak. His Lordſhip was ordered to withdraw, on which a long debate on the point of order enſued, whether a witneſs of any rank or ſituation was juſtified in refuſing to anſwer.

Lord Balcarras was called in by general conſent, and on condition that he ſhould not be preſſed to anſwer any queſtions to which he might think proper to object.

His Lordſhip gave one general anſwer, that he could not ſpeak on the propriety of meaſures of which he was not a witneſs, nor upon them further than his rank and experience in the ſervice enabled him to decide.

Capt.

CAPTAIN MONEY

Examined by General Burgoyne.

He acted as Deputy Quarter-maſter General in Canada, and after leaving that Province, in the abſence of Lieutenant Colonel Carleton, the whole ſervice devolved on him. Capt. Money called in.

From his rank and general connection in the ſervice, he confirmed in a more full, poſitive, and detailed manner, every particular movement and manœuvre ſtated by the Earl of Balcarras, relative to the rout by Skeenſborough; the ſituation of Fort George; the engagement at Fort Anne; the firſt and ſecond croſſing of the Hudſon's River; the delay and the cauſes of it, previous to the battle of the 19th September; the tranſaction of that day; and the infinite uſe the heavy artillery proved on every occaſion during the campaign. On the Route. Uſe of heavy artillery.

He acted as Commiſſary of the Horſe. He had the care of the contract with the drivers of the waggons, for the horſes, &c. The General had iſſued a ſpecific and general order, that no Officer, under any pretence whatever, ſhould take an horſe from the uſe of the baggage; that the horned cattle taken on the march ſhould be employed in the land tranſport of proviſions; that there were ſeven days ſpent only in the repair of the road from Fort Edward to Fort Anne, and one from Fort Anne to Skeeneſborough, in the whole eight; that the proviſion tranſport was effected by 180 waggons; the water tranſport by 400 batteaux and craft acroſs Lake George; and the carrying place would on the whole have taken ten days or a fortnight's time more than the land tranſport by Skeeneſborough. On tranſporting proviſions.

After the junction of General Fraſer with the detachment on the other ſide of Hudſon's River, July the 9th, it being determined to puſh for Albany, the delay was in order to get a month's proviſions forward. The engagement at Stillwater was a moſt bloody conflict; it continued from three in the afternoon till dark; the great weight of it lay on the 20th, 21ſt, and 62d regiments; theſe regiments ſuffered greatly, and were unfit for the line for ſome time; the rebels diſputed the ground with great obſtinacy, and uncommon reſolution, and were never entirely broke till it was too dark to purſue them, in a country ſo naturally ſtrong. He could not tell exactly the rank and file fit for actual ſervice. He did not know that the 62d regiment conſiſted of but ſixty four rank and file, and five Officers fit for ſervice; the returns would tell that; but he believed the three regiments already mentioned did not amount to three hundred men, and were of courſe inferior to a compleat battalion. They were much ſtronger on the 7th of October, numbers of ſick recovered, and ſlightly wounded, having conſiderably ſtrengthened them. Bloody conflict at Stillwater. 3 Regiments not 300 men.

He reconnoitered the right of the rebel camp in their lines, pre-

Rebel camp very ſtrong.

previous to the battle of the 7th October; there were ſtrong entrenchments on the right, on the top of a hill, defended by cannon to a ſwamp adjoining, where there was a ſtrong abbattis. Their left he had not ſeen.

Battle Oct. 7th.

On the morning General Arnold marched out to force the Britiſh lines, he had a full view of the whole tranſaction; the right under Arnold moved forward to meet the Britiſh in the front of their lines, under the heavieſt cannonade of Artillery, grape ſhot, and rifle fire he ever beheld, and never gave way till they met the Britiſh Grenadiers; in his whole knowledge of ſervice, it was the heavieſt he ever recollected except in the affair of Fort Anne; he was aſtoniſhed, ſtill more aſtoniſhed, when he heard the fire of the enemy's muſquetry kept up with much vigour and conſtancy, after undergoing ſo heavy a fire of artillery, &c. as he had deſcribed. The Britiſh were not broke, but were in the act of manœuvering in ſome diſorder, in taking a new poſition, which they at length effected. At this inſtant he obſerved a battalion of Brunſwickers, who ſhould have ſuſtained them, on the firſt fire diſperſe in confuſion, without the loſs of a man, for he did not ſee one man killed or wounded lying on the ground which they quitted. When the Britiſh were taking the new poſition, he heard a cry of ſhame! ſhame! but they ſoon got into order. When the Brunſwickers run, he did not ſee General Reidſel rally them, but he perceived two Aids de camp, threatening, endeavouring, &c. to bring them back to charge, but to no effect. They were, after ſeveral exertions collected, but not in order, behind the artillery, and could never be prevailed on afterwards to come forward in the line. His being made a priſoner, he believed, was not occaſioned by the flight of the Brunſwick battalion, it was rather owing to the death of Sir William Clarke, who had a command in the artillery, and part of the troops forward being broke, they fell back upon the Artillery near where he was ſtationed, during which time a confuſion having enſued, he had no choice left him but to fly, or remain in his proper poſt, as long as he ſaw it was his duty, abiding by the conſequences. His opinion on the whole reſpecting the affair of the 7th October was, that the miſbehaviour of the Brunſwick battalion was the cauſe of the loſs of a victory, if not of the whole army which was the conſequence of that loſs.

Brunſwickers run, tho' not one of them killed.

Would never come on again.

Their miſbehav. loſs of the army.

There was an high ground on the left of the rebels and the right of the Britiſh. Had a poſition been taken on that high ground, and heavy artillery planted there, it would have commanded the left of the rebel lines, and they muſt either have fought under very great diſadvantage, or have been compelled to abandon their camp. Their left would have been expoſed.

Gen. Arnold's milit. conduct.

While he was a priſoner he learned that General Arnold made the attack on the Britiſh lines without orders from General Gates;

Gates; that knowing of this high ground, which opened to the lines already deſcribed, he was aware if that ground had been occupied by the army, the rebels would have abandoned their lines, but by bringing them forward in the manner he did, he inſpired them with a confidence that they were not only able to defend themſelves, but to force the enemy, entrenched and defended as they were. The Captain entered into ſeveral other details, and his examination was ſeemingly over, when Colonel Onſlow roſe and put a great variety of queſtions, which he anſwered very much in favour of the General. At length, being aſked by him what opinion did the rebels conceive of the conduct of Sir William Howe? He ſaid, he was not in the confidence of the rebel chiefs, nor did he think the opinions of a rebel peaſantry were proper evidence to be received reſpecting the conduct of ſo great and able a commander.

And gallantry.

Capt. M. much in favour of G. Burgoyne.

And of Gen. H.

Governor Johnſtone ſaid, Capt. Money has given the opinion of the officers who ſerved with him, reſpecting the conduct of his Commander in Chief; of the rebel officers; reſpecting the conduct of Mr. Arnold, &c. He has been at New York, and ſeveral other places. Aſked, what, then, was the general opinion entertained of the expedition to the ſouthward, under Sir William Howe?

Sir William objected to the queſtion, unleſs the Captain was admitted to name the officers with whom he converſed.

Gen. H. objects againſt aſking opinions on the expedition ſouthward.

Lord North conſented to wave the queſtion, provided the witneſs would anſwer the following one: Does Capt. Money mean to infer, that the opinions of officers on military meaſures are not entitled to credit, or ought to carry no particular weight with them, in the courſe of the preſent enquiry?

Colonel Barre roſe, and ſaid, that moſt certainly if opinions were to be received generally, there could be no exception taken againſt any one opinion more than another, according to their intrinſic value; but if the opinion reſpecting Generals, of people at a diſtance from the ſcene, was to be received concerning the latter, ſo it ought concerning Miniſters. Here the Colonel launched forth on Adminiſtration, reſpecting the whole of their conduct; the military conduct at home; the ſending troops on impracticable ſervices; the deceiving the commanders in their promiſes; their not ſending out a ſufficient force; their expedition to Georgia and St. Lucia, &c.

Col. Barre.

Lord North gave up the queſtion, but complained greatly of the Hon. Gentleman's unprovoked ſeverity.

EARL *of* HARRINGTON.

June 1ſt, 1779.

E. Harrington's ſtrong evidence.

He ſpoke to every material point already deſcribed, if poſſible, with greater ſtrength and preciſion, than either Lord Balcarras or Captain Money.

After the affair at Huberton we were not immediately able to purſue our advantage; indeed he thought that we rather advanced too far, and puſhed forward too ſoon, conſidering that our proviſion tranſport had not as yet come up.

Gen. B. reſtrains the Savages under St. Luc la Corne.

The Savages were of very little uſe, unleſs the General had indulged them in maſſacre and plunder, and every horrid enormity and cruelty; that he determined to inflict ſignal puniſhment on the murderers of Miſs Mecree, but was diſſuaded from it for two reaſons; firſt, that it would be the loſs of any future aid from the Indians, and that being provoked, on their return home, they might have marked their footſteps through Canada with blood and ſlaughter. He carried ſeveral meſſages to Monſ. St. Luc la Corne, who had the direction of thoſe ſavages; the laſt of which was, that he would much rather want their ſervices than permit them to ſcalp the living, though he was obliged to connive at their ſcalping the dead. To induce them to forbear upon motives of intereſt, he even offered and gave rewards to them for the bringing in priſoners.

Delays from want of proviſ.

The delays which took place after quitting Fort Edward were ſolely owing to the diſaſter at Bennington, for being diſappointed in procuring forage, &c. from that quarter, the army was neceſſarily obliged to wait for the ſtores and proviſions, before any effectual movement forward could be ſafely riſked.

Bennington exp.

The application to go on that ſervice originated with Major-General Reidſel, which he firſt communicated to him (the witneſs.) He informed General Burgoyne of it. General Reidſel ſelected his own officers and troops, and fixed upon Col. Baum and Col. Breyman. If, however, the latter had arrived in time, that diſaſter would never have happened, ſo as to be productive of the conſequences which afterwards followed.

Neceſſity of moving on to Stillwater.

The army muſt have croſſed Hudſon's River, or returned as far back at leaſt as Fort Edward, which would, in fact, amount to an abandonment of the campaign; and the movement forward, which brought on the engagement at Still-water, became neceſſary, no choice remaining but that meaſure, or a very hazardous retreat to their former poſition on the other ſide of Hudſon's River.

Order of battle at Stillwater.

The Britiſh grenadiers, light infantry, &c. at the action at Stillwater, were on the right, under Gen. Frazer, which body was obliged to make a *detour* through the woods; the line was led by

by General Burgoyne himself, who formed it on the opening of the plain; the other wing, composed chiefly of the Germans, were on the left, and had their left flank covered by the river, but they were not up so soon as the right and centre. The weight of the engagement was sustained by the Commander in Chief, at the head of the British line, and the three following regiments, 20th, 21st, and 62d, suffered most. The ground was well disputed by the rebels, who fought with great obstinacy, and kept up a regular fire, with more or less effect, for upwards of five hours. Several attempts had been made by the General, at the head of the British line, to charge them with bayonets, but the fire on the part of the enemy was too heavy and regular to give that manœuvre the expected success. He went with several messages himself from the General to the Germans, to compleat the line early in the day, and to take certain positions, in order to favour the attack of the centre. Probably if those orders had been timely carried into execution, the victory would have been more compleat.

Gen. B. with the 20th, 21st. & 62d regts. bear the weight of the battle.

Victory incomplete from the slowness of the Germans.

The troops were not in a condition to improve the advantages of the victory the next day, nor to prevent the rebels from entrenching themselves, in less than ten days at the soonest. The three regiments already mentioned suffered greatly, as did the 9th and 24th, which composed the British line; the British light infantry and Brunswick grenadiers, under Gen. Frazer, on the right forward, amounted to about 1200, the line to about 1300. He did not know the exact loss of the three regiments, but believed it was much too great to permit them to do service in the line for some time, their numbers from the affair of the 19th being so very defective to the necessary complement of battalion.

Numb. of British

Before the army was again in a condition to proceed to further operations, the rebels were strongly intrenched; the hill on their right down to the river was full of works planted with cannon; their front was covered with a wood, and their left secured by ravines. His lordship then proceeded to give an account of the action of the 7th of October, and confirmed every particular that had been already stated relative to that affair.

Descript. of the rebel camp.

The army had the greatest confidence in their General during the whole progress of the campaign, till the surrender at Saratoga; equally so after that misfortune while in America, and to that instant. He had the honour of an intimate friendship with the late General Frazer; it amounted to what might be called confidential, and he never heard him pass the most distant degree of censure on the conduct of the campaign till his death, though he conversed with him after he received his wound, which he did not survive many hours: on the contrary, he heard him frequently, in the course of the campaign ex-

Army great confidence in Gen. B.

Gen. F's high opinion of Gen. B.

preſs himſelf in warm terms of approbation reſpecting General Burgoyne.

Gen. Phillips never offered to force his way back.

He never heard that Gen. Phillips made a propoſition at Saratoga to endeavour to force his way back to Ticonderoga with a part of the army; but he was preſent when Gen. Phillips offered to hazard his own perſon, attended by one or two guides through the woods, in order to throw himſelf into that fortreſs, and defend it againſt the rebels ſhould they think proper to attack it.

His Lordſhip anſwered two queſtions as follows.

1400 baggage horſes to 7000 men.

Does the noble Lord think that fourteen hundred horſes were not too great a number to carry the baggage, cannon, proviſion, ſtores, &c. of an army conſiderably under 7000 men? He does not, becauſe he always underſtood, that there was a a demand for more horſes than could be procured.

Conſequences if they abandoned their artillery.

Is it not his Lordſhip's opinion, that if the park of artillery and heavy field pieces had been abandoned after the action of the 7th of October, that the army thus diſincumbered might have found its way back to Fort Edward?—By no means, becauſe the heavy artillery and heavy field pieces proved its beſt defence, in its ſubſequent ſituation, till after the ſurrender; that it would be impoſſible to repaſs the ford over Hudſon's River, unleſs protected by them; and that being ſurrounded on every ſide, if they had abandoned their cannon, that circumſtance alone would have proved their deſtruction, as their own artillery would be employed againſt them.

We beg leave to ſtate a circumſtance relative to this engagement, mentioned by Lord Harrington, but which Capt. Money could not ſpeak to; after the German battalion had given way on the left, General Reidſel did every thing in his power to rally them, and bring them back to the charge, but to no real effect. It was during the retreat on the right, which neceſſarily took place, leſt from the defection on the left, that part of the army ſhould be turned and ſurrounded, that the gallant General Frazer received the wound, which in a few hours proved mortal.

G. Frazer mortally wounded.

MAJOR BALL.

Major Ball.

He confirmed every thing material already given in evidence till the battle of Stillwater, in which he was wounded early in the day. He was peremptory in his opinions, and gave them without reſerve. He ſaid he fought in the line on that day, which was formed on the edge of the plain by the Commander in Chief; that the rebels fought with great obſtinacy; that the right, commanded by General Frazer, and the centre, were formed in time; that the left, compoſed of the Germans, were

were not arrived in their proper ſtation, on account of which the left of the centre was uncovered, and the opportunity loſt of turning the right of the enemy; that five or ſix Britiſh regiments (we forget which) engaged in the line, had ſuffered greatly; that the rebels diſputed the ground with great obſtinacy and reſolution, but that being wounded early in the action, he would ſpeak nothing as to what happened after that circumſtance took place; that the troops, harraſſed, fatigued, and decreaſed in numbers as they were, were not, in his opinion, fit the next day to improve the victory they had gained. Germans prevent a deciſive victory.

He underwent, as did Lord Harrington, a very long croſs-examination. The queſtions were chiefly put by Sir Richard Sutton, and Mr. Eden; but the witneſſes were ſtronger, if poſſible, in their anſwers, than on their examinations in chief. The croſs-examination was chiefly directed to learn, whether there were not too many horſes employed; whether the heavy cannon were not too numerous, and whether, in fine, the land tranſport was not the cauſe of the ſlowneſs of the movements forward.

CAPTAIN BLOOMFIELD.

of the Artillery.

After giving anſwers to the ſucceſſive queſtions already ſtated, and being very fully croſs-examined relative to the number of horſes, carriages, &c. employed in the land tranſport; the number of light and heavy field pieces, the weights, callibres, &c. of the artillery park, the neceſſity of which he fully juſtified in every particular, he gave the following narrative of the battle of the 7th of October. Capt. Bloomfield on the bat. Oct. 7.

He ſaid, that the 24th regiment was placed in a wood on his right, and the light infantry on the right of them forward in a plantation, or opening of clear ground; on his left, the battalion of Heſſe-Hanau, and ſome other German corps. The artillery, two medium twelves, were planted on a hill, on the plantation in his front; and a little on one ſide 6 ſix-pounders. The poſition was therefore this; the artillery and Germans were poſted on the plain; the wood on the right was lined with the 24th; in the other plantation, ſtill further on the right, and which was divided only by the wood, the light infantry, advanced corps, &c. were poſted. Order of battle.

In this poſition the army remained, when the rebel column advanced into the plain. They came forward out of the woods in front, but partly on his left. On this a moſt heavy cannonade enſued on our part, which the rebels bore with remarkable reſolution. After ſuſtaining the ſhock of this cannonade, grape ſhot, and rifle-fire from the troops for ſome Rebels attack. Repulſed by the Britiſh.

Form again and attack the Germans who run.

ſome time, they fell into a wood on their own right, and after forming again, attacked the German advanced poſts, who fell back in great confuſion upon the main body, which afterwards communicated itſelf to the regiment of Heſſe-Hanau, poſted nearly on a line with him, upon his left. At that inſtant he heard a very heavy fire in the plantation, on his right, and diſcovered that the light infantry were broke, and were, as he heard, drove into the wood. After ſome further conteſt, he perceived that the regiment poſted in the wood on his right had given way, and that the rebels had gained his right and left. In this critical inſtant he was wounded, and could give no account of courſe of what happened afterwards, further than that the artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

Battle loſt.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KINGSTON.

Adjutant-General to the Canada Expedition.

June 3d, 1779.

Col. Kingſton.

After the Colonel had given an account of the army paſſing the frontier of the province of Canada, the taking of Ticonderoga, the march by Skeeneſborough, the action at Huberton, and almoſt of every movement and poſition taken, previous to the expedition planned againſt Bennington, he produced copies and extracts of ſeveral letters, written by General Burgoyne, during thoſe operations, to the Secretary of State, General Sir Guy Carleton, Gen. Hervey, Adjutant-General in Great-Britain, &c. in which it appeared that Gen. Burgoyne ſtated ſtrong doubts that his force was inadequate; complained of the enormities committed by the ſavages, the little ſervice they were of in forwarding effective operations, preſſing the neceſſity of ſending with all poſſible diſpatch the additional companies from Canada lately arrived from England, and earneſtly preſſing Sir Guy Carleton, if poſſible, to ſpare a garriſon for Ticonderoga, in order that the force left in that garriſon might be withdrawn for the purpoſe of augmenting his army.

Gen. B's letters to miniſtry, &c. on his force being inadequate.

Exculpates Sir Guy Carleton.

This written evidence being read, and followed by ſome obſervations by General Burgoyne, to ſhew that he did not mean to fix or imply any cenſure on the refuſal of Sir Guy Carleton, becauſe he underſtood by Sir Guy's inſtructions from the Secretary of State, that officer did not at all look upon himſelf at liberty to comply with the requiſition on his part now mentioned; Colonel Kingſton proceeded, and gave the preference to the land tranſport from Skeeneſborough to Fort Edward, and proved the neceſſity of repairing the roads, for the purpoſe of bringing the ſtores and proviſions forward.

He then produced the memorandum-book of Sir Francis Clarke, firſt Aid-de-Camp to Gen. Burgoyne, who was killed

at

at the action of Beaumont's Edge, on the 7th of October. He ſaid, he knew the memorandums therein ſet down, to be the deceaſed's hand-writing. He read ſeveral of them, ſtating a variety of facts, receipt of orders from the General, &c. parti- On baggage horſes.
cularly an early order (July the 12th) to forbid any of the officers being permitted to uſe the baggage and proviſion-horſes belonging to the army. To ſhew that the time ſpent in the repair of the roads was abſolutely neceſſary, for the ſpeedy ſup- Scarcity of pro-
ply of the army, he ſtated, from Sir Francis Clarke's memo- viſions.
randum book, that from the 2d to the 5th or 7th of Auguſt, there was frequently not more than one days proviſion in ſtore; that on the 6th, as well as he could recollect himſelf, there was a report made to him by the Commiſſary General, that there was not a ſupply for the enſuing day, and for that reaſon, the Commiſſary deſired to take his direction, whether the right or left of the army ſhould be ſerved next morning, meaning the Britiſh or the Germans; but that as ſoon as the roads were repaired, there was a conſtant and full ſupply.

After having conducted the army up to the 12th or 13th Auguſt, he proceeded:—He ſaid he had in his poſſeſſion the plan originally framed by General Reidſel for the expedition to Bennington, with General Burgoyne's additions to, and alterations of that plan, and a copy taken that morning. The mo- Motives for
tives which induced the German General to propoſe the expe- Bennington ex-
dition were, that, on a movement to Caſtletown, the party em- pedition.
ployed on that expedition were informed, that the people were well affected to the Britiſh government about Connecticut river and Bennington; that a great many men might, if freed from the tyranny and power of the Congreſs, be induced to take arms and join us, and that great quantities of cattle, horſes, and proviſions might be procured. The plan conſiſted of two objects, the procuring proviſions, recruits, &c. and, if it ſhould prove ſucceſsful to the full extent wiſhed for, then to proceed by a detour to the right, and join the main army at or near Albany; if not, to return by the ſame rout back to the main body.

Colonel Baum was accordingly detached with Germans, Baum's corps.
Provincials, and Savages, amounting to about five hundred and ſeventy on the 13th. He was to be ſupported by a choſen corps under Colonel Breyman, part of which was to conſiſt of Reidſel's diſmounted dragoons; and in caſe that either the firſt or ſecond detachment ſhould prove unſucceſsful, or meet with a ſtrong reſiſtance, they were to be ſuſtained by the whole army.

Colonel Baum's journal of his operations, tranſmitted from Savages hurt the
the ſeveral poſts he occupied, was then read, by which it ap- ſervice.
peared, that the ſavages were ungovernable, proved entirely diſobedient to the orders of the Officers appointed to direct and controul them, and, in ſhort, were of more diſſervice than uſe.

He then ſtated that Colonol Breyman was ſent forward the next

next morning, the 15th, to ſupport Colonel Baume; but that no account having been received of them the next day (16th) on Sunday, the General put himſelf at the head of the 24th regiment; but before he had got forward more than two miles, he met Breyman's corps returning in great diſorder, and was informed of the diſaſter at Bennington. The Germans continued to return in ſmall or broken parties the whole day.

Germans return broken.

Army 4900.

He ſtated the returns of the army on the 1ſt of September, previous to the croſſing Hudſons River. Britiſh 2,600, Germans 2,300. On the 3d, after paſſing the River, there was very little difference.

The General wiſhed to keep a communication open by his poſts with Fort Edward; but as that was impoſſible, and to be in force, in obedience to his inſtructions from the Secretary of State, he reſolved to make a movement forward. The artillery, ſtores, baggage, and detachments on the other ſide of the river being all brought up and called in, he moved towards Stillwater.

Gen. Frazer approves paſſing the Hudſon.

Previous to the paſſing of Hudſon's River, and after, he had ſeveral confidential converſations with the late General Frazer, upon the propriety of that meaſure, who always expreſſed the warmeſt approbation of it.

He was preſent near the General the whole day in that action, which was more obſtinately diſputed than any a long ſervice ever gave him an opportunity of ſeeing. The Britiſh line conſiſted of but four regiments, 20th, 21ſt, 62d, and the 9th, amounting to 1,100 rank and file: the whole weight of the action fell on this body. On the laſt charge, juſt before dark, the troops ſeemed to be greatly fatigued, and not in a condition to make very vigorous exertions; they retained their ſpirit, firmneſs, and reſolution, but not that alacrity they ſhewed in the beginning of the day, which was very natural for troops that had now been nearly five hours firing and manœuvring, and had almoſt on every freſh charge a freſh enemy to contend with.

Firmneſs of the 20th, 21ſt, 62d, & 9th regts.

Always attack'd by freſh troops.

Yet victorious.

He ſaw the line after the rebels had been diſperſed; it had ſuffered greatly: the ranks had been thinned; the men were fatigued; the loſs in killed was 76, wounded 247, miſſing or priſoners 28. The two field officers of the 62d were wounded, and the greater part of the Officers of the regiment killed or wounded. The other regiments had likewiſe ſuffered greatly, and the officers and men on the next day (September 20) nor for ſeveral days after, were not in a fit condition to undertake further operations.

One third of them killed and wounded.

At this period army 3890.

The general returns at the latter end of the month were, Britiſh 2300, Germans 1590, beſides the three additional companies from Canada.

The rebel camp near Beaumont's-Edge could not be reconnoitred on the left; he ſaw the right, and perceived it was very ſtrongly defended by field-works, redoubts, and cannon planted

planted down the ſide of the hill to the ſwamp adjoining the river.

He ſaw a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, received September the 22d, informing General Burgoyne, that Gen. Vaughan would be about that time in the Highlands, and was meditating an attack on Fort Montgomery, which, tho' the royal army had been conſiderably more in force, was a ſtrong reaſon for not attacking the rebels in their intrenchments, till ſome further account ſhould be received of the operations of General Vaughan.

Gen. B. receives a letter from Sir Hen. C. Sept. 22.

He was preſent at the action of the 7th of October, and occaſionally in every part of the line. When the retreat became general, he did not think he was authoriſed, as an officer, to give orders for the cannon being brought off, while there was an artillery General Officer (Phillips) of ſingular reputation, on the field. At the very inſtant that the cannon were left expoſed on the right and left, he met Sir Francis Clarke on a gallop going to the left. He aſked him where he was going? he ſaid from the General, to order off the artillery. They had ſcarcely parted when a very heavy fire came from the enemy, by which, he had every reaſon to believe, Sir Francis Clarke was killed.

Battle of Beaumonts Edge.

He had a copy of an original paper in his hand, which he received from General Gates, containing a return of the rebel army. General Gates and he were old and intimate friends, when that brave officer was engaged in a more commendable line of ſervice.

An old friend of General Gates.

He had not the original in his poſſeſſion, but he ſaw it at General Burgoyne's that morning. The General promiſed he would produce the original. He was not certain whether the commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned officers were included in the return, but he believed not, becauſe they were diſtinguiſhed in it.

One General, twelve Brigadiers, 46 Colonels, 43 Lieutenant-Colonels, 45 Majors, 346 Captains, 342 Firſt Lieutenants, 332 Second Lieutenants, 328 Enſigns, 640 Serjeants, 648 Drums, and 13,200 rank and file; he underſtood the return to mean that, beſides corps and out-poſts not included, 3400.

Rebel army 19,383 men.

Britiſh, on the 1ſt of November, 2086, Germans, including every deſcription, 1900; there were beſides ſome Provincials and Canadians, not included in his former returns of the King's army.

British army 3986 men.

His intimacy with General Gates led him to the knowledge of the following particulars. Previous to the action of the 7th of October, ſome, if not all of the following poſts were taken by the rebels on the flanks and rear of the royal army: 1400 on the heights oppoſite the ford of Saratoga; 1500 at the ford higher up; 2000 in the rear to prevent a retreat

Gen. B. ſurrounded without the poſſibility of a retreat.

treat to Fort Edward on the weſt ſide of the river; the body on our rear, and on the heights oppoſite Saratoga, were poſted before the 7th, and the body at the ſecond ford, he believed, after, on the 8th. On the 8th a working and covering party were ſeen on the plain of Saratoga, throwing up works; but a party being ſent forward, they croſſed the river and poſted themſelves on the other ſide at the head of the ford. It was intended by the General to attempt a retreat, and hazard a ſecond action which would have taken place, had not the out-ſcouts given intelligence of thoſe poſitions having been taken, the truth of which was afterwards confirmed to him by General Gates. Sick of the rebels preſent, 600 and upwards, ſick not preſent, about 700.

Strong inſtance of courage in a Clergyman.

Said, there was a remarkable inſtance happened at Saratoga on the 8th or 9th. General Frazer, a few minutes before he died, requeſted that he might be privately interred in the redoubt next the enemy. The injunction was not rigidly complied with; for Generals Burgoyne, Reidſel, and Phillips, with ſuch officers and others as could be ſpared from their poſts, and he among the reſt, attended the funeral, in reſpect to the memory of that very gallant officer. The rebels, the only act of inhumanity he knew them to be guilty of, obſerving the funeral proceſſion, pointed two guns at the redoubt, and kept up an inceſſant fire until the body was covered in. The Chaplain, however, notwithſtanding his very unpleaſant ſituation, went through the funeral ſervice with all due propriety and ſolemnity, ſeeming to be totally regardleſs of any conſequences while diſcharging his duty.

He ſaid he had an original paper in his hand, being minutes taken at the ſecond council of war of the Generals and Field Officers.

The names of the officers were not read.

47th & 62d reg. not fit for action.

——— ſays, that the 47th regiment is not to be depended upon, in caſe the propoſition from General Gates ſhould be rejected.

——— is of opinion, that the 62d is too much reduced and diſpirited to be able to do regimental duty in real action.——Similar opinions, or nearly to the ſame effect, but not quite ſo ſtrong, were given as to other regiments. Foreign officers could not anſwer for their men in an enterprize which forbid all expectation of ſucceſs. Britiſh unanimouſly engaged for their ſeveral regiments and corps, ſo long as they remained in their preſent poſition, being determined to reſiſt the attack of the enemy to the laſt. Three of the Field Officers were not preſent.

German's not fight.

It was unanimouſly agreed in a conſultation between the General Officers only, that an attempt ſhould be made to gain Fort Edward at all events, had not the intelligence already ſtated to have been given by the ſcouts happily prevented it.

On

On his croſs-examination by Sir Richard Sutton, Colonel Kingſton ſaid, that he did not know that there were any horſes to ſpare to remount Reidſel's diſmounted dragoons; that he knew of none but thoſe appropriated to the carrying of proviſions, camp baggage, artillery, and thoſe belonging to the officers; that the officers could not ſpare theirs, as they had not enough to ſupply their own wants; that he and Sir Francis Clarke found themſelves greatly diſtreſſed for horſes, and that he procured ſome with much difficulty; that the horſes belonging to the train and proviſion tranſport, belonged to the contractor in Canada, who provided them; that he ſaw no ground in America fit for cavalry to make a charge on, though in ſmall parties, for ſecret intelligence, &c. dragoons might have proved of eſſential ſervice. He did not know that there were many women followed the army; he had no time to attend to their beauty or their numbers; he never heard there were two thouſand, nor did he believe there were half that number.

On horſes.

Dragoons,

And women.

Examined by General Burgoyne.

By the queſtions aſked by the honourable gentleman, it would imply as if I was influenced by improper paſſions. He put ſeveral queſtions to Col. Kingſton.

The Col. anſwered, that there were only three women allowed to every company; that proviſions were allowed for ſo many and no more; that the Commiſſary, without a groſs breach of his duty, could not iſſue any more rations than what the order allowed; and, as for impeding the baggage, it was impoſſible, for if any more women than were allowed by the order attended, they muſt have walked, or found a mode of carriage for themſelves: but without entering into further particulars, he had every reaſon to believe that there was no colour of complaint on that head.

Examined by Governor Johnſtone.

A co-operation up the North River, if in force, would, as he had heard from ſome of the rebel general officers, and made in time, have obliged Gen. Gates to have quitted his poſition. He believed, if Sir William Howe, with the grand army, had come up by that route, the impreſſion he would have made would have been in proportion to his numbers. It was reaſonable to think, that he would have effected more with a greater force than what he underſtood might have been done by an inferior one. He underſtood the country between Albany and New-York was very ſtrong. He did not know what degree of interruption or obſtruction Sir William Howe might have met with from Gen. Waſhington, in the courſe of his operations

If Sir W. H. had co-operated, G. Gates muſt have retired.

up the North River, as he knew nothing of the force or condition of that General's army.

State of 47th & 62d regiments.

The Colonel begged to explain one circumſtance in the minutes of the council of war, which, by the paper delivered, where it ſaid the 47th regiment was not to be depended upon, implied a cenſure on that corps. It was no reflection meant or intended on that regiment, nor upon the other, but merely as the former was not complete, ſome of the companies only being upon ſervice with the army; and the other was ſo greatly reduced in number, that they were not to be depended upon as capable of doing regimental duty in the line, ſhould active ſervice be determined upon.

The Colonel concluded his examination in replying to ſeveral queſtions put by General Burgoyne, relative to that General's appointments reſpecting ſecret-ſervice money, and the diſpoſition of the money contained in the military cheſt.

Diſintereſtedneſs of Gen. B.

General Burgoyne had not the appointments of a Commander in Chief, but of a Lieutenant General; that he was at the ſame expence as if he had; that he was obliged to keep a table, to which, beſides the officers on the ſtaff, it was cuſtomary that all others ſhould, from their rank, or the particular ſervices they were engaged in, have free acceſs and invitation at particular times. That from the advanced price of every article ſuited for ſuch a table, the General was at a very great expence; and that, on the whole, he was perſuaded, when his appointments were balanced againſt his outgoings, that the General was conſiderably out of pocket, out of his private fortune, by the campaign of 1777.

His Generoſity.

On the diſpoſition of the ſecret ſervice money, he ſaid he kept the account of its expenditure; that a ſhilling never was appropriated to any other uſe than that for which it was intended; but on the contrary, he had known the General to have advanced money out of his own purſe to the widows of ſoldiers, and other diſtreſſed perſons, which, by the conſtant uſage of the army, might have well come within the deſcription of ſecret ſervice money.

Military Cheſt.

On the military cheſt, he ſaid the General had nothing at all to do with it, further than it was his duty to preſerve it in ſafety; that the payments and receipts were tranſacted entirely between the Paymaſter-general and the Commanders of corps; that he underſtood, before the ſigning of the Convention, thoſe officers drew certain ſums in advance from the Paymaſter-general, for which they gave accountable receipts; and that the remainder was retained by the Paymaſter-general, for which, of courſe, he ſtood, reſponſible to the public.

We forgot to mention one circumſtance, it was an anſwer of Col. Kingſton's to the following queſtion: Does the witneſs, in all his intimate and confidential converſations with Gen. Frazer, recollect

recollect that he found fault, or cenſured any one meaſure or operation of the campaign of 1777?—Not one but that of employing the Germans, inſtead of the Britiſh, on the expedition to Bennington.

Gen. Frazer for employing Britiſh inſtead of Germans.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON.

June 8th, 1779.

Previous to the calling in General Robertſon, Lord George Germain opened the grounds of his defence, reſpecting his conduct as Secretary of State for the American department, and as having a voice in his Majeſty's confidential councils.—He obſerved that the Hon. General who commanded in chief, and the other Hon. General who commanded the Northern expedition, (Howe and Burgoyne) had produced a vaſt maſs of evidence to throw the miſcarriage of the American war upon his ſhoulders; and that, in the courſe of the examination, ſeveral witneſſes had endeavoured to prove, that America was, "almoſt unanimous" in reſiſting the claims of this country, and were determined never again to return to their former ſtate of obedience.

Lord. G. Germain's ſpeech.

To meet the perſonal charges reſpecting himſelf, as well as to repel that part of the evidence, which deſcribed the majority of the people of that country as hoſtile to a Britiſh government, he had ſummoned General Robertſon to the bar. His long reſidence in America, upwards, as he underſtood, of twenty-four years; his high and deſerved rank in the ſervice, and his being preſent on the ſpot when the rebellion broke out, furniſhed him with every reaſon to expect that his evidence would be accurate and important; and that he was every way, from his long experience and local reſidence, enabled to give the moſt ſatisfactory information to the Committee.—His Lordſhip, after ſtating the particular facts, which will be more properly collected from the minutes themſelves, moved, that Gen. Robertſon be called in.

Great expectations from Gen. Robertſon's evidence.

Examined by Lord George Germain.

He had reſided in America, twenty-four years; his experience and long reſidence there, enabled him to be well informed of the diſpoſitions of the people. They were warmly and affectionately attached to the people and government of this country. A very ſhort time before the diſturbances broke out, he had ſeveral converſations with perſons of great weight and conſequence in the colonies, who all agreed in what he had now aſſerted. Independence was never thought of till the rebellion commenced; and he remembered a circumſtance that aroſe in thoſe converſations, which confirmed him in the opinion, which

Gen. R's great knowledge of the Americans.

which was that only one man on the whole continent of America was known to be a friend of independency.

Two-3ds loyal. Said, that the majority of the people, full two thirds, were well affected towards Great Britain; and that the loyal Provincials now in arms, were equal, if not ſuperior in numbers to the rebels.—Said, that the force ſent out from home was fully adequate to the ſervices for which it was deſigned, particularly for the campaign of 1776, and following years. Said, that he had numberleſs opportunities of knowing the wiſhes and deſires of the people, while Quarter-maſter-general; that they had given frequent proofs of their loyalty and affection; that although not obliged to furniſh quarters, or lodgings for the troops, they ſpontaneouſly conſented, and gave every poſſible mark of a friendly and hoſpitable diſpoſition to the King's army.

Force adequate to the conqueſt.

Americans affectionate.

Our force always equal to the ſervice. The royal army was equal to the ſeveral ſervices as they aroſe; and he remembered well, when it was known among the Officers at New-York that a certain commander (ſuppoſed to mean Sir Jeffery, now Lord Amherſt) had made it a condition of his acceptance of the command of the army, that a reinforcement of 20,000 men, ſhould precede the acceptance of the command, it was looked upon as a moſt extraordinary requiſition, and interpreted only as an apology for declining to accept of any command in that country.

Lord Amherſt.

Rebels 16,000. He never underſtood that the rebel army exceeded 16,000 men; the royal army, in its ſeveral diſtributions, under the command and order of Sir William Howe, including Germans and Provincials, amounted to 40,870 effective men in the campaign of 1777.

Howe 40,870.

Deſcription of America. The country was not remarkably ſtrong, ſo as to impede and render difficult military operations. There were woods interſperſed among plantations in the cultivated parts. He knew the Jerſeys, particularly that part of them which lay in the route between New-York and Philadelphia, and for ſome diſtance on each ſide. The cultivated parts were full of farm-houſes, gentlemen's ſeats, &c. inloſed like England, or the vicinity of London. There were woods here and there; but in the Jerſeys he knew of none of any great extent in the low lands. In the internal parts there were mountains, and of courſe defiles, which were called the Jerſey Highlands. There was no remakarble difficulty in procuring intelligence; enough could be procured from perſons well-affected, or from rebel priſoners, ſufficient to deſcribe the face of the country, the poſitions the enemy had taken, their real or ſuppoſed ſtrength in numbers and appointment, &c.

No want of intelligence.

He was preſent at the landing of the troops at Graveſend, on Long-Iſland, 22d of Auguſt, 1776. The people did not deſert their dwellings, nor remove their live or dead ſtock; their

doors

doors were open, and they ſeemed to ſhew every appearance of confidence and good-will towards the royal army.

He had not the returns, but as well as he could recollect, the force under General Howe conſiſted of 15 or 16,000 men; that of the rebels under Putnam about 6000; in all, including thoſe employed in defending the works on New-York Iſland, perhaps at the higheſt about 10,000 men.

Howe 16,000.

Putnam 6000.

The rebels paid one hundred pounds currency (56*l.* 5*s.* ſterling) bounty money for every recruit; the King's troops but ten dollars, (2*l.* 5*s.* ſterling). The rebels made no conſiderable defence on Long-Iſland.

A rebel recruit 56 l. 5 s.

King's recruit 2 l. 5 s.

After the retreat from White Plains, and the flight of the rebels by Brunſwick through the Jerſeys to Newark, and when they croſſed the Delaware early in December, they did not exceed 3000 men, hardly ſo many.

Reb. army 3000.

He knew the country from New-York to Albany extremely well, and the courſe of the North River, having ſo long reſided in its neighbourhood. It was not remarkably ſtrong. There were ſome woods, one in particular of ſix miles in length. He paſſed by this route in the year 1759 with the army then commanded by Lord Amherſt. It was not a march of more than ten or twelve days by land. He knew of no particular impediment which ſtood in the way of ſucceſsful operations, either by land or up the North River, if aſſiſted by the co-operation of a naval or marine force.

Operations on the North River eaſy.

He preferred operations to the northward to the ſouthern expedition; ſuch a meaſure, in his mind, carried with it every fair and rational appearance of ſucceſs. Had he been preſent at New York in Auguſt 1777, he would have preſumed to offer his advice to General Howe, to have proceeded by the way of North River in preference to either going up the Delaware or Cheſapeak Bay, particularly as the Commander in Chief had received an account from General Burgoyne of the capture of Ticonderoga, and that he was proceeding in his way to Albany. Indeed, when he heard that the General who commanded the northern expedition was left without any effectual co-operation, to force his way ſingle handed to Albany, he obſerved to his friends, that if General Burgoyne obtained his object, or even eſcaped deſtruction or captivity, it would be a greater eſcape than that made by Hannibal. Alſo uſed the ſame expreſſions in a letter to General Howe, after General Burgoyne's victory at Stillwater.

Preferable to the Southern expedition.

Thought Gen. B. loſt for want of a co-operation.

He was of opinion that a diverſion on the coaſt of Maſſachuſets Bay, or any of the New England Provinces, would have proved of infinite ſervice, in drawing the attention of the provincial militias to the defence of their own home. That he was of opinion he could give a proof. On his return to America in Autumn 1777, and meeting with croſs winds off the coaſt

A diverſion on the coaſt propoſed by burning two barns.

coaſt of New England, and having a reinforcement of 1700 men under his command, he conſulted with the naval officers and others, whether they could put him on ſhore on that coaſt; they ſaid they could: he accordingly put in for the land, and was determined to burn two barns within his view, and create an alarm, which he made no doubt would have anſwered very good purpoſes. The wind however ſhifting, he proceeded to the proper place of his deſtination which was New-York.

Examined by Sir William Howe.

Time of American loyalty. He had little or no communication with the people of America ſince the commencement of the war. His alluſions to their diſpoſitions were chiefly gathered from his former knowledge of them, while in a ſtate of peace and obedience; particularly that relative to their willingneſs to provide quarters for the troops, though not obliged to it. This was during the laſt war, upwards of twenty years ſince.

The converſations with people of weight and conſequence in the country, were at the breaking out of the rebellion; were about the year 1775; were about eight months before actual hoſtilities; were before the battle of Lexington, on the 19th of April 1775; were before that battle three or four months; were in the year 1774.

The converſations with the Officers at New York were about the commencement of the rebellion; were about 1774 or 1775: he could not preciſely tell the time; it was before the campaign 1776; he believed it might be about the commencement of that of 1775; he heard twenty thouſand men ſpoke of, but whether previous to the campaign 1775 or 1776, he could not undertake to ſay; he knew a certain Officer's name was mentioned. (Lord Amherſt.)

Army 6000 at leaving Boſton. The number of rank and file embarked at Boſton, did not, he believed, exceed 6000. The Commander in Chief upon quitting Boſton, had not a force ſufficient to proceed to New York, nor could he have ſafely ventured to land, till his force was augmented by the Germans and the Britiſh from Europe. No improper delay happened from the General's remaining at Staten Iſland, till his debarking his force at Graveſend. The male inhabitants at Graveſend and Flat Buſh had deſerted their dwellings in a great meaſure, upon the arrival of the royal army, though not all; and he could not ſpeak to the flight of the male inhabitants at Utrecht, becauſe he was not there at the firſt landing of the troops; the doors were open, and ſome males, and almoſt the whole women and children remained in their dwellings.

He always underſtood that the rebels in their flight through the Jerſeys, did not conſiſt of, at the higheſt, 3000 men. He did not know the exact amount of the force under General Lee, who

who croſſed the North River about the middle of December, nor of that under General Putnam. He had heard they conſiſted of about two or three thouſand men each. He could not undertake to aſcertain the rebel force in the Highlands. He never ſaw any authentic returns of the rebel force in its ſeveral diſtributions. He ſpoke from hearſay. He had not the effective returns of the royal army in 1776 or 1777; but if the corps were complete they muſt amount to the numbers ſtated by him.

He did not know the navigation of the Delaware, or by the way of Cheſapeak. He knew the North River. There were no rivers of any conſequence in the route from New York to Albany. There were ſome on the oppoſite banks, on which the enemy might take poſt; the route was in ſome places five, ſix, and eight miles from the river; the enemy might, if in force, turn the flank of the royal army, and compel them to hazard a battle at a diſadvantage; but all that might be eaſily avoided by a water tranſport of the troops as well as the ſtores and proviſions. The Highlands, with all the paſſes in it, muſt be ſecured. The army by water could be tranſported in two days, ſo as to defeat all the land operations of the enemy.

Knows North R. navigation.

Army might go by water in two days in ſpite of all oppoſition.

Waſhington had no magazines, he muſt draw his ſupply from a remote country; operations by water muſt have been ſucceſsful. Sloops and craft on the North River might be procured; they were procured laſt war. They carried on a commerce or trade between Albany and New York; they were called Albany ſloops or craft; they were of about ſeventy tons burthen; each of them would carry a hundred ſoldiers. He could not ſay whether a number ſufficient to tranſport 15,000 men could be procured.

Veſſels 70 tons go to Albany.

There were roads and communications in the Jerſeys for the troops marching in columns. To march in columns through woods, paſſages through the woods muſt be cut and cleared. Marching an army in a ſingle column he allowed was very improper, becauſe the army might be ſtopt by an inferior force; and before the line could be properly and regularly formed, the enemy might eſcape by flight. Lord Amherſt met no enemy nor interruption in his march from New York to Albany, nor from thence to Ticonderoga. The French abandoned their lines, and the Fort at that place was ſoon after evacuated without reſiſtance.

He believed a part of the grand army might have been ſpared to make a diverſion on the coaſts of New England. Four or five thouſand men might have been well ſpared, after which the royal army would have been equal in number to that under Waſhington, who, he believed, had not even at the action of the Brandywine more than 10,000 men under his command,

4 or 5000 to attack New Eng. yet Howe then equal to Waſhington.

Examined by Mr. Burke.
June 9th, 1779.

Mr. Burke. The loyal Provincials in arms, amounted to between five and ſix thouſand. He did not know the number of the Rebels. The loyal Americans conſiſted of corps, ſome of them moſtly compoſed of native Americans, ſome moſtly compoſed of emigrants from Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of Europe.

Half the Rebel army Iriſh. He had heard that full one half of the rebel army was compoſed of Iriſh. He did not believe, that if the royal troops were withdrawn from within his own government, (New-York) that the loyal Provincial military would be able to maintain their ground againſt the uſurped power of the Congreſs. The province of Nova Scotia was very weak in point of internal defence, ſo would Rhode Iſland if evacuated. He could not ſpeak of the Carolinas, Georgia, Canada, &c. but there were ſeveral Gentlemen, Members of that Houſe, who could give full ſatisfaction on thoſe points. The loyaliſts though more numerous, were unarmed, and the powers of government had been uſurped. Two thirds of the people, though well affected to the Britiſh government, were not a match for the other third if armed, and in poſſeſſion of the civil government. The loyal Provincials were good troops, and well diſciplined. He believed the Congreſs did iſſue orders for arming all the inhabitants, but thoſe who had the power in their hands, diſarmed every perſon whom they ſuſpected, If one third were for Great Britain, another for the Congreſs, and a third partly neutral, the Congreſs part would prevail for the reaſon before aſſigned: not that he thought that an inferior number, and in every reſpect upon equal terms with a ſuperior number, could give law to the ſuperior number.

Two thirds of the Americans loyal.

Taxation was the cauſe of the rebellion; the people in general ſhewing an averſion to be taxed. If taxation had been given up, no rebellion would ever have happened. The people were zealouſly attached, before that claim was enforced, to the Britiſh government.

Loyal Americans plundered. Sir William Howe was earneſt, and took every method to prevent plunder, but plunder was committed. The loyal Americans were not properly protected, nor the neceſſary means taken for their ſafety. The General had taken every means in his power to protect them, but his endeavours had not always proved ſucceſsful.

Howe's terms of pacification not known. Did not know what promiſe was held out in the King's ſpeech in 1775, for an intended pacification with America, nor what terms the Commiſſioners were charged to hold out to America. The people in general were eager to know the terms. He did not know them to that inſtant. He believed that Great Britain relinquiſhing the claim of taxation was the great object

of

of expectation with the Colonies. He did not know when the Parliament met, or the prohibitory bill paſſed, or when the Commiſſion left Great Britain. It was publiſhed for the firſt time in America in the following Auguſt. He did not know when the vote of independence paſſed, he believes it was about the time of publiſhing the Commiſſion; he could not exactly ſay that it was in the beginning of July.

He believed a great majority of the people were inclined to return to their former ſtate of obedience before the vote of independence paſſed; and he had heard, that if taxation had been given up, that vote would never have paſſed.

He believed the treaty between France and America was the chief, nay the ſole cauſe of defeating the intended effect of the conciliatory act of laſt ſeſſion, and the objects of the Commiſſion which accompanied thoſe acts. Treaty with France continues the rebell.

He did not think of a deſcent upon the coaſt of New England before he left England, nor till he was at ſea. He had no converſation with the American Miniſter on the ſubject, though he may have dropped ſentiments of a ſimilar nature to others. There were many of the parts of the coaſts of New England vulnerable, where a landing might be effected, and a retreat ſecured. New England coaſt vulnerab.

He never gave any advice to the noble Lord at the head of the American department, but in one inſtance, reſpecting the plan propoſed by Sir William Howe to Adminiſtration. He told the noble Lord, that a plan formed in America, tranſmitted to England to be conſidered, and afterwards returned with or without alterations, would be very improper, becauſe, before the approved plan could reach America, circumſtances might be conſiderably changed, and what would be a very wiſe plan of meaſures in one ſituation, that ſituation being changed, would perhaps in another be extremely inapplicable to the exiſting ſtate of affairs, and be of courſe improper to be carried into execution. The noble Lord left General Howe to his own judgment. Gen. H. had full power to act as he tho't proper.

Examined by Sir Richard Sutton.

There was a conſiderable quantity of ſtores left behind at Boſton, when the royal army evacuated that town. They conſiſted of woollen goods, &c. which were of great ſervice to the rebels; woollens, and ſeveral other articles being extremely dear and ſcarce in the rebel camp, and throughout the whole province. He could not ſay, whether there were means of bringing them off; he underſtood that every tranſport, or ſhip fit to go to ſea, was employed in conveying the troops to Halifax; ſome however of the ſtores, merchandize, &c. that had been left behind, might have been brought away aboard the tranſports. A great number of ſhips and veſſels, none he ſaid, Great qantity of woollens, &c. left to the rebels.

100 veſſels left. immediately fit for ſea, had been left in the docks and harbour of Boſton. He could not aſcertain the exact number. Upon mere recollection, a hundred perhaps, or more. He did not know that any of thoſe veſſels were afterwards converted into privateers; but they might for what he knew to the contrary. It would not have been a proper meaſure to have proceeded to New-York without a ſufficient force. The royal army had a communication with the well-affected at New-York. Veſſels were ſent from Boſton to New York for neceſſaries; one or two of them returned with the deſired ſupply; the third, he believed was wrecked. On the whole, he thought it would not have been adviſeable for General Howe to proceed to New York; the tranſports were too much crouded; and the preference was clearly due to Halifax, as it was conſiderably nearer than New-York.

Battle 27, Aug. He was preſent at the action of the 27th of Auguſt on Long-Iſland. After the rebels were diſperſed, the grenadiers and 33d regiment puſhed forward, and would have ſtormed the lines at Brooklyn, if they had not been called off by the General. Neither the General nor he knew the ſtrength of the lines at the time; but he had learned, from rebel priſoners and others, that if an immediate attack had been made on the lines, that Putnam could not have been able to collect 300 out of the whole of the troops under his command to ſtand to their arms. The rebels had taken a ſtrong poſition on ſome ſmall eminences on the right of their lines, and ſome diſtance from them in front. He ſaw the General advance, and, by a movement round thoſe heights, get between them and their lines, by which means he made about two thouſand of the rebels priſoners. The rebels evacuated the lines by five o'clock the next morning. He ſaw the rear-guard croſs the ferry. He had notice to march with the firſt brigade about eight o'clock. If he had had notice earlier, he would have obeyed his orders. If the royal detachments had received orders earlier, at ſix or ſeven o'clock, they might have come up with the rebels rear-guard. He did not know what degree of ſucceſs might have attended ſuch a meaſure. It was no more than a mile and a half, or at moſt an hour's march, from the lines to the place where the rebels embarked. He could not ſay what would have been the iſſue. It would be attended with ſome difficulty, as there were ſome heights poſſeſſed by the rebels, which commanded the place of embarkation.

Putnam could not have collected 300 men.

But a mile & an half from our camp to where the rebels embarked.

Rebel retreat & magazines might have been cut off. After the flight of the rebels from White Plains and Fort Lee through the Jerſeys, if a corps of two or three thouſand men had been puſhed over from Staten Iſland, and landed at Amboy, or Elizabeth Town, he was of opinion that they might have cut of the rebel magazines near Brunſwick; and that, being cut off from their magazines, the ſame body of men might have

have intercepted them in their retreat towards the Delaware. Purſued by Lord Cornwallis from Fort Lee, and their force being ſo very ſmall, no more than between two or three thouſand men, cut off from their magazines, and poſitions being taken in their rear, or in their direct route, there was every fair probability of their ſurrender or deſtruction. A corps could be ſpared from New York for this ſervice; and to him it appeared the moſt feaſible ſcheme of putting an end to the war.

Would have ended the war.

He was not preſent in the Jerſeys on the opening of the campaign 1777. He knew the country. The rebels were near Morris-Town, and had taken a very ſtrong poſition in their rear upon the mountain above Quibbleton. He believed they had no magazines, proviſions coming in once in two days, or twice a week: if they had the magazines deſcribed by the honourable Member, and that ſuch a movement as had been deſcribed by the honourable Member could have been effected, moſt certainly Waſhington muſt come down and hazard a battle in their defence, or endeavour to retreat over the Delaware, or take ſome other ſtrong poſition. He did not know that part of the Jerſeys ſufficiently to be enabled to give a decided opinion one way or the other. The diſtance from Middlebrook, where the royal army was then ſtationed, to the Delaware was about twenty-five miles, and thirty from thence to Philadelphia. Sir William Howe might have marched by this route, without interruption, or obliged Waſhington to deſcend from the mountain and riſk a battle; or if not immediately, to be compelled to fight in defence of Philadelphia. It would have been a march of but a few days. The country was open on the Jerſey ſide of the Delaware; on the Pennſylvania ſide there were ſome woods, but the country was not ſo ſtrong even on that ſide as to throw any remarkable difficulty in the way of the execution of ſuch a meaſure. He did not know the exact diſtance from the head of the Elke to Philadelphia; he underſtood pretty near the ſame diſtance as from Middlebrook. There was but one river the Schuylkill in this line of march.

Waſhington's poſition and ſupplies.

G. Howe might go by land to Philadelphia, 55 miles.

Country not difficult.

There was much ſtrong ground, he was informed, between the head of the Elke and Philadelphia; more, he underſtood, than by the direct route over the Delaware from Jerſey. He did not know, or pretend to judge, of Sir William Howe's reaſons for chuſing to go by ſea to the ſouthward; they might be very good ones, and he preſumed they were. He was not preſent during any part of the campaign of 1777, being then in England, or on his return to America; but informed as he was by others, he was of opinion, that land operations promiſed more diſpatch and effectual ſucceſs than going round to Cheſapeak; becauſe, if the move to Philadelphia had been effected early in the campaign, a co-operation might have followed

Route from Elk more difficult than from Middlebrook.

Againſt Howe's ſea voyage.

followed, in order to aſſiſt and forward the operations of the northern army.

Examined by Colonel Barre.
June 10th, 1779.

Col. Barre. There were woods, moraſſes, and ſeveral rivers, he acknowledged, upon the route from New York to Albany.—Strong poſts might be taken and defended by numbers much inferior.

Deſcription of North River route by land. Some of the rivers which fell into the North River on the eaſtern ſide, were very deep; ſome of them were fordable. The deep ones could be paſſed over on floats, rafts, and in ſmall craft; the ſhallow ones could be forded.

He could not ſay, whether it would or would not be ſafe to purſue ſuch operations, in the face of an enemy, in force ſufficient to diſpute the paſſage. That would depend upon the degree of ſtrength on one ſide, and reſiſtance on the other, and the proper diſtribution and direction of the force employed.

Water conveyance practicable He could not ſay whether operations by water, by the North River were practicable. He was clear, that by the co-operation of the naval force and procuring a water-conveyance for the troops, that it might. He did not exactly know, whether ſloops, craft, &c. could be procured for the purpoſe; but on the ſuppoſition that there could, he ſaw nothing to materially obſtruct or defeat ſuch a meaſure.

He had no intercourſe with the people of America, ſince the breaking out of the rebellion. He was at Boſton. He was preſent at Long Iſland, and ſtaid at New York in his command, during the remainder of the campaign 1776. He was in England, or on ſea, during the whole of the campaign 1777. He had, during his ſtay at New York, in 1776, autumn 1777, and the campaign 1778, ſeveral converſations with Americans of weight and conſequence.—He had, under the above exceptions, given his teſtimony chiefly on the information of others.

Lord Amherſt, he confeſſed, in his operations up the North River, had no enemy to contend with. He only ſpoke therefore on the grounds of probability, and what he had reaſon to believe would have been the iſſue of ſuch operations.

He did not know, nor hear, that the Britiſh Cabinet had conſulted any military men on the conduct of the Americans. They might, without its coming to his knowledge. The noble Lord at the head of the American department had conſulted him in one inſtance, which he related to the Committee the preceeding day, concerning the propriety of ſending plans from America to Great Britain, and tranſmitting them back altered or unaltered. He gave his opinion, that ſuch a mode of conducting military operations, at ſo very great a diſtance, was improper. He always thought that a Commander in Chief

ought

ought to be veſted with very extenſive powers, and preſent patronage. Such a command was always ſuppoſed to originate in high confidence; and it ſhould of courſe be accompanied with what it apparently profeſſed.

Rebellion to be extinguiſhed.

He did not think, that it was either the wiſh of this country, to ſubdue America, or, if it were, that it would be practicable. He never underſtood that America was to be ſubdued, but that rebellion was to be extinguiſhed. He did not ſuppoſe that the loyal Americans, armed, were equal to reſtore legal and conſtitutional government, without the aid and cooperation of this country. He thought, that the loyal ſubjects in America might be employed as a balance againſt the rebels; and that the arms of Great Britain being thrown in, might preponderate the ſcale in our favour.

If old experienced officers command.

He did not ſee any intention of ſubduing America; but he believed, all circumſtances conſidered, with old and experienced officers to command, America might be brought to her former ſtate of obedience. He could not undertake to ſay, that he ſaw to the end of the American War, nor could fix any limited time to its duration. He believed, if there had been no taxation, there would have been no rebellion; that if taxation had been given up before the vote of independence took place, no ſuch vote would have ever paſſed; nor if the conciliatory bills had reached America, even after Gen. Burgoyne's defeat, but previous to the treaty with France; Congreſs, however well inclined to reject them, would not have ventured contradicting the prevailing voice of the people.

He was no judge of the wiſdom of the councils of this country; nor, if he had an opinion upon the ſubject, would it be decent, or conſiſtent with his rank and ſituation, to give an anſwer to the Hon. Member's queſtion in the terms in which it was propoſed.

Clinton's army.

Tho' he cannot ſee to the end of the war, or how it will or will not terminate, he had no opinion how far it would be wiſe to purſue or deſiſt from it. He looked upon Sir Henry Clinton to be a very able and active Officer. He had no returns, but he preſumed the army, under his proper order and command, in the campaign 1778, was equal, or nearly equal to that under Sir William Howe the preceeding campaign 1777. He believed his army was equal to the plan of the campaign, that of a defenſive war, and being always prepared to ſeize and improve favourable circumſtances.

Grant's corps & Campbell's.

He could not ſpeak to the exact numbers of the troops detached to the Weſt Indies under General Grant, or the corps ſent under Colonel Campbell to the ſouthward. There were ſeveral members of that Houſe, who could give the Committee better information on that head. He heard that the former body amounted to five thouſand, and the latter to three, he had no returns in his poſſeſſion. He did not know

know of any offenſive operations carried on by Sir Henry Clinton, but his marching againſt the rebel General Sullivan, then beſieging Rhode Iſland, and the expedition to Martha's Vineyard, &c. by which the rebels were much diſtreſſed and alarmed. That expedition was commanded by Major General Grey, who, he confeſſed, was a moſt able, active, and ſpirited officer. So far from doubting of his zeal, judgment, and activity, he acknowledged that there was not a more capable officer in his Majeſty's ſervice.

Charact. of Gen. Grey.

He did not preſume that more could be done with an inferior force, than what had been done with a ſuperior one. He did not know that the reinforcement lately ſent out, only amounted to about four thouſand men, or that they exceeded the detachments ſent to the ſouthward in the courſe of the winter, or that another would be ſent, in order to make up any ſuppoſed deficiency. He had no information on the ſubject. Circumſtances being changed, the ſame number of Britiſh and Germans might effect more in one campaign then another, if the enemy were weakened, or the local aſſiſtance more general and effectual.

4000 men ſent out.

Examined by Sir William Howe.

Q. The General ſays, that ſtores, proviſions, veſſels,&c. were left behind at Boſton, when the King's troops evacuated the town?

A. There were ſome, he did not know what quantity, value, or number. Itwas not his particular duty to ſee that proper meaſures were taken for bringing them off. He preſumed that no means were neglected for that purpoſe. He had obeyed ſuch orders as were given to him. He had not the care of the ſtores or their embarkation; but of the troops. He believed the Geral did all in his power, and if the town and ſtores were not deſtroyed, he preſumed the General had very good reaſons for abſtaining from that meaſure. He gave no opinion; he only ſpoke to a fact within his own knowledge. He neither drew any inference from that fact, nor wiſhed that any inference whatever ſhould be drawn from it.

On ſtores left at Boſton.

Q. The General ſays that many of the male inhabitants remained in their dwellings at Graveſend and Flat Buſh, when the royal army landed on Long Iſland?

A. He ſaid ſome remained, but not in any great numbers. He did not ſee that the male inhabitants in any part of the ſeat of war remained in their dwellings but thoſe of Staten Iſland, but he had been a very ſhort time with the army.

Q. The General ſays that plunder was frequent?

A. Certainly plundering was common. It was not permitted in the brigade he commanded, On a complaint being made to him of ſome exceſſes committed by that brigade, he iſſued the

Plundering common but not in his Brigade.

the order now on the table of the Committee, made inſtant reparation to the ſufferers, and an immediate ſtop was put to plundering in that brigade. He was only preſent from the 22d at the landing on Long Iſland, till his arrival at New York on the 16th of September, during which time he ſaw plundering frequently committed and had heard afterwards that it ſtill became more frequent. He believed that the General did every thing in his power to prevent it. He heard him give directions to hang two plunderers, and was a witneſs to the execution. He did not know that plundering was committed in that part under the General's immediate command; but he heard it as a general complaint, ſo long as he remained in the army. He acknowledged that he heard it univerſally ſaid, that the Heſſians, when they left Germany, underſtood that they would be permitted to plunder; that they looked upon themſelves to be in an enemy's country, and were entitled to enrich themſelves with the ſpoil. He did not know that plunder was ever permitted in Europe during operations in an enemy's country; but he always underſtood, that, by the laws and uſages of war, contributions were accepted, as a compenſation or ſatisfaction for ſparing private property. He preſumed that the rebels had no money, but it would not be eaſy to perſuade ſoldiers, particularly foreigners, if they could not get money, that they ſhould not have ſome ſort of equivalent. He never thought America an enemy's country; but the idea that it was, was not ſolely confined to the Heſſians. He heard, that when Col. Rhall was ſurprized at Trenton, twenty-one waggon loads of plunder was recovered by the rebels, and was afterwards diſtributed by Mr. Waſhington among the ſufferers, as far as they could be aſcertained. He had every reaſon to believe that any enormity of this nature, committed either by Britiſh or Germans, was totally repugnant to the wiſh or approbation of the General.

2 plunderers hanged.

Ideas on plundering.

Gen. H. againſt plundering.

Q. The General has ſaid, that great numbers of loyaliſts were diſpoſed to take up arms, had they been properly countenanced and encouraged?

A. He did not mean to ſay, that the General was remiſs in his duty. He ſtated a fact which afterwards proved to be true. He believed that ſeveral, who had arms put into their hands, turned them againſt us, and that ſeveral, who expreſſed a deſire for them, were far from being ſincere; but he was, nevertheleſs of opinion, that more arms might be diſtributed with ſafety, though in ſuch a combuſtion of fear, and terror, and impoſition, it was indeed extremely difficult to determine, who was, or who was not to be truſted.

Difficulty who to truſt.

Q. The General, the preceding evening, ſaid ſomething of ſtorming the lines which he did not perfectly comprehend?

A. He ſaid, that as to the ſtorming of the lines, he had a-

greed in opinion with Sir William Howe, as neither of them were acquainted with the ſtrength of the lines. He advanced with the firſt brigade till he came within about 120 or 130 yards of the lines, where he halted, becauſe he thought them much ſtronger than they were. His brigade was cannonaded in this ſituation. The balls moſtly went over their heads. Some men belonging to his brigade were killed and wounded. Some of them were wounded by the muſquetry. He ſent his Aid de camp to the General, to know whether he ſhould advance; but before he could return to him, he was glad to have his judgment confirmed, by ſeeing that the General had ordered the grenadiers of the army, and the 33d regiment into their proper ſtation. He had paſſed the road leading from Brooklyn and Flat Buſh. He had proceeded ſo far as where both roads meet. He did not think that could be more than 120, or 130 yards. He did not ſee any other corps before him. He advanced, attended only by his Aid de Camp, to a houſe between him and the lines, ſome yards forward. He did not ſee the grenadiers, or 33d regiment before him, nor the 71ſt. They might be nearer the lines than the firſt brigade; but not in the line of march. He did not recollect ſeeing the 71ſt poſted in the houſe, which he alluded to, and which was in his front. He did not ſee the General forward with the light infantry. He ſaw only corps on his right and left, which might be nearer than he, but none directly forward between him and that part of the lines which were oppoſed to him. This part of the examination was rather delicate and critical.

Gen. R. within 120 yards of the rebel lines.

Troops recalled.

Q. The General has ſaid that if a movement forward had been made early in the day, after the rebels quitted the lines, that the royal army might have come up with the rear-guard?

A. Notice was given of the evacuation of the lines between five and ſix o'clock. He had notice to ground with the firſt brigade. He ſent word by his Aid de Camp to the head quarters, that he was ready, but ſuch was the alertneſs of the General, that he was out before his Aid de Camp reached head quarters. As ſoon as he underſtood that, he advanced, and ſaw the rebels paſſing over to Hell-gate. He did not ſee the General before him. He ſaw troops, but could not tell who they were. He could not ſay he was foremoſt in that movement, nor ſay he was not. He ſaw troops forward, and that was all he knew.

Saw rebels paſſing to N. York.

Q. The General ſaid, that the rebel army never conſiſted of more than 16,000 men, and that the royal army immediately under his order and command conſiſted of 40,874; he wiſhed the General would inform the Committee, what documents he reſorted to, in order to juſtify himſelf in maintaining either aſſertion?

A. He never ſaw any authentic returns of the rebel army.

The

The numbers ſtated by him on a former occaſion before the Committee, were taken from the returns of the Major of brigade, before he laſt left America, and by papers which had been put into his hand, ſince he received notice to attend at the bar. He imagined, that he would, in the courſe of his examination, be interrogated upon the ſubject, he had therefore applied at the ſeveral offices, where he thought he could procure the information he wanted. He accordingly applied at the proper offices, but he was obliged for the greater part of his information to the clerks in the Secretary of War's office. He had the copy of the returns in his hand; deſired to read them —17,000 under Sir William Howe, 10,000 under Sir Henry Clinton, 3,000 at Rhode Iſland, 1,700 at Halifax, 1,500 at Penſacola. Total taken; and deſired to ſay, how he made up the 40,874, after deducting nearly 2,000 from Sir William Howe's army in the Jerſeys, which did not proceed with that General in his expediton to the ſouthward, and which would render the real effective total but 32,000 and a fraction?—— Anſwered, he did not know, but preſumed the non-effectives, as well as the effectives, were included.

Howe 17,000
Clinton 10,000

Q. Whether the loyal Provincials were included?

A. He believed they were.

Q. Whether he believed, that nearly 9,000 men, an half, or a quarter of that number, were ever at once in the hoſpital, without including the wounded?

A. He believed not.

Q. Whether he meant to include the non-effectives, when he gave his laſt evidence on the ſubject?

A. He ſtated what he had learned from the information alluded to, and no more, he never made a difference one way or other in his own mind.

Q. After deducting the troops at Penſacola and Halifax which were under Sir William Howe's order but not immediately under his command, does General Robertſon believe that during the campaign of 1777, including officers, commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned, and drums, that Sir William Howe had ever more than 27,000 effective men, fit for actual ſervice under his command?

Howe in all 27,000 effective.

A. He believed not; for he preſumed the difference between the two returns aroſe from non-effectives, ſick, priſoners, &c.

Q. Whether he ſaw the Commiſſaries return of the numbers muſtered, or the rations iſſued for their daily allowance?

A. He had not.

This trying part of his examination was carried on by ſeveral members, particularly by Sir George Yonge, who taking up the items, made up the total, and firſt diſcovered that there was a difference of nearly 9,000 men between the two returns delivered by the witneſs at the bar.

Q. Does General Robertſon undertake to ſay that he knows the numbers of the rebel army, either from documents, or authentic information, at any one period, during the campaigns of 1776 or 1777?

A. He did not, further than from general report and hearſay.

Q. The General has ſaid, that if a force had been puſhed over from Staten Iſland of two or three thouſand men, and landed at Amboy, or Elizabeth-Town, the rebel magazines near Brunſwick might have been deſtroyed or ſecured, and the retreat of the rebels to Newark and over the Delaware, intercepted?

Should have intercepted the rebels.

A. He allowed the force within New-York iſland was not very numerous, but a corps of 2000 men might be ſpared. It might be hazardous to land at Coriel's Ferry, in the face of a poſted enemy. It could hardly be expected, that a flying enemy would take poſt while they were purſued by a ſuperior force. He did not know of any route but through Elizabeth-Town; he knew of no paſſes on the edge of the mountain; there might be bye roads, with which he was unacquainted. Elizabeth-Town was the high road. He could not ſay but the magazines might be removed; he rather imagined they could not. He had heard that the rebels made ſeveral ſtands, and took ſeveral poſts in their retreat from Lord Cornwallis. The weather was very bad, the rains heavy, and the roads much broke up. He would not pretend to ſay whether it would be juſtifiable to detach to Rhode-Iſland and Elizabeth Town. The men could have carried ten days proviſions on their backs, which would be no more than twelve pounds and a half, and would not be totally at a loſs, though they ſhould miſs of poſſeſſing themſelves of the rebel magazines near Brunſwick. He did not know what force was under Lee, Putnam, or in the Highlands. It might not be proper to ſtrip New-York. The General might have had private reaſons; but informed as he was at New-York, he ſaw nothing to prevent ſuch a move, and balancing the probable advantages and diſadvantages, he ſaw nothing ſufficient to alter his opinion that the experiment was worth making. He does not recollect that he ever communicated his ſentiments on the ſubject to perſons in power; he might have mentioned it in converſation; he did not particularly recollect that he had.

Men carry ten days proviſions.

Saw nothing to prevent intercepting the rebs.

Sir William Howe now led the witneſs once more to his favorite ſcene of action, the North river and its vicinities, where he kept him till the clock ſtruck twelve, very little to the edification of the auditory, or to his own ſatisfaction; the only direct anſwer the General gave being, that if the royal army had once poſſeſſion of the Highlands, the proceeding to Albany in order to co-operate with the army under General Burgoyne, would be an operation attended with facility, and a moral certainty of ſucceſs.

Previous to this Sir Willam led him into the Jerſies, relative

to

to the opening of the campaign 1777, when the General was in England, in which he endeavoured to ſhew, that he was totally miſinformed, and knew nothing of the actual circumſtances, the witneſs being then abſent in England.

Q. The General has alluded to an expreſſion in a letter addreſſed to me, relative to the improbability of Gen. Burgoyne's extricating himſelf from his then ſituation; wiſhed the General would ſay what day he arrived in America?

A. September the 25th.

Q. When the General wrote that letter, had not he heard of the action at Stillwater, September the 19th?

A. Did not recollect; could not ſay—he was indiſpoſed at the time. The letter was wrote by his direction; but believed he had heard of the Stillwater.

He took up a conſiderable time in examining to the point reſpecting the evacuation of Boſton, and to ſhew, if there had been any ſtores, military or others, improperly left behind, that it was the General's peculiar province, to ſee that that ſervice was faithfully and punctually performed.

He next interrogated the witneſs cloſely as to the early part of the campaign 1777 in the Jerſeys.

Q. If he thought the field could be taken without tent or field equipage? *A.* He believed not.

Field could not be taken without tents.

Q. The General gave it as his opinion that the King's army might have paſſed through the Jerſeys to the Delaware, and ſo have proceeded to Philadelphia, or obliged Mr. Waſhington to quit his ſtrong camp near Quibbleton: Does the General know the country between Quibbleton and the route marked out by this movement?

A. He never ſaid he did: he thought ſuch a movement would have that effect, and he knew nothing yet ſufficient to induce him to change his opinion.

Q. Does General Robertſon know that there were ſufficient boats, craft, pontoons, &c. with the army in the Jerſeys, to enable them to paſs over the Delaware?

Want of pontoons and craft no excuſe.

A. He could not tell, being then in England, but there might be timber enough felled in a few days, and worked up for the purpoſe of tranſporting the troops acroſs.

Q. Would ſuch a meaſure be adviſable, and an enemy on either bank poſted in force?

A. He could not ſay; that would depend upon circumſtances. It might lead to a general engagement.

Q. Would that be engaging at an advantage, in the midſt of a ſtrong and hoſtile country, and no poſts or retreat ſecured in caſe of a diſaſter?

Curious interrogations and anſwers.

A. That would depend upon the judgment of the General.

Q. Is then General Robertſon ſufficiently informed of the State of the country, of the army, of Mr. Waſhington's poſition

tion at Quibbleton, to give a direct opinion, that forward operations in the Jerseys, cross the Delaware, and so on to Philadelphia, all circumstances considered, would have been an advisable measure?

A. He could not say. As a matter of opinion he gave it to the best of his knowledge. He was at the time in England, and he supposed that the General had good reasons for making the choice he did.

Q. General Robertson has said that the Delaware at Trenton is 700 yards across. He would desire the General to recollect himself, and consider, whether he would have that fact stand as part of his evidence?

Delaware at Trenton 700 yards.

A. He did not pretend to speak with accuracy, he only said so by guess: he would not undertake to assert whether it was more or less, or was exactly 700.

Q. General Robertson, on the last day's examination, said, he was within one hundred and twenty or thirty yards of the lines at Brooklyn, the evening preceding their evacuation: he likeways said that he had advanced as far as where the two roads meet, on the road from Brooklyn to Yellow Hook: will General Robertson then undertake to say, that it was no more than one hundred and thirty yards from that spot to the part of the lines which opposed his front?

A. He believed it was about that distance, it might be more, it might be two hundred.

Q. Will General Robertson from his own knowledge say, that the distance from the spot described to the lines was not more that two hundred yards?

Accurate as to distances.

A. He believed not: he had often rode over the ground, and by the best estimate he could make of the distance, he thought it could be hardly so much. There were no vestiges of the lines soon after they were taken; but he thought he had given the distances pretty accurately.

Q. General Robertson has said, that the morning after the evacuation of the lines at Brooklyn, he was waiting for orders; might not he have proceeded under the general order, and have taken his particular station according to his rank, &c.

A. He might, but he thought it his duty to have Sir William Howe's directions.

Q. What time did General Robertson first receive notice that the lines were evacuated?

A. Before seven o'clock.

Q. When did he understand that circumstance was known?

Rebel evacuation known at six.

A. About six or before it.

Q. If the fact was known at six, what time would it take to put the army ready to move in force?

A. He could not say: a very short time.

Q. What

Q. What time was General Robertſon ready to move with the firſt brigade, and when did he march?

A. He was ready at eight, and marched about half after eight, as ſoon as his aid de camp returned from head-quarters. Gen. R. ready at 8 o'clock.

Q. Did not General Robertſon hear, that as ſoon as it was known from Major Montreſor that the rebel lines were evacuated, that orders were immediately given for the light troops, pickets, and advanced poſts to move forward, without waiting for the body of the army; and were not they conſiderably advanced before the firſt brigade, commanded by the General, when he ſaw the rebel rear guard embarking?

A. He heard they were detached, he did not ſee them: he ſaw troops forward, but could not from his own knowledge, ſay what troops they were.

Q. General Robertſon has ſaid that a detachment of two or three thouſand men might be puſhed acroſs from Staten Iſland, to Elizabeth Town or Amboy, in order to cut off the rebel magazines near Brunſwick, and intercept the retreat of the rebel army over the Delaware; the General was then at New York: does he know that there were flat bottomed boats ſufficient to carry or tranſport ſuch a detachment to the Jerſeys at that time, beſides thoſe employed in the operations up the North River?

A. He believed not, but he ſuppoſed there were ſloops and craft of various kinds, which might be had, and would have anſwered the purpoſe Veſſels enough to carry troops.

Examined by Governor Johnſtone.

Poſſeſſion muſt be taken of the Highlands before any operations up the North River could be adopted with any proſpect of ſucceſs. From Sandy Hook to Albany was about 170 miles. He had run it up in twenty hours. The craft called the Albany ſloops generally compute it a run of four tides. The tide runs ſtrong, and he ſaw it flow ſo high up as Albany, full four feet. It runs in a direction nearly North and South; it has no turns in it; nor could any land poſition be taken to bring batteries to bear on the heads of ſhips, or their ſterns. The batteries therefore muſt be on the banks, parallel with the broadſides. No great annoyance could be given by batteries, wind and tide favouring. When ſhips paſſed by land batteries they received little or no damage. He remembered that to be the caſe, particularly of the Roſe and the Phœnix, who paſſed the rebel batteries, which by the report, noiſe, ſmoke, &c. did not appear to him to be mounted with leſs than two hundred pieces of cannon. He did not know what force the rebels were in the Highlands early in the campaign 1777; but if they were not ſtronger then when Sir Henry Clinton took Fort Montgomery, in the latter end of Autumn, it

From Sandy Hook to Albany 170 miles: has been run in 20 hours. Common paſſage 2 days.

No batteries could annoy them much.

Highlands might have been poſſeſſed without much riſk.

it was obvious that the poſſeſſion of the Highlands, at the commencement of the operations of the grand army, might have been eaſily effected, without much riſk or loſs. King's Ferry at the foot of the Highlands, between them and New York, was about two miles acroſs. Did not know that ſhips of force could ride ſecurely there, ſo as to command the Ferry: if they could, it would be impracticable for Mr. Waſhington to croſs it with his army. Could not pretend to ſay what ſtrong poſt could be taken on either ſide of the Ferry, ſo as to command it, and prevent Waſhington from paſſing and re-paſſing.

JOSEPH GALLOWAY, Esq.

Late one of the Members of the American Congreſs.

June 18th, 1779.

Mr. Galloway called in.

The Speaker determined that Mr. Galloway's converſations with Capt. Montreſor, on the ſtrength of the rebel lines at Brooklyn, was not admiſſible as evidence.

Examined by Mr. Burke.

Diſapproves of American independency, and leaves the rebels

He ſaid, having totally diſapproved of the proceedings of Congreſs, as ſoon as they declared the States of America independent, he came over from Philadelphia to New York in January 1777, and offered himſelf to Sir William Howe as coming in under the Commiſſioners proclamation. Soon after he applied to Sir William Howe's Secretary, or the Secretary for granting pardons, for one, but was anſwered, there was no manner of occaſion. He repeated his application, and received the ſame anſwer. He was bred to the profeſſion of the law; he had conſidered his own ſituation with the attention of a profeſſional man; but if he muſt fairly declare his mind, he was not conſcious that he had ever committed a public act in his life, which made a pardon neceſſary.

He was a member of the Congreſs, and had acted with and under the powers it exerciſed. He thought that the people of America laboured under many grievances, and had many juſt cauſes of complaint. He endeavoured all in his power to remove them, and to fix upon terms which might reconcile both countries.

His plan of reconciliation.

So early as the 18th of September 1774, before the non-importation agreement was finally adopted, he introduced into congreſs ſome propoſitions which he thought might juſtly include the reſpective claims and rights of both countries.

A repreſentation of America in the Britiſh Senate, he thought, was utterly impracticable, and would anſwer no good purpoſe: that ſuch a ſcheme was inapplicable to the local ſituation of that country, and would rather ſkin the wound over than

than effect a cure. The Colonies he thought ſhould have the diſpoſal of their own money, and that the advantages in commerce would more than balance any advantage that could be drawn in the ſhape of a revenue. Upon theſe ideas, the plan which he ſubmitted to the Congreſs was formed, and though it was rejected, it had a very ſtrong and powerful ſupport.

He ſaid before he acted with the Congreſs, and in acting with them, coupled with the whole tenor of his conduct, did not look upon it that he committed any illegal act.

When the ten fundamental articles of the new conſtitution were drawn up, he was preſent. For No. 1, he voted; he partly approved, he believed of No. 2 and 3; he approved of No. 4; he was not ſure whether he approved of No. 5; he could not charge his memory ſo as to poſitively anſwer whether he did or did not approve of No. 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10; he had ſome idea that he approved of part of No. 10; and his reaſon for ſaying ſo was, that part of No. 10, as well as part of No. 2 and 3, met his ideas at the inſtant he was ſpeaking. On the rebel conſtitution.

Q. Can Mr. Galloway, who has taken ſo conſpicuous a part, ſay, whether he agreed poſitively to any of them except No. 1 and 4?

Several objections were ſtated to this queſtion, but at length it was agreed it ſhould be put. Mr. Galloway's anſwer was, that from the time he offered himſelf at New York, till he left America, he had entered memorandums in a book of all the material occurrences as they aroſe, and had, in the courſe of his examination, refreſhed his memory with them. His memorands.

Q. Will then Mr. Galloway undertake to ſay that he kept no memorandums of what came within his knowledge while a Member of Congreſs?

A. He had taken ſeveral memorandums on looſe pieces of paper, which ſerved to aſſiſt his memory.

Q. Does Mr. Galloway mean to ſay, that his whole evidence, as well while acting with Congreſs, as while with the army, is founded entirely upon memorandums taken immediately at the time, or immediately after?

A. No, but ſeveral matters reſpecting Congreſs were.

Q. Did the witneſs take no memorandums relative to what paſſed in Congreſs upon the ten articles;

A. He did not recollect; but the matter contained in thoſe articles, as they now ſtood, partly aſſiſted him in recollecting his ſentiments.

Q. Mr. Galloway has entered into a very long detail of the manner of proceeding and voting in Congreſs, of the particular ſentiments of ſeveral individual members of that body; will he then ſay, that neither as a lawyer or a politician, nor as a man whoſe perſon, fortune, and poſterity might be greatly affected by his conduct reſpecting thoſe articles, that he has no recollection of what paſſed upon that occaſion in his own mind?

A. He had given an anſwer before to that queſtion; he remembered no particulars but thoſe he had before mentioned.

Manner of voting in Congreſs.

Mr. Galloway proceeded: he ſaid, there were ſtrong debates upon every particular article and ſeveral diviſions, tho' by the proceedings, as publiſhed, the votes were ſtated as being carried unanimouſly they were frequently carried by a ſingle voice. For example, when it was ſaid that nine of the provinces voted unanimouſly for the new conſtitution, that was not really the fact. Some provinces had three repreſentatives, ſome five, ſome ſeven, and others nine. When therefore they deliberated in their Committees, what paſſed in the Committee never made its way to the public. He remembered perfectly well, that the members of one Colony conſiſting of nine, there were five for the confederation, and four againſt it. So it was in ſeveral other inſtances, the majority including the whole, and he believed in no one inſtance without oppoſition and diviſion. He perceived the inconvenience of this mode of proceeding, and endeavoured all in his power to counteract it. He and another member, whoſe views and wiſhes continued the ſame, applied firſt in the Committee for permiſſion to enter a proteſt, containing their reaſons of diſſent, in order to have thoſe reaſons made public; but it was refuſed; and the report was ſtated as having been agreed to unanimouſly. He and his friend applied afterwards in full Congreſs, but to no better effect, both propoſitions being overruled; and to this, as much as any other circumſtance, he imputed the ſucceſs of the deluſion and impoſitions that had been put upon the people without doors.

Q. Will Mr. Galloway undertake to ſay roundly that Sir William Howe could have forced his way to Philadelphia, thro' the Jerſeys and over the Delaware, by a land route?

A. He could not pretend to ſay directly. He could ſay thus much, that the army under Mr. Waſhington, encamped near Quibbleton, by the moſt authentic accounts, did not exceed 15,000 men, independent of officers, commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned, and drummers, that he underſtood the royal army conſiſted of an equal force; and though he could not ſpeak deciſively on the ſubject, he was ſo far warranted to give an opinion, that the ſuperior diſcipline, ſkill, and appointment of the troops under Sir William Howe, gave him a ſuperiority over the enemy. He underſtood, the Britiſh army was equal in number in June, when in the Jerſeys; and he believed a thouſand militia, included in his account of the numbers of the rebel army, were without arms.

Rebels 15,000.

Howe equal in numbers. Superior in diſcipl.

1000 of the rebels without arms.

Q. When Sir William Howe landed at the head of the Elke, did many perſons of weight and conſequence, or any conſiderable number of perſons of any deſcription, reſort to the royal ſtandard?

A. No; but a Mr. Brown, a man of great property in that neigh-

neighbourhood, came over to New-York in the preceding spring, and informed him, that great numbers in the four lower counties on the Delaware would, as soon as a force appeared, repair to the royal ſtandard. Four lower counties loyal.

Q. After Sir William Howe proceeded up the country, previous to the battle at the Brandywine, did great numbers of people, armed or unarmed, join the royal army?

A. No; becauſe they were afraid, dreading, that as ſoon as the army left them, they would be ſubject to the oppreſſions of the Congreſs party.

Q. Is then Mr. Galloway of opinion, that the loyal inhabitants of the four lower counties, unprotected by the royal army, were able to protect themſelves?

A. Yes, if they had arms; and that the royal army had remained a month with them, to diſcipline and embody them.

Q. Was Mr. Brown as good as his word; did he offer himſelf accompanied by ſeveral perſons of fortune, weight, and influence in thoſe counties, to Sir William Howe, on his arrival, or on his march towards the Brandywine, &c.?

A. He did not, becauſe without arms or diſcipline, or protection, the loyaliſts muſt have remained at the mercy of the Congreſs party.

Q. Did any conſiderable number of loyal Americans offer themſelves to Sir William Howe, after his taking poſſeſſion of Philadelphia, either within or without the province of Pennſylvania? *A.* He could not ſay there did.

Q. Does Mr. Galloway know what were the whole number of recruits or corps raiſed in the province of Pennſylvania, during Sir William Howe's ſtay at Philadelphia?

A. Two troops of cavalry, and three battalions of infantry?

Q. What was the amount of this force, and what number of men was each battallion of infantry compoſed of?

A. He could not exactly ſay; he believed the infantry amounted to one thouſand, and the cavalry to ſomewhat under two hundred. 1000 foot & 200 horſe raiſed.

Q. Would the witneſs undertake to ſay, that the whole force ſo raiſed amounted to one thouſand?

A. He believed it did.

Q. Was not the witneſs in a ſituation, from a place he enjoyed under Government, which enabled him to ſpeak with preciſion on the ſubject, and what was that place?

A. He had no document which informed him ſo as to return a ſpecific anſwer to the queſtion; his place was that of providing quarters for the loyal Provincials.

Q. After Sir William defeated the rebels at German-town, took Red-Bank, &c. what number of perſons, inhabitants of the four lower counties, came in under the Proclamation, or offered to take up arms?

A. None came in. Offers came from the four lower counties, provided they were armed, disciplined, and protected.

Q. Was Sir William Howe's army sufficiently strong to admit of a detachment equal to the disciplining and protecting the loyalists in those counties?

At Brandywine rebels 15,000.

A. He could not say. He could say, that the whole rebel force engaged at the Brandywine did not exceed 15,000 men.

Q. After the defence of Philadelphia and the posts on the Delaware, &c. was the witness of opinion that Sir William Howe could spare a detachment sufficient for the purpose?

A. He could not say, but he understood, that Mr. Washington's force was greatly diminished, while the army under his command lay hutted in the camp at Valley Forge.

Q. On the whole, will Mr. Galloway undertake to say from his own knowledge, while he remained with the army, that he saw any appearance or probability, either in the four lower counties, Pennsylvania, the Jerseys, or province of New York, of a number of inhabitants sufficient to maintain themselves against the power and government of the Congress, though they had been armed?

A. He believed not, unless the army remained with them some time; but the people of the Jersies, who had been deserted and left to the power of the Congress, were fearful of shewing themselves ever again friendly to Great-Britain.

Q. Will the witness undertake to say, that when the inhabitants were armed, disciplined, and protected by the Royal army, that they were able to defend themselves, as soon as they lost the protection described, either in Pennsylvania, New-York, Rhode-Island, or the Jerseys?

A. Certainly not, without they should be assisted by the Royal army.

On his intimacy with Sir W. Howe.

Q. Did not Mr. Galloway live in the greatest intimacy with Sir William Howe?

A. Yes, in the way of business.

Q. Was he ever denied access, as often as he called at Head Quarters?

A. Never, he presumed, when Sir William Howe was at home.

Q. Was not he frequently with him, and near him?

A. Yes, he was, in the way of business, and he lived next door to him.

Q. Did not Sir William Howe frequently dine with Mr. Galloway, and Mr. Galloway with Sir William Howe?

A. Sir William never dined with him but once; he dined with Sir William Howe often.

Q. Was not the situation of America, in respect of the temper and disposition of the inhabitants towards the British Government, the constant subject of conversation between them, and the best means of improving that disposition, &c.?

A. It

A. It ſometimes was. It was oftner directed to the ſubject of the department in which he acted. He remembered, on his firſt introduction to Sir William at New-York, the converſation continued only for about ten minutes, and was directed only to an enquiry into general occurrences, and mere matter of ceremony.

Q. What fortune had Mr. Galloway before the breaking out of the rebellion? Loſt 40,000 l. by the rebels.

A. About what would ſell for forty thouſand pounds.

Q. If American independance ſhould prevail, and that we ſhould not be able to ſubdue that country by force of arms, has Mr. Galloway any proſpect of recovering his eſtate?

A. None at all; it has been already confiſcated, and its produce applied in augmenting the public revenue.

Q. Has Mr. Galloway any other preſent ſupport but what he derives under Government? *A.* None.

Q. Has he not a penſion from Government?

A. He has an allowance or maintenance, very trifling in compariſon to the property he loſt.

Q. Has not Mr. Galloway a penſion? Is he not this inſtant in the receipt of it? He does not want to know its amount, but he deſires to know if it be not during pleaſure, and not for life, with or without remainder to his family?

A. He never thought of the diſtinction. He cannot ſay that he has a fixed penſion. He has been promiſed a ſmall allowance. He has received as yet but a mere trifle. On his allowance.

Examined by Lord Howe.

Q. Had not Mr. Galloway a conſtant uninterrupted acceſs at all times, and upon all occaſions to Lord Howe, upon matters reſpecting his majeſty's commiſſion for making peace with America? *A.* He had. Queſtioned by Lord Howe.

Q. Did Mr. Galloway ever communicate to Lord Howe, the temper and diſpoſition of the inhabitants of the four lower counties?

A. He could not exactly ſay or undertake to charge his memory. He imagined the arming and diſciplining the troops, &c. came more properly under the cognizance of Sir William Howe.

Q. Had he ever communicated to Lord Howe the errand which brought Mr. Brown to Philadelphia?

A. He had not.

Q. Had he communicated it to Sir William Howe?

A. Not till after the troops landed at the head of Elke.

Q. Did not Mr. Galloway apply for a flag of truce, in order to go out and treat upon terms with the rebels, two days previous to the evacuation of Philadelphia?

A. He did, but he begged to explain: he did not go out to treat upon terms for himſelf, but only to ſee if the congreſs would ſuffer his wife to enjoy her own eſtate in his abſence, or if he Treats with the rebels.

he could not obtain that, whether ſhe and her family ſhould be entitled to it after his deceaſe.

Q. Though Mr. Galloway left Philadelphia with the army, did not he recommend to all the loyal Americans there to ſtay?

Adviſes loyal Americans to remain in Philadelphia on our going off.

A. He did, becauſe he thought no ſanguinary meaſures would be taken againſt perſons who might be ſuppoſed to act upon motives of compulſion, being in a ſtate of ſubduction under a ſuperior force.

Q. Did the ſuppoſed loyal Americans in Philadelphia act from ſuch motives?

A. He could not ſay. Some of them might; many of them he was ſure did not.

Q. Was not Mr. Galloway's advice the occaſion that two perſons were hanged, immediately after Philadelphia was evacuated? Was it not, particularly, by his perſuaſions that thoſe unhappy men remained behind?

Two perſons hanged in conſequence.

A. Two men were tried and executed, it is true. He did not recollect that he had addreſſed himſelf particularly to thoſe two men; his arguments were founded in general reaſonings, ſuch as he had already aſſigned.

Q. When Mr. Galloway applied to Lord Howe to recommend him to the protection of the Miniſtry, what was Lord Howe's anſwer?

A. He could not ſay that he exactly remembered.

Curious converſation.

Q. Does Mr. Galloway recollect the following remarkable words? The only way, Sir, in which you can expect to ſucceed with the Britiſh Miniſtry, is, to abuſe Lord Howe, and Sir William Howe, and impute every misfortune that has happened in America to their neglect and incapacity.

A. He did not recollect the words now ſtated. He remembered, after ſome expreſſions of a wiſh to ſerve him (the witneſs) that his Lordſhip ſaid, his intereſt or influence with the miniſter, meaning the noble Lord at the head of the American department, was at an end, or words to that effect.

Q. Did Lord Howe, upon any occaſion either public or private, treat Mr. Galloway with any appearance of neglect, coldneſs, or want of attention and reſpect?

Lord Howe's politeneſs to Mr. Galloway.

A. Lord Howe always behaved with great politeneſs to him.

Q. On Lord Howe's return to Europe, upon an application made to him by Mr. Galloway for a ſafe paſſage to Great-Britain, did not he accommodate him aboard his own ſhip, the Eagle, which, upon many accounts known to the witneſs, and particularly the numerous applications made to him by ſeveral other gentlemen in the civil and military line, was rather inconvenient? *A.* He did

FUGITIVE

FUGITIVE PIECES

RESPECTING THE

American War.

Lord Howe in a ſpeech April 29th, gave the following reaſons for demanding an enquiry. His conduct and his Brother's had been arraigned in Pamphlets and in News Papers, written by perſons in high credit and confidence with Miniſters; by ſeveral Members of that Houſe, in that Houſe, in the face of the Nation; by ſome of great credit and reſpect in their public characters, known to be countenanced by Adminiſtration: and that one of them in particular, (Governor Johnſtone) had made the moſt direct and ſpecific charges.

The Pieces alluded to by his Lordſhip are here inſerted to give the Reader a full view of the Subject.

LETTER *from* BOSTON.

July 5th, 1775.

A Conſtant hurry, a ſucceſſion of unexpected events, and a croud of reflexions during my few leiſure hours, have till the preſent day prevented my writing. But I ſhall begin regularly. General Gage was both well informed and prudent in fortifying Boſton neck. The rebels had laid a plan to ſurpriſe the town, to cut off the troops, and the loyal ſubjects. This was diſcovered through the ſtrong inveteracy of ſome of the conſpirators, who could not help enjoying before hand, in converſation, the pleaſure of the maſſacre. Proper meaſures were taken to prevent it; but no ſearch made for concealed arms. The evening of St. George's day was the time fixed; the officers doors were to be particularly marked. A hint from the Bible.

Plan to cut off the army in Boſton.

The 18th of April, at eleven at night, 800 grenadiers and light infantry embarked at the common under Lieut. Colonel Smith, and landed at Phipps's Farm. The object to deſtroy a rebel

Action at Concord.

rebel magazine at Concord about twenty miles diſtant. On their route early next morning at Lexington, they were oppoſed by a body of armed men, who from fences, fired upon our advanced guard, but were ſoon diſperſed. Arriving at Concord we executed the purpoſe for which we were detached, throwing into the river near an hundred barrels of powder, a quantity of ſalted proviſions, flour, &c. and deſtroyed ſome gun carriages, three guns, &c. Capt. Parſons ſent forward from the bridge with three companies, on his return found Capt. Laurie who had been left to poſſeſs it, driven off; luckily for him and his party the rebels did not break up the bridge, or he and his men would have been cut off. On this ſpot they found three of Laurie's men who had been wounded, dreadfully mangled by the rebels; they were ſcalped, their ears cut off, and gouged, this laſt is puſhing the eyes out of their ſockets, and yet theſe miſerable men were ſtill alive.

Our wounded ſcalped, and eyes put out.

From Concord back to Lexington, we ſuſtained a conſtant fire from every fence, houſe, hollow way, and height as we paſſed along. Here Lord Percy joined us with the firſt brigade. He had left Boſton at 9 o'clock that morning. It was a neceſſary reinforcement, for the whole country was in arms, and all the picked men for forty miles round. We got back to Boſton with the loſs of upwards of fifty men, and many more wounded. This finiſhed our excurſions after rebel Magazines. I cannot tell the rebel loſs.

Our ſecret had been ill kept, the rebels knew our intention and were prepared for us. Lieut. Col. Smith's party would have been deſtroyed had not Lord Percy joined him, and even he was almoſt too late from two ſtupid blunders we committed. The General ordered the firſt brigade under arms at four in the morning; theſe orders the evening before were carried to the Brigade Major's; he was not at home; the orders were left; no enquiry was made after him; he came home late; his ſervant forgot to tell him there was a letter on his table; four o'clock came; no brigade appeared; at five o'clock an expreſs from Smith deſiring a reinforcement produced an enquiry; the above diſcovery was made; at ſix o'clock part of the brigade got on the parade; there they waited expecting the marines; at ſeven no marines appearing, another enquiry commenced; they had received no orders; it was aſſerted they had; in the altercation it came out that the order had been addreſſed to Major Pitcairn who commanded the Marines and left at his quarters, though the gentleman concerned in this buſineſs ought to have recollected he had been diſpatched the evening before with the grenadiers and light infantry under Lieut. Colonel Smith. This double miſtake loſt us from four till nine o'clock, the time we marched off to ſupport Lieut. Colonel Smith.

Two ſtrange blunders.

On

On the 17th of June, at day break, we ſaw the rebels at work throwing up intrenchments on Bunkers hill; by mid-day they had completed a redoubt of earth about thirty yards ſquare on the height; and from the left of that, a line of about half a mile in length down to Myſtic river: of this line 100 yards next the redoubt was alſo earth, about five feet high, all the reſt down to the water conſiſted of two rows of fence rails, the interval filled with buſhes, hay, and graſs, which they found on the ſpot ready cut. Deſcription of the rebel lines at Bunkers hill.

Early in the afternoon, from a battery in the corner of the redoubt, they fired ſeven or eight ſhot into the north end of the town; one ſhot went through an old houſe, another through a fence, and the reſt ſtuck in the face of Cobb's hill.

At this time their lines were attacked by Major General Howe at the head of 1600 men, compoſed of 20 companies of grenadiers and light infantry, 40 men each, with the 5th, 38th, 43d, and 52d regiment. General Howe commanded on the right with the light infantry, Brigadier General Pigot on the left; while Pigot attacked the redoubt, Howe was to force the graſs fence, gain the rebel's left flank and rear, and ſurround the redoubt. Plan of attack.

Our troops advanced with great confidence, expecting an eaſy victory. As they were marching up to attack, our artillery ſtopped firing, the General on enquiring the reaſon was told they had got twelve pound balls to ſix pounders, but that they had grape ſhot; on this he ordered them forward and to fire grape. As we approached, an inceſſant ſtream of fire poured from the rebel lines, it ſeemed a continued ſheet of fire for near thirty minutes. Our light infantry were ſerved up in companies againſt the graſs fence, without being able to penetrate; indeed how could we penetrate, moſt of our grenadiers and light infantry the moment of preſenting themſelves, loſt 3-fourths, and many 9-tenths of their men. Some had only eight and nine men a company left, ſome only three, four, and five. On the left Pigot was ſtaggered and actually retreated; obſerve our men were not driven back, they actually retreated by orders: great pains has been taken to huddle up this matter: however, they almoſt inſtantly came on again and mounted the redoubt. The rebels then run without firing another ſhot, and our men who firſt mounted gave them a fire or two on their backs. At this time Warren their commander fell: he was a Phyſician, little more than thirty years of age; he died in his beſt cloaths; every body remembered his fine ſilk fringed waiſtcoat. The right flank of the rebel lines being now gained, and not the left as was intended, their whole body ran along the neck to Cambridge. No purſuit was made. Twelve pound ball to ſix pounders. Warren the rebel commander.

We have loſt 1000 men killed and wounded. We burned Charleſtown during the engagement, as the rebels from it exceedingly

ceedingly galled our left. Major Pitcairn was killed from it. Too great a confidence in ourſelves, which is always dangerous, occaſioned this dreadful loſs. Let us take the bull by the horns was the phraſe of ſome great men among us as we marched on. We went to battle without even reconnoitering the poſition of the enemy. Had we only wanted to drive them from their ground without the loſs of a man, the Cymetry tranſport which drew little water, and mounted 18 nine pounders, could have been towed up Myſtic channel, and brought to within muſket ſhot of their left flank which was quite naked, and ſhe could have lain water borne at the loweſt ebb tide; or one of our covered boats, muſket proof, carrying a heavy piece of cannon, might have been rowed cloſe in, and one diſcharge on their uncovered flank, would have diſlodged them in a ſecond.

Could have diſlodged the rebels without the loſs of a man.

Had we intended to have taken the whole rebel army priſoners, we needed only have landed in their rear and occupied the high ground above Bunkers hill, by this movement we ſhut them up in the Peninſula as in a bag, their rear expoſed to the fire of our cannon, and if we pleaſed our muſketry: in ſhort, they muſt have ſurrendered inſtantly, or been blown to pieces.

Or taken them all priſoners.

But from an abſurd and deſtructive confidence, careleſneſs, or ignorance, we have loſt a thouſand of our beſt men and officers, and have given the rebels great matter of triumph, by ſhewing them what miſchief they can do us. They were not followed though Clinton propoſed it. Their deſerters ſince tell us that not a man would have remained at Cambridge, had but a ſingle regiment been ſeen coming along the neck.

Had we ſeen and rejected all the advantages I have mentioned above, even our manner of attacking in front was ruinous. In advancing, not a ſhot ſhould have been fired, as it retarded the troops, whoſe movement ſhould have been as rapid as poſſible. They ſhould not have been brought up in line, but in columns with light infantry in the intervals, to keep up a ſmart fire againſt the top of the breaſt work. If this had been done, their works would have been carried in three minutes, with not a tenth part of our preſent loſs.

Or ſtormed their works with a tenth of the loſs.

We ſhould have been forced to retire, if General Clinton had not come up with a reinforcement of 5 or 600 men. This re-eſtabliſhed the left under Pigot, and ſaved our honour. The wretched blunder of the over ſized balls ſprung from the dotage of an officer of rank in that corps, who ſpends his whole time in dallying with the Schoolmaſter's daughters. God knows he is old enough—he is no Sampſon—yet he muſt have his Dalilah.

A Dalilah the cauſe of the artillery blunder.

Another circumſtance equally true and aſtoniſhing is, that General Gage had undoubted intelligence early in May, that the rebels intended to poſſeſs Bunkers hill, yet no ſtep was taken to ſecure that important poſt, though it commanded all the north part of the town. He likewiſe had an exact return of the

the corps that compoſed the rebel army then inveſting the town; of every piece of cannon they poſſeſſed; of their intended lines of blockade; and of the numbers expected, and on their march from the other Provinces.

We are all wrong at the head. My mind cannot help dwelling upon our curſed miſtakes. Such ill conduct at the firſt outſet, argues a groſs ignorance of the moſt common and obvious rules of the profeſſion, and gives us for the future anxious forebodings. I have loſt ſome of thoſe I moſt valued. This madneſs or ignorance nothing can excuſe. The brave men's lives were wantonly thrown away. Our conductor as much murdered them as if he had cut their throats himſelf on Boſton common. Had he fallen, ought we to have regretted him?

Lives wantonly thrown away.

LETTER *from* NEW YORK.

March, 9*th*, 1777.

As probably you may not have heard the true particulars of our flight from Boſton, about this time laſt year, I ſhall give it you. Soon after our victory as it has been called on Bunkers Hill, General Howe ſucceeded to the command of the army. This for ſome time gave pretty general ſatisfaction, as General Gage was thought too tame, and by ſome ſuſpected of a predilection for the Americans, ariſing from his family connections. The critical ſituation of our affairs demanded men of vigour and enterprize. Some complained of his complaiſance to the Boſton ſelect men, of his ſaying they were good ſort of people and ſaved him much trouble; and of his goſſiping with the Commiſſioners. Theſe people, you may believe, admired General Howe for the oppoſite qualities, which they ſaid, or imagined, he poſſeſſed. He was an officer of experience, and tried courage; the Select Men would be proſcribed; every American diſtruſted; and the Commiſſioners would not be permitted to thruſt their noſes into his houſe. All tittle tattle and goſſiping were to be at end at Head Quarters. Even the blunders at Bunkers Hill were forgotten, ſo happy were moſt people at the change. His reſerve and retirement were imputed to an indefatigable attention to the duties of his ſtation, and his perſonal gloom and moroſeneſs were apologized for from the vexation that a great mind, always intent on important objects, muſt feel from frivolous or impertinent intruſions. It was a conſiderable time before this was diſcovered to be only a fancy picture. The man's retirements, were found to be *not* the retirements of buſineſs; and his habitual moroſeneſs, *not* to be the ſenſibilities of a great mind diſturbed by impertinence. We remained the fall and winter waiting reinforcements. In March the rebels appeared on Dorcheſter Neck, which commands

Opinions on General Gage.

On Gen. Howe.

Latters real character.

Should have poſſeſſed Dorcheſter heights.

mands the South part of Boſton, as Bunker's Hill does the North part. We had once a detachment on this height, but abandoned it. The rebels diſcovered its importance, and as ſoon as the ſeaſon permitted, occupied it. We embarked 2000 men to attack them, but a violent ſtorm prevented the execution. Next day, the rebels were thought too ſtrongly poſted; and ſoon after, orders were given for an evacuation. Thus by a palpable neglect of our own, were we forced to deſert a town with diſgrace, which had coſt us at leaſt 2000 men to keep; and that too juſt on the eve of our receiving the expected reinforcements. In fact, our ſafe retreat was owing to a ſecret capitulation with the rebels. They were to allow us to run away quietly, and we were not to burn the town. It is impoſſible to enumerate the immenſe variety of goods that were left, particularly woollens and linens. A rich, and what is more, a much wanted ſupply for the rebels. Had we attacked at Dorcheſter, we moſt probably ſhould have been repulſed. Our detachment was too weak; and the rebels, by Sullivan's advice, had got more than 100 hogſheads filled with ſtones to roll down the hill and break our lines as we advanced. When it was determined to run away, the General convened the principal officers and made a ſpeech to them on the occaſion, and ſome even of them who diſliked him moſt, confeſſed their was real merit in it, which greatly perplexed them, as they were ſure it was not his own, and yet they could not diſcover where he got it.

Secret capitulation at Boſton.

Sullivans odd ſcheme.

Good ſpeech of General Howe.

A blunder loſes us 700 men.

Though our reinforcements were by this time thought to be at Sea, no care was taken to leave a ſufficient force off the harbour to prevent them running into the mouth of the enemy. Indeed the Renown, Capt. Banks, was left in Nantaſket Road, but it never appeared he had proper orders, for on the firſt ſalute from only one piece of cannon, he made the beſt of his way for Halifax; whereas, he ſhould have continued cruizing off the harbour, to give information of our retreat. This was a capital blunder, the reſult of the moſt impenetrable ſtupidity, and loſt us Lieut. Col. Campbell and 700 men, who run right into the harbour of Boſton, not knowing but that place was ſtill in our hands.

Our voyage to and from Halifax was juſt like any other ſea voyage, where troops are too much crouded together.

Gen. Howe lets the rebel army eſcape.

Laſt Auguſt on Long Iſland we rejected an opportunity of terminating the rebellion; the rebels when defeated ran into their lines in the utmoſt diſorder, our grenadiers were following them with great ardour, when the General after much difficulty, called them off. Had our troops been allowed to go on, not a ſoul of the rebels would have eſcaped. A lady, whoſe huſband and brother were rebel officers, on their defeat ruſhed into the houſe, and deſired her to fly with her child, as they expected every moment to be cut in pieces. She did ſo; but could

could not get within a quarter of a mile of the ferry; the rebel croud was ſo great, and they were in ſuch trepidation, that thoſe in the rear were mounting on the ſhoulders and clambering over the heads of thoſe before them. What a glorious opportunity did General Howe here reject of finiſhing the war with eclat. We threw away three days in regular approaches, during all which time the rebels were ferrying themſelves over, for it was the morning of the 30th before their rear embarked.

So does Lord H.

Lord Howe could ſend two frigates up the North River, for a whim of his own, and expoſe them to the fire of at leaſt 100 pieces of cannon, but he lay almoſt within ſight of the ferry, and let the rebel army croſs it, tho' it was a branch of the ſea near a mile wide, for three days, or at leaſt two days and half, without ſending any of his numerous ſquadron to annoy them.

I aſked a warm friend of the Admiral's, why his Lordſhip did not bring his heavy ſhips againſt the batteries on the Eaſt River, and cut off the rebel retreat as well as riſk his frigates for no purpoſe up the North River? The reply was the Admiral did not chuſe to riſk his Majeſty's ſhips. Thus his Lordſhip will not riſk his Majeſty's ſhips; the General will not riſk his Majeſty's men; for theſe reaſons the rebels eſcaped, and the rebellion continues.

So the rebellion continues.

Loſſes in Jerſeys

Every day preſents new blunders, we have loſt three regiments of Heſſians in the Jerſeys this winter, and nearly an equal number of our own men from our foraging parties; all from not ſupporting and protecting our line of cantonment formed the end of laſt year. Our Commander has been enjoying his pleaſures while every thing has been going to wreck in the Jerſeys. What do you think of the favourite ſultana loſing 300 guineas in a night at cards, who three years ago would have found it difficult to have muſtered as many pence? Don't you think this Boſton Lady in high luck? As to the huſband, his various places are reckoned 6000 *l.* a year: it is ſaid he does not ſave a ſhilling:—But he looks fat and contented.

The profuſion of the Sultana

Her huſband fat and contented.

REMARKS on General HOWE's own account of his proceedings on LONG ISLAND, *in the Extraordinary Gazette of October* 10*th*, 1776.

Caution in judging of Generals and Miniſters.

UPON any undue miſcarriage in our land or ſea ſervice, every man's love of juſtice, and regard for the public intereſt, will lead him to wiſh, that whereſoever the fault lay, there may fall the public cenſure and diſgrace: that the innocent may not ſuffer, and the guilty may not eſcape. If a meaſure

ſure has been originally wrong and ill concerted, or was in itſelf too hazardous or impracticable; and we lay upon the commander the blame of not having ſucceeded in it, we may loſe a good general, and retain a bad miniſter. If, on the other hand the meaſure, as originally planned, was right and proper, and we blame the miniſter, becauſe the general miſbehaved in the execution, in that caſe we may loſe a good miniſter, and retain a bad commander. Every honeſt man muſt ſee, that the public intereſt is much concerned in the making this neceſſary diſtinction.

Conduct of all oppoſitions.

The conduct of all oppoſitions is little different. In every miſcarriage their invariable rule of practice has been to juſtify the commander, and to lay the blame on the miniſter. Far from feeling any concern for their country, and expreſſing a juſt reſentment at any miſconduct in the commanders; they hold themſelves rather obliged to them for diſgracing the ſervice, and furniſhing them with a freſh ground of attack upon their rivals.

Obliged to Officers who miſbehave.

False charge of oppoſ. in 1741.

Upon the miſcarriage at Carthagena in 1741, miniſters, they ſaid, had ſtarved the war, and tied up the hands of the commanders. Afterwards, their own letters, which Vernon publiſhed, proved the leaders in oppoſition knew the falſhood of this charge. But it ſerved their purpoſe to give it out, and the people were made believe it.

Mr. Pitt's opion of Byng.

His ſaying when in power.

Upon Admiral Byng's miſbehaviour in 1756, Mr. Pitt told the Houſe, in his own favourite and abſurd idiom, he found no criminality in Mr. Byng. Mr. Pitt himſelf, when he came to be miniſter, upon the miſconduct at Rochfort, experienced ſomething of the ſame kind. But as the Newcaſtle party had, as he ſaid, lent him their majority, the oppoſition was too feeble to make head againſt him.

A good plan and ſufficient force the Miniſter's duty.

The Executive part the General's duty.

If in projecting any diſtant expedition, a miniſter ſhall have formed a good and proper plan, and furniſhed a ſufficient force for the execution of it, he has diſcharged his part, and done all that is incumbent upon him. The manner of making uſe of that force, and of carrying the plan into execution, that lies with the commander.

Our low ebb when Ld. G. G. became Secreta.

His vigorous councils.

When Lord George Germaine became ſecretary, the Britiſh intereſt in America was at its loweſt ebb. Our troops had been inglorioufly pent up in Boſton, and ſtill more inglorioufly driven out of it. The whole American empire was reduced to Halifax and Quebec, and Quebec itſelf was beſieged. In this low ſtate of our affairs, Lord George Germaine took the ſeals, and gave a vigour to our councils unknown to them before. By engaging a large body of foreign troops, and ſending the earlieſt ſuccour up the river St. Lawrence, the whole of Canada was recovered, a fleet was built at St. John's, and the rebels were beaten from off the lakes.

General

General Howe, at the head of between twenty and thirty thouſand men, and attended by a great fleet, landed on Long Iſland a force ſuperior in number, and much more in diſcipline to that which oppoſed him. By a juſt diſpoſition the out-poſts were all forced; ten thouſand of the rebels, as the General himſelf counts them, were defeated; beſide the killed, wounded, and drowned, eleven hundred of them were made priſoners, and the reſt fled with the utmoſt precipitation into their lines, purſued by the victors cloſe up to their trenches. Filled with all the ardour of ſucceſs, the troops would inſtantly have entered their camp, when the General thought he had, for that day at leaſt done the rebel army damage enough; and choſe to give them time to recover from their fright. See his own account of the affair.

Battle of Brookl.

Rebels defeated.

"The grenadiers and 33d regiment being in front of the column, ſoon approached within muſket ſhot of the enemy's lines at Brooklyn; from whence theſe battalions, without regard to the fire of cannon and ſmall arms upon them, purſued nnmbers of the rebels that were retiring from the heights, ſo cloſe to their principal redoubt, and with ſuch eagerneſs to attack it by ſtorm, that it required repeated orders to prevail on them to deſiſt from the attempt. Had they been permitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the redoubt; but as it was apparent the lines muſt have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches, I would not riſk the loſs that might have been ſuſtained in the aſſault, and ordered them back to a hollow way, in the front of the works, out of the reach of muſquetry."

Troops eager to ſtorm but called off.

Gen. H's opinion they would have carried the redoubt.

Can the reader wonder, that the troops were thus eager for the attack, and that it required repeated orders to prevail upon them to deſiſt, when the General himſelf was of opinion, and every other man plainly ſaw, that the lines muſt have been forced, and the whole rebel army taken or deſtroyed? Even without any previous defeat, the army which attacks another in their trenches, is generally thought to have the advantage. But there is ſcarce an inſtance to be found, of a defeated army precipitately flying into their trenches, ever defending them againſt a victorious army of near double their number. The French generals aſcribed their loſing the battle of Turin to their ſtaying behind their lines. Prince Eugene had certainly never won it, if when he had got up to them, he had delayed the attack, and had thought only of beſieging them with regular approaches. King William loſt the battle of Landen by truſting to his lines, which Marſhal Luxemburgh attacked as ſoon as he came up to them, without giving him time to croſs the river in the night and eſcape him.

Remarks on this conduct.

Troops attacked in their lines generally beaten.

Examplified in the French at Turin.

And King Will. at Landen.

Had the commander in chief choſen to follow the judgment of the other generals, and ſtormed the lines, the rebel army was at their mercy, and the war would have been at an end. Was it

Gen. Howe's not puſhing his victory, not the fault of Miniſt.

it the fault of the miniſters at home, that the rebellion was not brought to ſo happy a period?

It was not the Miniſter that called off the troops.

Was it the miniſter that ſuggeſted the giving up all theſe advantages, by calling off the troops in the midſt of victory, and the hiding them in a hollow-way, out of the reach of muſquet-ſhot? and then, after two days delay, deliberately opening trenches at ſix hundred yards diſtance?

Marlborough ſtorms the ſtrong lines at Donawert.

From this ſlow and ſolemn preparation we might think, that theſe lines were as ſtrong as thoſe of Donawert; which yet the Duke of Marlborough ſtormed the ſame evening that he came up to them. But did we ever hear of a great and victorious army's being ſtopped in the midſt of conqueſt, for forming regular approaches againſt the ditch of a line, which was three miles long, and only three or four feet deep? Did not the rebel fugitives run over the ditch and breaſt work, wherever their purſuers ſuffered them? and could not Britiſh troops as eaſily have followed them? Were theſe lines guarded by any ſuch rocky precipices, as thoſe which the Heſſians ſtormed at Fort Waſhington? Had the redoubt, for which the ſucceſs of twenty thouſand victors was ſtopped, a tenth part of the ſtrength that nature and art had given to Fort Montgomery? which yet General Clinton ſtormed, with one quarter of that number; without loſing three minutes upon regular approaches.

Rebel lines 3 miles long, ditch only 3 or 4 feet deep.

As the rebs. run over them, they might have been followed.

Forts Waſhingt. & Montgomery much ſtronger yet ſtormed.

Opinion of other Generals.

The loſs of a hundred men, which other generals thought would be the greateſt they could ſuſtain in forcing the camp; and the putting an end to the war, by the deletion of the rebel army, would have been the ſaving of ten thouſand brave men's lives, which have been loſt by protracting it.

Rebels eſcape by land and ſea.

But it was apparent, we are told, that the lines muſt have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches. Doubtleſs—but they helped him to a much cheaper one: and that was, to move off and leave them to him. Were not the ſame boats, which carried the rebel army from New York to Long Iſland, lying ready to bring them back from Long Iſland to New York? Had the admiral deſtroyed any one of them? Could they wiſh for more than three days leiſure to collect and add to them all the veſſels in New York, and the adjacent places, to carry them off? Could he think that they would not exert their utmoſt diligence to ſave themſelves from the deſtruction which they hourly expected.

12 or 14,000 men, and all their baggage & ſtores, croſs an arm of the ſea unmoleſted by the Admiral or General.

Inſtances do not often occur of a General's vigilance being thus eluded. And we may juſtly wonder, that a whole army of twelve or fourteen thouſand men, with almoſt all their baggage, and ſtores, ſhould move off, acroſs an arm of the ſea, twelve hundred yards over, without the General or Admiral knowing any thing of the matter; that their very centinels, to ſay nothing of their artillery, ſhould be drawn off, and our

advanced

advanced centinels give no notice of it. There are, indeed, who ſay ;—But let others write what they hear ;——I would confine myſelf to the General's own account of his ſuffering them thus to eſcape.

One of the greateſt military atchievements of the Prince of Parma's life, was his conveying his army acroſs the Seine, after being ſhut up by the French in a Peninſula of that river ; and nothing ever happened more mortifying to Henry the Fourth. But our ſea and land commanders ſuffer a beaten army, inſtead of a victorious one, to ferry over an arm of the ſea, without making any the leaſt apology. The General having at his own cheap rate gotten poſſeſſion of the lines, ſeems quite at eaſe ; and, far from expreſſing any mortification at their eſcape, treats their flight out of the iſland as rather a matter of triumph.

Atchievement of the Prince of Parma.

The noble Admiral's account runs in much the ſame ſtrain. " The Roebuck, Capt. Hammond, was the only ſhip that could fetch high enough to exchange a few random ſhot with the battery on Red Hook ; the ebb making ſtrongly down the river ſoon after, I ordered the ſquadron to anchor. On the night of the 29th, the rebels abandoned all their poſts and works on Long Iſland, and retired with precipitation acroſs the Eaſt River to the town of New York."

Lord Howe's conduct.

Ebb ſtops the fleet.

If a crow had fled over the paſſage, could he have ſpoken of it with a calmer indifference ?

Remarks on it.

The reader will obſerve, that the journal of the fleet's proceedings ends on the morning of the 27th : whether, and which way the wind veered during the three following days, is not ſaid. All, which we at this diſtance can know, is, if the tide of ebb made it neceſſary to caſt anchor, to prevent the ſhips being carried down ; that in thoſe three days there were ſix tides of flood to carry them up.

But 3 days, ſix tides of flood might have carried them up.

The expreſſion, " leaving their cannon in all their works," manifeſtly leads us to conclude, that they did not take any away. If this was the caſe, and we look to the liſt of the cannon taken, in what a contemptible light muſt all theſe lines, redoubts, and batteries appear. The braſs pieces were taken in the rout of the 27th. From that day therefore to the 30th, a great army, with forty pieces of artillery, beſide their field equipage, attended by a fleet carrying many hundred guns, are all ſtopped in the full career of victory, and kept in awe for three days together, by lines, redoubts and batteries of *three miles extent*, containing all of them put together only *twenty-ſix pieces of iron ordnance.*

Lines of 3 miles extent containing only 26 cannons. ſtop us 3 days.

All theſe various movements, neceſſarily attending the retreat and embarkation of ten or twelve thouſand men, with the beſt part of their cannon, baggage and ſtores, were performed without any the leaſt interruption from either army or fleet, which lay ſo near ; and that too on the very night of a full moon.

The rebels move off without interruption.

If Lord Howe could not intercept, Gen. Howe Should not have permitted them to eſcape.

I do not however put the dilemma. Either the ſhips, on one of the foregoing days, could have puſhed up beyond the ferry, and prevented that vaſt tranſportation; or, they could not; becauſe I ſuppoſe; that the batteries on the two ſhores, and on Governor's Iſland, rendered it impracticable. But then the General could not but know this. And the public might have expected that he would have preſſed the enemy ſo much the more, and given them no time to eſcape from him at land; ſince he knew he could not intercept their paſſage at ſea. The nation ſurely need not repent the having put this gentleman at the head of an American eſtabliſhment for fifty-four thouſand troops, attended with ninety-ſix ſhips of war.

America eſtabliſhment under Gen. H. 54,000 men, with 96 ſhips of war.

LETTER *from* NEW YORK.

December 10*th*, 1777.

Burgoyne's ruin imputed to Gen. Howe.

If you was in this town, you would be ſurprized to find the Howes ſo unpopular; they have been ſo here all this campaign. The total loſs of General Burgoyne's army can only be imputed to them.

Military diviſion of America.

By thistime, to poſſeſs the lakes and the North River, and, by that means to ſeperate the northern and ſouthern colonies, ſeems to have been the expectation of the King, Miniſtry, Parliament, and the nation.

Had General Howe gone up the North River, inſtead of acting to the Southward, that line of ſeperation would have been formed in July; General Burgoyne's army would have been ſaved, and both armies, conjunctly or ſeparately, might have acted againſt New England, which would have been ſtriking at the heart of the rebellion.

Plan to conq. it.

Had this been done in December, the rebel inhabitants of Connecticut muſt have taken ſhelter in Maſſachuſſets and New Hampſhire, and there they muſt have all ſtarved or ſubmitted in the ſpace of a few months, as thoſe provinces never yet maintained their own inhabitants.

All this might have been done; admitting, however improbable, that Waſhington had forced our poſts on the North River, and paſſed it, which is not likely he could do, not having boats, and having both our armies and ſhipping oppoſed to him.

Suppoſing therefore, as the moſt probable caſe, that he could not paſs the North Kiver, he muſt either remain a tame ſpectator of the conqueſt of New England, or attack Staten Iſland; for New York he could not approach without paſſing the North River. That iſland might eaſily have been defended, as very ſtrong poſitions may be taken on it, it is greatly protected by the ſhipping, and the poſts there could eaſily be reinforced

forced and ſupported. Beſides, Waſhington, in attempting the North River, might, in the courſe of the campaign, have given General Howe an opportunity of attacking him with ſucceſs.

General Howe might then have either conquered or deſtroyed Connecticut, and then the reſt of the northern rebel colonies, muſt either have ſtarved, or ſued for pardon. The conqueſt of the Southern provinces, would the year enſuing, have followed of courſe.

Now all the buſineſs is to begin over again on our part, under infinite diſadvantages, the defeat and capture of General Burgoyne's army having raiſed the inſolence of the rebels to the higheſt pitch, and they now boaſt that they are invincible.

In fact General Howe's round about voyage to Philadelphia, and turning his back on the very place where he ought to have acted, has done more to ſtrengthen rebellion than all the Committees and Congreſſes among the rebels, and their confederates at home. Voyage to the ſouthward confirms rebellion.

General Howe in his retreat from the Jerſeys, in his embarkation, in his ſtay on board the tranſports, before he ſailed, in his voyage to the mouth of the Delaware, where he played at bopeep with the rebels, and, in his circumbendibus to Cheſapeak Bay, expended near three months of the fineſt time of the campaign; and all this to go out of his way, to deſert his real buſineſs, and to leave Burgoyne, with 6000 regulars, to fall a ſacrifice. Sacrifices the Canada army.

There never was a campaign ſo injudiciouſly conducted. By going up Cheſapeak, and marching to the Delaware, he was under the neceſſity of ſending his ſtore ſhips and tranſports round again to the Delaware, to meet him, and there the troops were nearly ſtarved, as well as the inhabitants that remained in Philadelphia; the rebel craft and frigates, under the protection of Mud Iſland and Red Bank, cutting off his communication by water, with the fleet, for more than two months.

In ſhort, except the mere matter of fighting, and his victories have never yet amounted to any thing, the rebels taking poſt on the next hill, and defying him, all his campaigns exhibit only a ſucceſſion of blunders. A Succeſſion of blunders.

He defeated Waſhington at Brandywine, but was himſelf ſurpriſed at German Town, during a thick fog, and the conſequences might have been fatal, had not Lieutenant Colonel Muſgrave, with ſix companies of the 40th regiment, made a ſurpriſing ſtand in a ſtone-houſe; this gave time for our line to advance and repulſe the enemy. Fifty-two men lay dead round the houſe, four of them on the ſteps of the door. The rebels had time to bring five pieces of cannon againſt it, but, fortunately for us, it was cannon proof, none of the ſhot entering but at the windows. Muſgrave ſaves Howe's army.

After this, the Heſſians were repulſed, in an attack on Red

Loſs of the Heſſians at R. Bank.

Bank, with 22 officers, and 371 men, killed and wounded. The gallant Col. Donop. the beſt officer of the Heſſians, was mortally wounded; two Heſſian grenadiers, attempting to carry him off, were ſhot dead under him, and he was left, by his own deſire. He died about eight days after, on the 29th of October, and was interred by the rebels, with military honours.

Gen. H's ſaying on the loſs of Burgoyne.

Let General Howe's ſucceſſes on the Deleware be ever ſo great, they will never ſufficiently apologize for the deſertion of our army from Canada, by his going to the Southward, and ſpending almoſt a whole campaign at ſea, and within ſight of the ſteeples of Philadelphia. His inſignificantly ſhrugging up his ſhoulders, when he heard of General Burgoyne's diſaſter, and ſaying, with an air of indifference, "Well, it will only make the war laſt another campaign," will not be conſidered by his ſuperiors, and the nation, as a proper vindication of his own conduct.

Clinton's weak effort.

General Clinton made a weak effort to aſſiſt General Burgoyne by going up the North River, but too late to be of any ſervice. He and his friends indeed ſay, that his not going ſooner was want of leave from General Howe; that he ſent to the Delaware three times for leave to make a puſh up the North River: that General Howe's anſwer to the firſt requeſt was, "To mind his former orders;" to the ſecond, that "he would think of it;" to the third, that "the trial might be made, but he thought it would be of no ſervice." The fact is, he might have gone up the River a month ſooner than he did, without the parade of ſending three times to Pennſylvania; but that time was ſpent in going with three ſeparate parties into the Jerſeys a cattle-hunting. In the cattle exploits he never thought of ſending for leave.

He ſhould have gone up a month ſooner, inſtead of cattle hunting with 4000 men.

Imprudence of Gen. Tryon.

The injudicious conduct of General Tryon, formerly Gov. Tryon, has been of infinite prejudice to the cauſe of the Mother Country. On the firſt arrival of the army here, he followed the army whereever it marched, adminiſtering oaths of allegiance to the inhabitants. Theſe oaths were readily taken; and from the Gazettes we find, that the Governor did not loſe ſuch a favourable opportunity of puffing off his aſſiduity. As the army did not remain long in one place, the rebels again took poſſeſſion, and barbarouſly murdered ſeveral of Governor Tryon's converts, forced others to join the rebel army, and plundered the effects of all who refuſed. This, has in a great meaſure, deterred even the moſt loyal ſubjects from taking the oaths till they find they are to be protected.

A thouſand recruits loſt.

In General Clinton's excurſion up the North River, near a thouſand ſtout fellows came to claim the benefit of their proclamation, and propoſed to enliſt in the new corps; but General Tryon, who never let ſlip any opportunity of appearing conſequential, immediately aſſembled them together, pronounced a pompous ſpeech to them, and tendered the oath to them with much formality. The country folks took the oath with great

pleaſure

pleaſure, and then having got their protections in their pockets, they thought it beſt to return home to their own habitations, till his Majeſty's troops had conquered the rebels. In this manner were ſo many able-bodied recruits loſt.

Sends ſermons to convert the rebels.

General Tryon takes another method to convert the rebels; he ſends out officers with flags of truce, loaded with ſermons, to diſtribute among them. The Chief Prieſt of the Moorfields Tabernacle could do no more. With theſe ſermons, the rebels light their tobacco pipes, or expend them in other neceſſary uſes.

Why our native troops are ſuperior to foreign.

It is univerſally felt, that our native troops are far ſuperior to any other for the war carried on here. The foreign troops may be as good as them in Germany, but they are not ſo here. This may eaſily be accounted for on the principles of human nature; our men, in fighting for their country, feel an intereſt, which cannot be ſuppoſed to poſſeſs or actuate foreign troops; and on that account, they attack with more alacrity, and reſiſt with more firmneſs. It has been the policy of the rebels, always when opportunity offered, to attack the foreigners in preference to the Britiſh; as on them they found, by experience, they could more readily make an impreſſion. This was ſtrongly verified in General Burgoyne's different engagements. The Heſſian Grenadiers are noble troops, and form an exception to theſe obſervations in ſome degree.

For the reaſons above given, we do not wiſh for any more foreign troops in this country, unleſs it ſhould be thought proper to ſend out Hanoverians; who as they would fight for their own Prince, may naturally be ſuppoſed to feel a ſtronger intereſt than thoſe who are only influenced by pay and military renown.

But if Howe is to waſte the national ſtrength in campaigning, to no manner of purpoſe on the Delaware, the Engliſh nation had better give up the point at once, than ſacrifice ſo many thouſands of brave men, merely to pamper his folly.

Ld. Percy would have done more in 2 months, than Howe in 3 campaigns.

Such a man as Lord Percy, who would have followed the true intereſt of his country, without jealouſy or envy, would have done more laſt June and July, by going up the North River, than General Howe has done in three campaigns, or is likely to do in three more, unleſs he is better inſtructed or changes his plan of operations.

Next campaign, Howe, if he ſhould ſtill command here, and ſhould be ſo obſtinate as to continue on the Delaware and its environs, will draw out the war till the Engliſh are wearied out.

North River & Lakes the key of America.

Even ſhould he be victorious in that quarter, his victories will not be of any ſervice, as Waſhington can always be ſupported both from the Northern and from the Southern Colonies. It is preſenting himſelf to the rebels, where they are moſt impreg-

pregnable; and where they can concentre all their forces and all their reſources, and where victory itſelf can bring no other advantage with it to him, but poſſeſſion of the field of battle. No line of ſeparation between the Southern and Northern rebels can be formed from the Delaware. The North River, and the Lakes George and Champlain, form the key of America. If General Howe went to the Delaware out of ignorance, he is unfit for the command; if he went out of any other motive, he is unworthy of it. If he is continued here, he will either remain on the Delaware, expending the blood and treaſure of the nation to no purpoſe, or he will move to the Northward, leaving a garriſon in it, and not leſs than 10,000 will protect it; or he will abandon it altogether, which is hardly to be expected, as that would be confeſſing in the ſtrongeſt manner, the futility of his former operations. By this you ſee, he has only a choice of difficulties, if he ſupports his great conqueſt of Philadelphia, or diſgrace if he deſerts it. In deſerting the northern army, he has inextricably ruined himſelf, he has no choice left but to reſign; and his character, as a great officer, is gone for ever. Beſides, in a fortnight from this, it is probable he will be frozen up for two months; ſo that we are not likely to hear any thing of him, or the army under his command, till the month of March next year. The Delaware generally freezes about the beginning of the year, and the ice, for the moſt part, renders the navigation impracticable, or very dangerous, till ſometime in March. The people here have no hopes from our preſent commanders; they have been ſufficiently tried; the only expectation left us is, that better men next campaign will purſue better meaſures.

Howe unfit or unworthy his command.

Futility of his operations ruined his character. A reſignation his only choice.

LETTER *from* NEW YORK.

December 16*th*, 1777.

It is an unanimous ſentiment here, that our misfortunes this campaign have ariſen, not ſo much from the genius and valour of the rebels, as from the miſconduct of a certain perſon.

Gen. Howe's miſconduct.

Our Commander in chief ſeems not to have known, or to have forgotten, that there was ſuch a thing as the North River; and that General Burgoyne, with his ſmall army, would want ſupport in his attempt to penetrate to Albany; as the inhabitants of that country were the moſt rugged and hardy, and the beſt accuſtomed to arms, of any of the Northern rebels.

If General Howe had been ſo happy for himſelf and his country as to have moved up the North River, inſtead of going to ſea in the middle of the Campaign, all America could not have prevented the junction of our two armies; and that of General Burgoyne's would have been ſaved; and a ſtrong line

of

of communication from St. Lawrence to New York would have been formed by the lakes and poſts on the North River, dividing the northern from the ſouthern provinces. Had this been done, the rebellion would have been half over, even without a battle. But ſome people ſeem never to have looked at the map of America; or, if they did, they have proved to us they did not underſtand it.

Since Philadelphia was taken, General Howe has never been able to get out of ſight of it; and the whole campaign appears to have been ſpent in taking that ſingle town, which if we keep, will coſt us an army to defend.

In truth, merely through miſconduct, inſtead of our expected ſucceſſes, we have met with nothing but misfortune and diſgrace.

The deſerting Burgoyne has loſt us 10,000 men and upwards, in regular troops, Canadians, and Indians, and in loyal ſubjects adjoining to Albany and the Lakes; and the glorious acquiſition of Philadelphia, will coſt us a garriſon of 10,000 more, unleſs General Howe, while this rebellion laſts, means to protect that darling conqueſt with his whole army. Coſt of 10,000 men.

Whereas, if the communication had been formed by ſecuring the North River and the Lakes, the operations of our army to the northward would have covered New York, Long Iſland, and Rhode Iſland, which would have enabled General Howe to take the field with at leaſt 10,000 men more than he has been able to do in Pennſylvania. Advantages of acting on the North River.

In that caſe he would only have had the northern rebels to contend with; for Waſhington could not have paſſed the North River while the Eaſtern Banks were defended by our poſts, and the whole river occupied by our armed ſhips, floating batteries, gun boats, and other craft. Then the taking of Connecticut, a ſmall but fertile colony, and the ſtorehouſe of New England, would have enſured the conqueſt of the northern colonies. They muſt have thrown down their arms or ſtarved; for I cannot ſuppoſe, that a body of militia could have defeated an Engliſh regular army, amounting at leaſt to thirty thouſand men, and as well appointed in every reſpect, as any army that ever took the field; and the men of that army, rouſed to the higheſt pitch of enthuſiaſm in the cauſe of Old England, and inſpired with indignation againſt the rebels, for their multiplied acts of treachery and barbarity. But the ſpirit, the vigour, and the lives of many of our brave fellows in the main army, have been loſt by purſuing the moſt ill adviſed meaſures, the carrying on the war from the Cheſapeak bay and Philadelphia, places in which the rebels can bring their whole force againſt us, and where all the advantages we may gain can avail us nothing further than keeping poſſeſſion of the ground on which our army encamps. The reverſe on the Delaware.

In

In fact, there is not a common ſoldier in the army but knows, that deſerting the North River loſt Burgoyne and his army; that his being fought down has given the rebels tenfold confidence, and thrown a gloom over the aſpect of our affairs in America.

The errors of laſt campaign are now conſidered as trifles, having before our eyes the groſs and mortifying blunders of the preſent.

Confidence in the Miniſter for America.

We anticipate here the aſtoniſhment and depreſſion, the clamorous lamentations, the bitter complaints, and the general indignation, that will ſucceſſively ariſe at home; but we repoſe the greateſt confidence in the ſteadineſs of the miniſtry, and in the vigour and abilities of the noble lord at the head of the American department.

On the defenſive till ſtrongly reinforced.

I have not time, and beſides it would be tedious, to mention all our expectations. I ſhall only ſay, that till reinforcements are ſent us, our operations in this country are likely to be for the moſt part defenſive; and the ſucceſs of our future meaſures will greatly depend on the military genius who is to conduct us next campaign.

Advice to repeal Habeas Corpus act regarding treaſons committed in Eng.

Our loſſes this campaign will greatly animate oppoſition and the rebel Partizans in England; and we expect to ſee little elſe in the London prints, than croakings of the downfal of England and the triumph of America. It would not be an unadviſable meaſure to ſuſpend the Habeas Corpus act, with reſpect to treaſons committed in England; that would go a great way towards uniting you at home.

Rebels will detain Burgoyne's army.

General Burgoyne, with the wreck of his ſmall army, has been ſome time near Boſton, between Charleſtown neck and Cambridge. Our tranſports are now at Rhode Iſland with an intent to take them on board. I ſincerely wiſh them all embarked, for I am much afraid the rebels will make uſe of ſome ſubterfuge to detain them.

The more one reflects on the manner this campaign has been conducted, the more one is aſtoniſhed. If the intention is to

Way to conquer America.

conquer a country, there is an abſolute neceſſity for occupying the principal paſſes; more eſpecially if that country is extenſive, and the inhabitants numerous. In doing this you divide the forces and reſources of the enemy, and, as I have already remarked, you may beat them in detail.

Now the grand paſs in Britiſh America is the North River, and the Lake's George and Champlain, which muſt be poſſeſſed if there is a ſerious intention to bring this rebellion to a ſpeedy concluſion.

But if you would rather have a ten years war, and a hundred millions additional debt, then you may continue to indulge General Howe or any other General, who may ſucceed him, in amuſing himſelf and the army with a ſea voyage in the

middle

middle of the campaign, and in leaving whatever armies you may ſend via Canada, to be ſwallowed up by the New England men.

It is not any apology to the nation, in General Howe and his friends ſaying, that Burgoyne thought himſelf ſtrong enough; his duty, if he underſtood any thing of his profeſſion, was to be on the North River, and not to ſpend the campaign and waſte his own army, in a part of the country where even his victories are uſeleſs.

If any thing effective is intended next campaign, the war muſt be brought back to the North River. After occupying that with ſhipping and ſmall craft, and poſſeſſing ſome of the ſtrongeſts poſts on its banks with troops, you may then carry your whole force into New England, which would not reſiſt a vigorous campaign, or allowing it did, however improbable, the reduction of Connecticut would ſtarve the reſt of that country into ſubmiſſion: you then have only the ſouthern colonies to ſubdue: they would not make a deſperate reſiſtance after the conqueſt of their northern friends. Muſt bring the war on the North River.

If General Howe intends to keep Philadelphia, which has coſt him a whole campaign, and the nation 14,000 men, including Burgoyne's army, and the killed and wounded, ſick and dead of his own army, he muſt either remain near it himſelf, or leave a ſmall army to defend it. If he remains near it, I cannot comprehend how America is to be conquered; nor can I conjecture how he is to march forward, as Waſhington is only twelve miles from him, ſo ſtrongly poſted that he does not chuſe to attack him. It is true he may, by croſſing the Delaware on his right, return again to the Jerſeys; or, on his left he may paſs into Maryland; but in either of theſe Provinces, after having patroled the country, with Waſhington at his heels, he will do no good without coming to a battle and gaining a deciſive victory, unleſs he ſhould chuſe to ſurpriſe the whole world again by another ſea trip. Gen. Howe's dilemma.

Whichever of theſe methods he follows, an army muſt be left at Philadelphia, ſo that our conqueſt becomes a burthen; for the troops required to garriſon that ſingle town, would have ſupported the communication on the North River, which would have diſunited the rebels, and gone a great way to quell the rebellion.

You ſee I do not preſume to think he will abandon Philadelphia; as that might ſubject him to be aſked, why he ſpent ſo much time, men, and money to take it?

January 1ſt, 1778.

I ſuppoſe that Lord Howe has arrived at Rhode Iſland by this time. He has ſailed to that quarter, on purpoſe to expe-

Rebels will keep Burgoyne.

dite if he can, the embarkation of General Burgoyne's troops. I am much afraid the rebels will invent ſome ſcheme to detain them altogether.

Our gallant commander has expended at leaſt 14,000 men this campaign; and to conſole us for that loſs, has had the honour of appointing Mr. Galloway, formerly one of the rebel Congreſs, ſole ſuperintendant of the port of Philadelphia. Perhaps ſuch a grand ſtroke, and the pleaſure of reading his letters, minutely diſplaying his retreat through the Jerſeys, which made our brave fellows almoſt gnaw their own fleſh out of rage, may alſo conſole you. By God, had you ſeen our common men, when they ferried them over to Staten Iſland, they would have ſtruck you with ſuch a complicated picture of mortification and reſentment, as would have left a laſting impreſſion.

Mortification & reſentment of the army on ſhipping them off for the ſouthward.

It took the nation till the third year of this rebellion, to place a body of troops in this country ſufficient to conquer it; the intent of ſending Burgoyne to Canada, was for no other end than to penetrate by the way of the Lakes, while General Howe went up the North River; yet the moment that this is brought within our view, Howe, as if afraid of joining Burgoyne, turns tail, goes to ſea, and deſerts the very buſineſs upon which the whole nation was intent.

General diſſatisfaction.

There is a general diſſatisfaction here and at Philadelphia. All the territory we poſſeſs in Pennſylvania, is the point of land formed by the confluence of the Delaware and the Schuylkill, meaſuring nearly five miles in length, by two in breadth. The town itſelf is included. This, and the ground on which our army encamps, are the ſum of our conqueſts this year.

Howe's conqueſt 1777, five miles by two.

You will obſerve, that your humble ſervant does not deſpair of the Commonwealth. Indeed, whining and deſpondence are inexcuſable, when the times demand firmneſs and vigour. In defiance of ill conduct and the times, were you to ſee us ſometimes you would laugh heartily; in our barrack the army liſt is produced, more than once a day, to conjecture upon a commander in chief; for we no longer look for one in America, ſince Burgoyne is in the hands of the enemy.

LETTER *from* NEW YORK.

May, 5th, 1778.

General Clinton ſailed for Philadelphia the firſt of this month to ſucceed General Howe in the command of our army. Our ſituation is ſuch at Philadelphia, that we ought not to think of any deciſive action in that quarter. General Clinton indeed may very eaſily, and it would be a credit to our arms, march acroſs the Jerſeys to New York, and reunite all our forces, in readineſs to act as the exigency of our affairs may require; but if

if he ſhould retire by ſea, it muſt give the rebels additional confidence, and be a proof either of the weakneſs of the army, or the imbecility of our new commander. There never was, ſince the exiſtence of time, an army more ardent for battle than ours now in America; they only want to be led on, to prove that they will conquer or die for their country; they think that the conceſſions lately made at home to the rebels, ariſe from a want of confidence in them, which irritates them exceedingly. They ſay they have often been preſented to the enemy;—have ſometimes been permitted to attack them;—but never have been led to follow their victory with effect. They have had a ſoldier, but not a General.

Army opinions of Gen. Howe's conduct.

General Howe's dependents here ſay, that he had his plan of operations from home, and that he was not to deviate from the orders ſent him. Theſe gentlemen have been eaſily confuted by reading to them the following paragraph of General Howe's own letter, dated June 3d 1777. "The campaign will now "immediately take place in the Jerſeys; and I ſhall proceed "as occurrences may ariſe, according to the plan *made known* "to your Lordſhip in my former diſpatches." This extract always ſilences them;—it proves that he formed the plan of the campaign 1777, and only deigned to communicate it to Adminiſtration.

His plans proved his own by his letters.

Another circumſtance ought not to be forgot: he complained in the ſame letter of the camp equipage not arriving till the 24th of May; and his letter would lead us to conceive it had retarded the opening of the campaign. After this, the army was marched up to Waſhington's entrenchments in the Jerſeys, and marched back again, and embarked for Philadelphia by the romantic navigation of Cheſapeak bay. The camp equipage was moſt certainly carried on board the ſhips, but it was not landed with the troops at the head of the Elke, but ſent round by ſea to the Delaware, in which river it remained till the end of the campaign. It would appear that the commander, as his own letter ſtates it, was relieved from much anxiety by the arrival of the equipage, but that when it did arrive, he did not think proper to uſe it for the accommodation of the troops.

His excuſe for not opening campaign 1777 proved not to be valid.

If General Howe had acted with vigour, and in concert with the Canada army, all the force of the rebels could not have withſtood them. Inſtead of that he ſubdivided our forces, leaving Burgoyne with 6000 men to attack a country inhabited by near a million of people; and with 18 or 20,000 men went a ſummer voyage by ſea, to land in a country, and take a town, which he never durſt, or never thought proper to quit for more than one days march. If all theſe forces had been properly combined the rebellion would by this time have been over.

Injudicious conduct.

Indeed there is no military man who underſtood any thing of his buſineſs, but foreſaw inevitable deſtruction to the cauſe and

Deſpondence on his going ſouthward.

glory of his country, whenever it was firſt whiſpered that the embarked troops were bound to the ſouthward. For ſome time at New York we were at a loſs for their deſtination, as pilots one day were ſhipped for the northward, and another day for the ſouthward, and all carried off in the fleet. As ſoon as their plan tranſpired, an univerſal deſpondence among the loyal Americans took place; men of moderation were ſilent and looked ſtupified; and men of vigour and penetration, expreſſed their doubts, ſorrow, contempt, and abhorrence, juſt as the circumſtances of things preſented themſelves.

The honour & glory he loſt.

If General Howe had carried the war up Hudſon's river, he would have ſaved Burgoyne's army, cruſhed the rebellion, and re-eſtabliſhed our tottering empire: for himſelf he would have gained immortal glory. His grateful country would have covered him with honours, and our lateſt poſterity would have revered his memory. But unhappily for us, we have ſeen in part, and are likely to continue to ſee, the melancholy reverſe of all this. Yet amidſt the diſtreſſes of our country, one cannot help lamenting the fate of that man, whoſe very heart muſt be rent, when he reflects on the honour and glory that awaited him, but have now for ever paſſed away.

LETTER *from* NEW YORK,

May 17th, 1778.

The great line of ill conduct in this quarter, you muſt have already felt at home. By the moſt injudicious diviſion of our forces in America, the cauſe of England has, for the preſent, been ruined. With an army ſufficient for the conqueſt of this country, General Howe, inſtead of going up the Hudſon, left one third of his army to garriſon New York, and with the reſt went to Philadelphia, to perambulate its environs during moſt part of the campaign, and then compoſedly took up his winter quarters in that town; whilſt Waſhington, with not more than 7000 men, ſtationed himſelf at Valley Forge, only twenty-four miles diſtant, and was ſtill in the ſame poſition by the laſt accounts which arrived here only a day or two ago.

Gen. Howe in Philadelphia.

Blocked up by half his own number of raw troops.

Every body in this place, and at Philadelphia, are in amazement that 7000 raw troops, ſpeaking comparatively with our own, and theſe raw troops half naked, ſhould block up a veteran army double their number.

You have aſked me in more than one letter, what were our reaſons for going to the ſouthward at the very time that our northern army was approaching the head of the Hudſon? This is as incomprehenſible to us as it is to you; for we ſee by the King's inſtructions to General Burgoyne, and Colonel St. Leger, which we had by the laſt ſhips from London, that they

they were never to loſe ſight of a junction with General Howe, which of courſe implies, that he was either to favour their approach by moving up the Hudſon, or by attacking Waſhington in the Jerſeys early in the ſpring, or ſummer; at leaſt hinder him from detaching any of the continental troops to reinforce the northern rebel militia. This I aver is evident from the inſtructions which have been lately printed in this town.

His conduct apparently contrary to his inſtruc.

At this critical juncture, their two Excellencies go to ſea with the whole fleet and grand army, leaving our northern, or Burgoyne's army to periſh for want of that ſupport which his Majeſty and Adminiſtration, and the nation had undoubtedly ordered, and expected would be given them. The rebels, who are not deficient in penetration, laugh, and ſay, "Your "General, by his movements, made us a preſent of Burgoyne's "army and left us alſo a greater one in New York, if we "had muſtered force enough to take it.

Rebels ridicule him for giving them Burgoyne's army.

Suppoſing that Waſhington had any genius, God knows, he had no occaſion to exert it againſt us; our folly, ignorance, or envy, did every thing for him!

It was impoſſible, in the whole extent of America, to fix on a more diſadvantageous ſpot than Philadelphia to carry on the war from. That town, as ſoon as taken, muſt have been abandoned, or protected by the whole army. Indeed, the going there, and the covering it, have loſt us a campaign, all our northern army, ſome thouſands of our ſouthern army, and what is infinitely more to be regretted, our national honour.

National honour loſt.

It is a mercy, a ſaving grace to the General that you have recalled him; for he never ſeemed inclined to abandon his charming conqueſt. He and his army, his brother and his fleet, have done little elſe for the beſt part of eight or nine months, than hover round it, forming the great Mr. Galloway's ſatellites.

You will obſerve that the reaſons againſt carrying on the war from Philadelphia were numerous: by going there, our army was divided; New York with an immenſity of King's ſtores, and other valuable property endangered; our northern army conſigned to deſtruction; Philadelphia, a town which could not be kept without an army; that country juſt in the centre of the rebel provinces could be equally ſupported by the northern, and ſouthern rebels, and of ſuch a nature, that no commanding poſt could be taken, either to divide, or over-awe the enemy; the river a long, and dangerous navigation, full of ſhoals, and ſubject to freeze in the winter; ſo that our fleet muſt either remain blocked up in the winter by the ice, or ſeparate from the army, by moving off before the cold ſet in; and, the rebels in poſſeſſion of both ſhores, could, from their various harbours, act with the greateſt proſpect of ſucceſs againſt our merchantſhips, and tranſports, either going up, or coming down.

Imprudence in voyage ſouthw.

On

Propriety of acting on the North River.

On the contrary, by acting on the Hudſon, our army remained in full force; Gen. Howe could have begun the campaign with at leaſt 6000 more troops; his operations to the northward and his poſſeſſing the Hudſon, covering all our poſts, he would have cut the rebel country in two; againſt either half of which Burgoyne and he united, might in the enſuing campaign have carried on the war; he would have ſaved Engliſhmen from the greateſt and moſt mortifying diſgrace that ever befel them as a nation, and he himſelf would have been the greateſt man in our annals —he would have acquired immortal glory.

How the voyage to Philadelphia came to be undertaken, a movement ſo contrary to common ſenſe, to the general judgment of the moſt intelligent people here, to the moſt obvious rules of war, and apparently contrary to expreſs inſtructions from home, and at the firſt glance ſo evidently ruinous to the cauſe of England in America, is a queſtion, which, I believe, their two excellencies only, can explain.

Character of Lord Howe.

Lord Howe certainly came out with the moſt compleat idea of his own weight, and importance: it cannot be doubted, that, on his arrival here, he imagined that condeſcenſions from him would far outweigh any exertion of our national ſtrength. But we are now confident, he is recovered from that idea: he certainly had a great predilection for the Americans; his brother's monument in Weſtminſter-Abbey, at the expence of New-England, it is ſuppoſed, led him to believe, that all America reverenced himſelf, and would gather round him as their ſole mediator. But Franklin who had made a tool of him in England, as well as of many others, ſoon convinced him of his want of importance.

The following circumſtances may give you ſome notion of the ſituation of the refugees here. You muſt underſtand, by refugees, the gentlemen who have been driven off, on account of their uniform attachment to government; not your rebels, who came in upon proclamation, to regain their eſtates, that were in poſſeſſion of the King's army.

His ſtrange reply to the refugees.

A number of refugees, long ſettled in the ſouthern colonies, and moſtly Engliſhmen, who had been ſtripped of the greateſt part of their fortunes, applied to his Lordſhip for letters of marque, to cruize againſt the rebels; but he ſternly replied, "Will you never have done with oppreſſing theſe poor people? will you never give them an opportunity of ſeeing their error?" —This was the anſwer of the King's Admiral to a body of his Majeſty's loyal ſubjects, whom theſe poor people (as his Lordſhip called them) had treated moſt barbarouſly, had baniſhed from their habitations, and ſequeſtered their eſtates, in order to carry on the preſent rebellious war. This conduct, however, could not hold long; letters of marque have been ſince granted. I do not give this as a ſecret; it has been long publickly talked of here,

here. The gentlemen who received ſuch a rebuff, you may be ſure, were not ſilent on the occaſion.

His Lordſhip's great error is, in thinking himſelf equal to every thing. We do not know that he communicates with any perſon but his brother. Their meaſures, therefore, are purely their own. In making him a politician, they have put him quite out of his latitude. Yet after all, as a man, he is deſervedly eſteemed. His moral character is unimpeachable in every reſpect: he is quite the contraſt to a certain perſon; and, in the naval line, he has not a ſuperior. The braveſt man could not wiſh for a more able, or more gallant commander. An excellent moral character.

In ſome inſtances we have not been remarkable for our good conduct in this neighbourhood. Governor, now Gen. Tryon, who is the pink of politeneſs, and the quinteſſence of vanity, choſe to diſtinguiſh himſelf by petitioning that the Provincials under his command ſhould occupy the out-poſts at Kingsbridge; he had his wiſh for a long time, by which we loſt numbers of our beſt recruits. The man is generous, perfectly good-natured, and no doubt brave; but weak and vain to an extreme degree. You ſhould keep ſuch people at home, they are excellent for a court parade.—I wiſh Mrs. Tryon would ſend for him. Vanity of Tryon.

I have not entered on the ſcenes of diſſipation and gaming that have been practiſed and countenanced, or, as the General's friends correct us, "permitted." I have drawn a curtain around wanton wives and daughters; for a public man ought to ſtand or fall by his public actions; if theſe are right, we may ſmile at his private amuſements; beſides my reſpect for the ladies will not permit me to enter on this ſubject, though a rich one; and yet it is a tempting ſtory—ſo animating—ſo ſeducing, that I muſt drop the pen to preſerve my own principles. Hints on gaming & the ladies.

LETTER *from* NEW YORK.

May 18*th*, 1778.

It muſt be confeſſed, that the rebels triumph greatly in baffling Howe's army, at Philadelphia; but that ought not to make us deſpair; for, if his bad generalſhip divided our forces, inſtead of combining them, by which we ſuffered the loſs of Burgoyne, and had our grand army pent up in Philadelphia; that is no evidence of our weakneſs, or the rebels ſtrength, but ſimply a proof of Howe's deficiency in military knowledge; who deſerted our northern army, which was co-operating with him, and ſailed to a town that took his whole army to guard it. Howe's deficiency.

You muſt conquer the rebels, and bring them back to their allegiance. You have no other alternative but victory or deſtruction. I make no doubt, but many of the people of property among them, would be glad to come to an accommodation, as the We have no alternative but victory or ruin.

the burden of maintaining the rebellion falls chiefly to their ſhare; but the rabble, of which the army is moſtly compoſed, having all the power in their own hands, muſt be beat before any thing like a ſubmiſſion can take place. Your own ſafety, and exiſtence, as a nation, will not allow you to deſert this buſineſs, were you ſo inclined. If you was to adopt Dean Tucker's plan, and grant them independency, you would commit an act of political ſuicide. You ought to be ſufficiently convinced, that no tye can bind the rebels but force. You would ſoon loſe your Newfoundland fiſhery, or be under the neceſſity of entering into a new war for its protection; you then would have all the work to begin again, under infinite diſadvantages. Your Weſt-India Iſlands would ſoon follow; Nature herſelf ſeems to have attached them to the American continent, and, whoever poſſeſſes this country, muſt eventually command the iſlands. France, though ſhe now ſupplies the rebels, may have cauſe in future to curſe her folly. It is neither the intereſt of France, nor Spain, to enable the colonies to ſhake off their dependance on Britain; but I do not ſay it is not their intereſt to weaken us by keeping up the ferment. If your European politicians were as wiſe as they ought to be, they would have foreſeen, that the Freebooters of the United States of America, would be infinitely more formidable, than thoſe of the petty ſtates of Africa. All the commercial ſtates are deeply intereſted in this buſineſs.

If we grant independency.

We ſhall loſe Newfoundland.

And the Weſt India Iſlands.

Danger to all maritime States.

Suppoſing the Americans independent, and that they ſhould think proper to ſeize the Dutch ſhips, or the French, or the Spaniſh, or the Portugueſe, what remedy could any of thoſe powers have? I conjecture none of them would fit out fleets and armies, and ſend them ſo far as this to the weſtward.—But they might appoint convoys—That is true—yet the Amaricans, when left to themſelves, will ſoon have a fleet equal to any of the above ſtates. In fact they could enrich themſelves alternately with the plunder of every mercantile nation in Europe, without any of thoſe nations being able to do them a material injury, or obtain any adequate ſatisfaction. Such will be the bleſſed effects of American independency to all the European commercial ſtates. A more ruinous circumſtance however awaits Great Britain: America is a rich, fertile, healthy country; proviſions, in time of peace, are not at a fourth of the price they are in your kingdom. Your manufacturers, your labouring men, your people of ſmall fortunes and large families, and others of good fortune, but an enterpriſing mind, would all flock to the New Independent States; for though proviſions are only about one fourth the price, yet labourers and workmen's wages are four times higher than in England. Your people who come, may get land for nothing, or for a ſmall quit rent, next to nothing; and the turbulent politics of our new republics, would afford an extenſive field for men of vigour

To Britain in particular.

and

and enterprize to ſtruggle in. No laws you could paſs at home could keep your people. Never was a nation ſo bound to exert itſelf as Great Britain in the preſent criſis; if, for the ſake of a momentary but deluſive quiet, you patch up a rotten accommodation with the rebels, the glory of Britain is ſet forever; and from the terror, ſhe will become—the contempt of nations.

Exertion & conqueſt, or ruin & contempt.

MATTER OF FACT.

Addreſſed to Lord George Germaine.

To combat the whole force of official repreſentation conveyed to your Lordſhip, would be a taſk from which I ſhould ſhrink, was I not fully convinced of your Lordſhip's zeal for the public ſervice, and the penetration with which you can diſtinguiſh truth.

I aſſure your Lordſhip, in the moſt ſolemn manner, that I have no other motive for the trouble I now take, but a hearty zeal for the honour of the nation. I am totally unconnected with any of the parties which diſtracted the public ſervice in America laſt campaign: I am neither under the bias of obligation nor reſentment towards any of the three generals; nor have I the ſmalleſt wiſh either to abet faction on this, or rebellion on the other ſide the Atlantic. To the eternal diſgrace of thoſe concerned in both, hiſtory cannot furniſh a ſingle example of ſo wanton and ungrateful a rebellion, or of ſo unprincipled an oppoſition to government. Having been an eye-witneſs to the proceedings of the Congreſs to the period when they took the deſperate ſtep of declaring independency, and perſonally acquainted with many of the principal members, I beheld them daily taking their tone, and forming their meaſures, from the conduct of the faction at home. In the declaration of independency indeed they ſtepped before their friends here a little, but theſe ſoon followed.

Faction at home the tutors of Congreſs.

Leaving both to the infamy that muſt attend their proceedings, I ſhall purſue my deſign of pointing out to your Lordſhip ſome part of the blunders, the venality, the inſolence, the incapacity, and the tyranny which pervade almoſt every department of the army in America.

I need not ſay a word to convince your Lordſhip of the miſconduct on Long Iſland, in permitting a beaten and diſmayed army, cooped into a corner of an iſland, to paſs a wide ferry, by ſmall embarkations, without the loſs of a man. It is acknowledged the rebels were there at the mercy of the Royal army, but that a reluctance to ſhed the blood of his Majeſty's ſubjects reſtrained it. Poſſibly it may be pleaded, that the ſame reluctance prevailed in allowing them to eſcape from the city of New York, and afterwards from King's Bridge; that it permitted them to retreat leiſurely from the action at White Plains,

Miſconduct in allowing the rebels to eſcape from Long Iſl.

And New York.

And White Pl.

where M'Dougal's brigade was defeated; and finally, to induce the Royal Army to retreat, when they had driven the Rebels into a ſituation of the greateſt diſtreſs and diſmay, ready to have diſperſed, had any attack been made upon them. Here we left them to return and ſtorm Fort Waſhington, after we had allowed Mr. Waſhington to paſs the North River in our view; occupy Fort Lee, and eſcape from thence with more than double the garriſon of Fort Waſhington. Poſſibly this was a piece of generalſhip, as we took thoſe garriſons priſoners; but it was changing the ſyſtem upon which we had before acted, unleſs it was thought beneath the courage of the Royal Army to take Rebels, until we had ſuffered them to get ſafe into their very ſtrongeſt poſt.

And the Jerſeys. Allowing Mr. Waſhington to eſcape through the Jerſeys when he had not above five-and-twenty hundred poor, diſpirited, naked fugitives to attend him, is a thing without example. I beg your Lordſhip will look upon the map of New Jerſey for a moment, and then endeavour, if poſſible, to conceive why a body of troops were not detached from New York to Newark, Eliſabeth-Town, or even Amboy, to cut off his retreat, put him between two fires, and oblige him to ſurrender, and by that means put an end to the war, which the Rebels themſelves have often confeſſed it would certainly have done. Was not this ſomething worſe than a blunder, or even indolence? I can aſſure your Lordſhip, that many of the moſt judicious leaders among the rebels were even aſtoniſhed at it, and were ſo free as to declare to me, that they ſuppoſed the war would have been too ſhort, had it been put an end to in one campaign.

On the halt at Brunſwick. A halt at Brunſwick, for want of orders, when the fugitives were in view, allowed them time to retreat to the Delaware, and to croſs that river, to the aſtoniſhment even of themſelves. Yet has this march through the Jerſeys been extolled to your Lordſhip, and the public has been inſulted with the publication; whilſt every man in America ſtood aſtoniſhed, and every loyal ſubject there was chagrined and diſappointed—fully convinced that nothing leſs than blindneſs directed by ignorance, could have allowed ſuch an enemy to eſcape in ſuch a ſituation. But, as has conſtantly been our lot, our aſtoniſhment was not ſuffered to reſt long upon the paſt, the future miſconduct ſoon called it off. A line was formed from Mount Holly on the Delaware, to the village of Newark, by occupying open villages. The ſame army which would not detach a part to intercept Mr. Waſhington in his flight, was extended in a line of nearly a hundred miles, without a ſingle redoubt to cover any one poſt. A brigade of Heſſians commanded by a drunken madman, was placed in Trenton; the moſt important poſt, forming the angle of the whole line, and neareſt the enemy; whilſt the Britiſh light infantry, the beſt troops in the univerſe were, (contrary

Our aſtoniſhment ſuffers no reſt.

to

to all cuſtom and order) placed thirteen miles in the rear at Prince-Town.

General Grant having intelligence that Mr. Waſhington intended to attack Trenton, inſtead of ordering up the light infantry from Prince Town, ſent only twenty light horſe, and twenty-four light infantry to Trenton the day before. Rhall ſeeing ſo little precaution taken by the general, looked upon the intelligence as falſe, and got drunk as uſual. Gen. Grant and Col. Rhall cauſe of Trenton loſs.

The conſequences which almoſt naturally followed were ſuch, and they are at the ſame time ſo notorious, that I ſhall ſpare your Lordſhip the pain of ſeeing them recited. It is ſufficient to ſay, that thoſe naked, diſpirited runaways, whom we allowed to ſlip out of our hands a few days before, returned upon a victorious army, and in two or three ſucceſsful actions, killed and took half their own numbers, obliging us to abandon all our poſts in Jerſey, except Amboy and Brunſwick, and a regiment ſtowed into the few houſes in Bonham Town to keep open the communication. Conſequences of this miſconduct.

Thus, from being in full poſſeſſion of that whole province, we were reduced to thoſe three villages, the fartheſt extending fourteen miles into the country. Here the army remained all winter, obliged to fight for every mouthful of forage and freſh proviſions which they obtained: with what loſs the returns of the army will beſt ſhew. And permit me to aſk your Lordſhip, was it not moſt ſhameful? I will venture to aſſert, that in the hiſtory of all the wars which ever yet exiſted in the annals of all military miſconduct which ever yet appeared, there is not a ſingle example to take ſhelter under.

Great military geniuſes have often changed the nature of a war from the defenſive to the offenſive, by ſome ſtroke of military ſkill in the field, or have with an inferior force inſulted their enemy in his winter quarters, and even obliged him to relinquiſh them. But this was wh ere troops were ſuperior in native courage, or excelled in diſcipline; where they were in want of none of the neceſſaries for making war, and had fortified towns to cover them in caſe of a defeat; or where the enemy could not be reinforced. But in the inſtance before us, not one of all theſe cauſes can be pleaded. Waſhington was but three thouſand ſtrong when he attacked Trenton, and thoſe men ſo fatigued and benumbed with the cold, that they were unable to handle their arms; and it was with the greateſt difficulty any of them recroſſed the Delaware, and near half of them died, or were rendered unfit for duty. I ſpeak from *authentic information*, my Lord. At no time during the winter was the rebel army above five thouſand ſtrong, often not three, and thoſe in want of almoſt every article of cloathing. Yet with that inferior, naked force, Mr. Waſhington blockaded our army in their quarters, and remained the whole winter in unmoleſted poſſeſ- Strength & condition of the rebel army in winter 1776-7.

ſion of every town within ten miles of them, often nearer, occupying a circle of at leaſt ſixty miles. In which ſituation he continued until he was reinforced in ſpring, when he approached within a few miles of Brunſwick; and was permitted, though ſtill inferior, to poſt himſelf in ſo ſtrong a poſition, that it was not thought prudent to attack him. The army therefore quitted Jerſey, relinquiſhing a whole province, of which they had been in full poſſeſſion ſix months before, without ever having made a ſingle effort to recover the honour they loſt at Trenton (though Waſhington was often reduced to two thouſand men at Morris Town) leaving the rebels all the advantage and credit they obtained by that action, which alone enabled them to recruit a ſingle man.

Gen. Howe retreats from Jerſey without recovering his honour.

Before I quit Jerſey, allow me to point out to your Lordſhip ſome other parts of our conduct, and the conſequence attending it. Upon the army entering Jerſey, a proclamation was iſſued, promiſing protection and pardon to all ſuch as ſhould remain in their houſes. The people pretty generally remained, and many thouſands received printed directions, ſigned by order of the commander in chief. But neither the proclamation nor the protections ſaved the people from plunder, nor from inſult; their property was taken or deſtroyed without diſtinction of perſons. They ſhewed their protections. Heſſians could not read them, nor would not underſtand them, and the Britiſh ſoldiers thought they had as good a right to a ſhare as the Heſſians. This I aſſure your Lordſhip was very generally the caſe while the army was advancing into the country, was and were in poſſeſſion of it. In their retreat it was ſtill worſe; all who did not leave their wives and children, and abandon their property, were conſidered as rebels. When the rebels repoſſeſſed themſelves of the country, they treated all who had taken protections with the utmoſt ſeverity. Thus was this whole province either irritated againſt his Majeſty's government, by a breach of faith, or abandoned to perſecution, where they had ſhewn any loyalty. No ſtep was taken to conciliate their affections. The diſloyal were not diſarmed, nor arms put in the hands of the loyal, though both might have been done with the greateſt eaſe. No ſteps of ſound policy were purſued to ſecure the country; it was finally abandoned, and a proof given that proclamations and protections were no aſſurances of ſafety fit to be relied on.—An aweful example! which the leaders in rebellion have not failed to avail themſelves of, and which I can aſſure your Lordſhip I have beheld the bad effects of on more occaſions than one. I will not pretend to ſay that Jerſey has not always been as rebellious a colony as any of the thirteen, but I aſſert that there always has been many thouſands of loyal ſubjects in it, and that there would have been at this hour double the number there are in it, had it not been for the miſconduct I have

Ruinous conduct of G. Howe in the Jerſeys.

Proclamations Protections and Pardons all annihilated.

Bad effects on our affairs.

now

now pointed out to your Lordſhip. In ſuch caſes the people ſhould never be deceived, much leſs abandoned to deſtruction, when they were promiſed protection. Protection ought never to be promiſed by government, but it ſhould be afforded at all riſks; much leſs promiſed without even an intention of performing; which I am ſorry to ſee, from the correſpondence your Lordſhip has publiſhed, it was not in this caſe, as it there appears that it was not intended to keep poſſeſſion of Jerſey.

The People ſhould never be deceived.

Having conducted the Commander in Chief out of the Jerſeys, I ſhall leave him to perform his ſeven weeks voyage to Elke River (after having firſt taken a peep of a week into Delaware Bay, to know if it was navigable) while I ſhall beg your Lordſhip's attention to the affairs of the town and province of New-York. I do not like to treat of public ſcandal; I will not let fall a ſingle word upon any man's intrigues, where they do not interfere with the public good; where they do, the public has a right to know the cauſe of ſupineneſs and inattention in a General, or of corruption in a Commiſſary. Gaming muſt ever prove of the very worſt conſequences in an army, and totally ruinous if the example ſhould happen to be ſet publicly by the Commander: it then deſtroys ſubordination and reſpect, encourages licentiouſneſs, and all diſcipline falls of courſe. A young Officer who beholds his General every evening at a pharo-table, I will not ſay loſe his temper, though certainly ſubject to fret like other men who play a game of chance, in which there can be no amuſement but as it gratifies avarice—I ſay, the young Officer who beholds his General in ſuch a ſituation, will ſoon loſe the reſpect to his ſtation which he has loſt to his perſon, when he is allowed to ſport as freely at his elbow on his ſlender income, as the General does upon his princely revenues. He is aſhamed not to do it; he expects to make his court by it. There is little œconomy in an army where high gaming is allowed; it is beneath the man who plays at night for hundreds, to trouble himſelf next day how he is to live upon his pay: He runs in debt for his neceſſaries, and the Country muſt be plundered to ſupply his miſtreſs. I aſk you, my Lord, can the General, or any other Officer of rank, pretend to reſtrain, much leſs puniſh, an inferior for plundering, when he perhaps won all the poor gentleman's money the night before? To this cauſe, perhaps, as much as to the example ſet by the Heſſians, may be attributed the ſcandalous height which plundering is arrived at in the army. And yet, my Lord, I cannot ſuppoſe that this was the cauſe of Officers of very high rank taking large quantities of wine, tobacco, and valuable effects belonging to Merchants at New-York, who were known to be loyal, and who eagerly embraced the firſt opportunity of joining the King's troops. This muſt have been done under the impreſſions of that favourite idea, "that Par-

Gaming a ruinous example in a General.

Bad effects on the officers.

"liament

Military interpretation of an act of Parliam.

" liament has declared America to be in rebellion, and that " therefore every man in it has *ipſo facto* forfeited his eſtate, " and holds it entirely at his Majeſty's mercy," that is at the diſpoſal of the army.

Your Lordſhip will be aſtoniſhed when I aſſure you that this is not only a prevalent opinion, but almoſt univerſal one. That it has been eagerly embraced and ſupported by a certain governor now in a military character, and I have been well aſſured that it is cheriſhed even at head quarters. Thus my Lord, have I endeavoured to aſſign reaſons why many loyal and reſpectable citizens have been plundered of their furniture and effects under this comprehenſive mode of forfeiture. Plundering under ſuch an idea, is only making free with what belongs to the King. The gentlemen cannot have read the act they ſpeak of, nor diſtinguiſhed that, it only ſays, numbers of perſons, not all; and even if it did that it would be neceſſary to try a Britiſh ſubject by a jury, in order to confiſcate his eſtate. I ſpeak from undoubted facts, my Lord, facts that will be heard of in a yet more ſerious mode. I point them out generally, in hopes that your Lordſhip, in your humanity and juſtice, as well as for the honour of your country, and the Britiſh arms, will take ſome ſpeedy and effectual method of putting an end to ſuch pernicious and diſgraceful proceedings. All ſuch as have reſiſted the torrent of rebellion, and thrown themſelves upon the protection of his majeſty's troops, ſhould be ſhewn that they have acted wiſely as well as virtuouſly; and that the army was ſent there to protect, not to plunder and inſult them. That arch plunderer, General de Heiſter, offered the houſe he lived in at New York to public ſale, though it was the property of a very loyal ſubject, who had voluntarily and hoſpitably accommodated him with the uſe of it. This may be nothing aſtoniſhing in a Heſſian. But I have ſeen the furniture of good and loyal ſubjects, men who are ſuffering reſtraint or impriſonment among the rebels, ſold by public auction; the carriages of gentlemen, of the firſt rank, ſeized upon; their arms defaced, and the plunderers arms blazoned in their place; and this too by Britiſh officers. An officer of high rank took forcible poſſeſſion of a gentleman's carriage and horſes, after it was well known that he had received his pardon from the King's Commiſſioners: he uſed it for ſeveral months, and was with difficulty prevailed on to give it up. This was acting under the ſtrongeſt deluſion, to ſpeak of it in the mildeſt terms; not even allowing the King's pardon to ſave American property from the general paſſion for confiſcation. It was the ſame officer who made ſo free with another gentleman's wine, and even offered it in preſents by the pipe to his friends: a man, who from oſtentation and weakneſs, has vibrated between the deſire of popularity as a magiſtrate, and the vanity of being conſidered as

Loyaliſts plundered.

Speaks from facts.

Curious fact of Gen. de Heiſter.

Of a Britiſh military genius.

a

a military genius. I conceal his name, becauſe he really has good qualities, which break ſometimes through the cloud of imperfections that ſurround them. I have thus particularized ſome inſtances, leſt your Lotdſhip ſhould ſuſpect the truth of my general aſſertions.

Clinton's expedition up the Hudſon nugatory.

From this irkſome ſubject allow me to draw your Lordſhip's attention up Hudſon's River. There we ſee forts ſtormed with the intrepidity and ſpirit which ever accompanies Britiſh troops, when properly conducted; but with a loſs of brave men, which muſt be the more regretted, as we gained nothing but mere honour by it,—the ground being left to the rebels to improve upon their paſt errors. Why a delay was made of eight days before the army proceeded further up the river, we are ignorant of. Your Lordſhip will recollect that the Highland forts were taken the fixth of October; Æſopus burned the thirteenth; and that General Burgoyne did not ſign his Convention till the ſixteenth. I have been aſſured by undoubted authority, that the city of Albany was totally defenceleſs, ſerving only as an hoſpital for the rebels, and as a lodgment for their ſmall magazines of proviſions. The river is undoubtedly navigable for frigates within twelve miles of Albany. There was no force even to oppoſe open boats; gondolas could have guarded them to the wharfs of the town. Why then did not the troops proceed immediately to Albany? the taking of which might have been effected without the loſs of a man; and would have obliged Mr. Gates to have returned haſtily, or to have croſſed Hudſon's River for want of proviſions. The latter would undoubtedly have been the caſe, as it is certain he had not two days proviſions collected for his army, except what was in Albany. Putnam could have been no impediment, as he could not poſſibly croſs the river to attack Albany, had he been in a condition. This meaſure would have infallibly enabled General Burgoyne to retreat in ſafety, or to have formed a junction with the forces from New York at Albany, and thereby have ſaved the honour of the Britiſh arms. If it had not been found practicable to keep poſſeſſion of Albany, the paſſage to New York was ſafe and eaſy.

His delay.

Albany defenceleſs; frigates can go within 12 miles of it.

Had Clinton gone forward, Burgoyne's army had been ſaved.

Your Lordſhip will plainly perceive that there was time ſufficient between the ſixth and the ſixteenth to have effected all this. Perhaps it will be pleaded that Sir Henry Clinton was reſtrained by his orders, "to remain on the defenſive." This did not operate more ſtrongly againſt taking poſſeſſion of Albany, than againſt ſtorming the forts in the Highlands. Whatever it proceeded from, the army only amuſed themſelves with burning Æſopus, and the houſes of individuals which ſtood cloſe to the river's bank. If fire be neceſſary to accompany the ſword, permit me to aſk your Lordſhip, why was it reſerved for the province of New York, beyond all compariſon the moſt

His plea of reſtraint refuted.

moſt loyal colony of the thirteen? Why was it diſtinguiſhed by an unneceſſary deſtruction? Why did no ſort of declaration whatever accompany the army as it penetrated into the country, acquainting the inhabitants how to conduct themſelves, holding forth ſafety to the loyal at leaſt, many thouſands of whom your Lordſhip is well aſſured are in that Colony? Why have theſe loyal people been treated the worſt? I pray your lordſhip to enquire into the ſtate of that Colony, you will find that 1500 loyal ſubjects joined Gen. Burgoyne in his ſhort progreſs into it; that near 5000 from it have joined the other armies, and that 4000 have returned their names in the city of New-York, to ſerve as militia, for the defence of that town.

N. York treated worſt, tho' 10500 have taken arms for Britain.

In pity and in juſtice, my Lord, I hope you will enquire why theſe things have been done? And that, inſtead of a continuance of ſuch conduct, the loyal and repenting will have ſome diſtinguiſhing indulgence ſhewn them, ſhould the army move that way next campaign. Policy enjoins it. That province ſo gained, would inſure the reduction of the reſt, as the loyal there would greatly encreaſe and eſſentially aid his Majeſty's army.

If after what has been already ſeen in the provinces of Jerſey and New York, the public could be ſurprized at any miſconduct or proof of incapacity, the expedition to the Head of the Elke River muſt ſurely produce that effect. Great geniuſes in a variety of difficulties chooſe that which is moſt eaſy and practicable. It belongs only to the conductors of the King's armies in America to chooſe that which is moſt difficult, tedious, and uncertain.

Gen. Howe in Jerſey, only 24 miles from Delaware.

I will paſs over the abſurdity of declining a march of twenty-four miles from Somerſet Court Houſe in Jerſey to the River Delaware, which might have been performed in one night, and the river croſſed before a timid and greatly inferior enemy would have ventured to quit his ſtrong hold. Such a ſtep would have put us in poſſeſſion of Philadelphia in three days, inſtead of three months, and ſubjected that whole province to the royal army; and it would alſo have put every magazine the rebels had formed in that country at once into our hands, to the total ruin of their cauſe.

By this land route the rebel magaz. would have been ſeiz'd.

Why the fleet did not proceed up the Delaware River, inſtead of loſing five weeks in ſailing round to the Elke—is one of the moſt unaccountable parts of all our miſconduct. It is well known that the danger of the navigation in the Delaware is not greater than in Cheſeapeak Bay, and that the former is wider and more commodious for ſhips at Cheſter, which is within ſixteen miles of Philadelphia, than the River Elke is ſo far up; it was alſo equally unfortified; the banks of the Delaware are low and eaſily commanded by ſhips of war. Had the fleet proceeded up the Delaware to Cheſter, ſeven weeks time would have been ſaved; the horſes belonging to our army would

Should have landed at Cheſter 16 m. only from Philadelp.

have

have been fit for uſe ; little land carriage would have been neceſſary, from the place of landing being ſo near to Philadelphia ; and the fleet would have been near to the army ready to have afforded all neceſſary aids, and even to have ſecured a ſafe retreat in caſe of any diſaſter.

An action ſo deciſive as that of Brandywine would have enabled the King's army to have purſued the fugitives the ſame day to Philadelphia, as the boats would have been at hand ready to have croſſed the Schuylkill, the only river in its way. The great quantity of ſtores laid up in Philadelphia would have fallen into our hands, and probably in the general confuſion, the Congreſs themſelves. A great deal of time would at leaſt have been ſaved, which proved to be ſo neceſſary at the cloſe of the campaign ; and it would alſo have been the ſaving of ſeveral veſſels loaded with baggage, cloathing and merchandize, which were loſt in the river, owing to its being ſo late in the ſeaſon before they could be diſpatched from New York after we were certain the army would be able to keep poſſeſſion of Philadelphia. Had either of theſe plans been purſued, the buſineſs of the campaign would have been ſo forward, and with ſo ſmall a loſs from ſickneſs, that the troops which were called away from New York might have been ſpared, and thereby enſured a junction with General Burgoyne.

A Quick march would have given us variety of ſtores, and perhaps the Congr.

What a different face would our affairs have worn in America at this hour ? Your Lordſhip muſt be convinced, from your own information, that the rebellion would have been at an end. Behold the reverſe of all this. Five weeks were loſt in going round to Elke ; the horſes of the army were almoſt intirely rendered unfit for ſervice ; the troops were landed in one of the moſt unhealthy countries in America, in the moſt ſickly ſeaſon ; and obliged to halt near a fortnight in order to collect horſes, and to refreſh, after ſo tedious a voyage. The landing was made ſixty miles, inſtead of ſixteen, from the principal object of the campaign ; the troops ſubjected to a long march through a very difficult country, and obliged to attack the rebels at a very great diſadvantage, croſſing a river in their front, ſeparated in two diſtinct bodies, and ever liable to be encountered by the whole force of the rebels. The fleet could not co-operate with the army, but was diſmiſſed to go round into the Delaware ; no poſſible retreat was left in caſe of any diſaſter ; if they had been repulſed, it muſt have been fatal, as they were unprovided with proviſions ; victory, in ſhort, was abſolutely neceſſary to their preſervation. They muſt be maſters of the country, in order to exiſt. The bravery of the troops ſaved their commander the diſgrace, and the nation the misfortune, which ſeemed due to his indiſcretion.

Diſadvantages of Cheſapeak voyage.

There is great magnanimity and true courage, in firmly encountering dangers and difficulties when the ſervice abſolutely

Reflexions on General Howe.

requires it; but where a General expoſes his army to it unneceſſarily, and by that means protracts the war; when a plain, ſafe, and expeditious method offers, it is incapacity or madneſs in the extreme. Fortunately the fleet had a more expeditious Voyage returning from Elke, than it had going thither, and ſailed ſafely up the Delaware, which a few weeks before had been deemed ſo dangerous; or the army would have been in a very diſagreeable ſituation, notwithſtanding the victory they had obtained.

Rebel army run 30 m. in 14 h.

Few victories were ever more eaſily won, than that at Brandywine; and no army ever fled in greater confuſion or diſmay than the rebels: in fourteen hours after his defeat Mr. Waſhington was on the banks of the Schuylkill, near thirty miles from the place of action; the inhabitants of Philadelphia were in the utmoſt conſternation; large quantities of ſtores were lodged in it; the royal army had but to march on, and all muſt have fallen into their hands, without another ſhot. Inſtead of this, the army moved with the greateſt caution in purſuit of a broken and diſmayed enemy, who no longer thought of diſputing a paſs with the intrepidity of the King's troops.

Our up & down marching let them eſcape.

Inſtead of marching along the plain and broad road to Philadelphia, the army filed off, and marched ſlowly and cautiouſly acroſs the country, then up the Schuylkill, and then down again; by which means ſufficient time was allowed the rebels to recollect themſelves, recover their ſpirits, and remove their ſtores from Philadelphia.

Conjectures why the army not allowed to complete their victories.

At laſt when nothing remained in it worth taking, the city was entered in triumph, fifteen days after the victory at Brandywine. If this conduct does not proceed from a total want of capacity, I hope it is to be attributed to nothing worſe: courage certainly was not wanting; yet the ardour of the troops has been conſtantly reſtrained. Upon every defeat we have given the rebels, we ſeem to have been afraid of a vanquiſhed and broken rabble, that we deſpiſed before we defeated them. This, my Lord, is a paradox which people endeavour to account for in various ways; ſome attribute it to indolence, others to over-caution, and ſome even to a fear that the war would be too ſhort. I own I cannot agree in the laſt, with regard to the perſon who has the chief command, tho' I may ſuſpect ſome of thoſe in his confidence.

On the battle of German Town.

The action at German Town needs no other comment, than that it was ſimilar to all the battles we have fought. His Majeſty's troops gained a complete victory, and yet they were ſo much reſtrained in the purſuit, that the rebels eſcaped with a very inconſiderable loſs. The victorious troops were not thought ſufficient to purſue the enemy they had defeated, until the grenadiers were brought up from Philadelphia, eight miles diſtant; the purſuit was then permitted, but the rebels had

had by that time collected themſelves, and got to ſuch a diſtance, that it was totally ineffectual.

The forts on the Delaware were taken after ſuch a delay, ſuch a ſeries of blunders, and with ſuch loſs, that they were indeed a very dear purchaſe. The expedition to White Marſh, is, in the opinion of many, a moſt ſingular inſtance of incapacity. The King's army marched up to the front of the rebel encampment and finding it fortified too ſtrongly to be attacked, without further examination, were led back to Philadelphia. Here was another occaſion loſt of cruſhing at a blow the rebel power. I aſſert, as an undoubted fact, that the rebel camp was totally unfortified in the rear; and had the King's army turned their left flank, and attacked their rear, ſucceſs was certain; nay, their deſtruction muſt have enſued, as the rebels were greatly inferior even in numbers. If the General had but remained in their rear only two days without attacking them, Mr. Waſhington muſt either have decamped before him, or have marched out and given him battle, as it is well known he had not above one day's proviſion in his camp. This we learned even before we got back to Philadelphia, and ought certainly to have known it ſooner, did not a diſlike to buſineſs, and indolence, retard our ſucceſs. It is inexcuſable in a General, at all times, to be ſo ignorant of his adverſary's ſituation: in a civil war, when intelligence is ſo eaſily obtained, it is criminal.

Had Gen. Howe attacked the rebels in rear at White Marſh, ſucceſs certain.

Thus we have twice allowed Mr. Waſhington to ſhew all the world, that he is capable, with an inferior force, to chooſe ſuch a camp as he can remain in with ſafety. Such camps, my Lord, are to be found in almoſt every pariſh in America. What then is our ſituation? Muſt we not either relinquiſh all hope of conquering America, or change our commanders, and with them ſuch a diſgraceful ſyſtem? The idea of fighting upon any ſort of equal terms, is totally exploded among the rebels; the beſt we can expect is, that they ſhould wait for us in a camp which they deem ſecure, in which we ſhould either ſurround them, and cut off their ſupplies, or we ſhould embrace the occaſion like men accuſtomed to victory; feeling our ſuperiority in valour and diſcipline, and even in numbers, we ſhould ſtorm their camp, and at a blow annihilate rebellion. Your Lordſhip knows that in ſuch caſes it is even ſafeſt to be the aſſailants; the idea of ſuperiority, with which it inſpires every breaſt, almoſt enſures ſucceſs, and few attempts have failed in ſtorming a fortified camp. Inſtead of declining it, it is a ſituation which we ſhould wiſh the rebels to place themſelves in. I aſſert that this is the general language, and even the murmurs of the royal army at this hour in America. Bunker's-hill and Trenton have had very unhappy effects upon all our military proceedings in America. It belongs only to men of genius to draw advantage from their paſt errors; a mere

Muſt change our commanders

ſoldier is incapable of it; he falls into deſpair and inaction, for want of mental reſources.

In the winter quarters, before the diſaſter at Trenton, the troops were too much extended; ever ſince they have been ſo much collected, as to loſe the advantage of our victories. At Bunker's-hill we deſpiſed ſituation; we have ever ſince fallen into the oppoſite extreme.

Southern expedition abſurd. Want of ability in our operations

I think it totally unneceſſary to dwell longer upon the expedition to the head of Elke river, or upon the operations of the army until they went into winter quarters. I am perſuaded your Lordſhip, and every man of the leaſt information in this country, muſt be convinced of the abſurdity of the one, and of the dilatorineſs and want of ability in the other. The public may ſee that from theſe two cauſes the advantages of the campaign to the ſouthward have been very unequal to their hopes, or indeed to what they had a right to expect, even if it had not ſacrificed General Burgoyne's army. The people give their money freely; the zeal and intrepidity of the troops are unqueſtionable; but that the advantage which ought to ariſe from both ſhould be loſt, through a total want of capability in planning, and activity in executing, muſt mortify every good and loyal ſubject in an extreme degree. I acquit your Lordſhip of having planned the ſouthern campaign; I know it was ſent home recommended by many in reſpectable rank and ſituations, particularly from Amboy. You gave way to the deception, (your Lordſhip perceives I ſpeak from information) and large promiſes were made, that many thouſands of loyal ſubjects would join the Royal Standard as ſoon as it ſhould make its appearance in Penſylvania. The deceiver now lays the fault upon the general for not extending his forces, and affording a greater appearance of protection. He may be right, as he is in high truſt and favour under him. An unlimited power over the liberty of his fellow citizens is intruſted in him. He who never was eſteemed by one of them, is now placed over them.

Ld. G. G. did not plan ſouthern expedition.

Folly of occupying Philadel.

The town of Philadelphia, my Lord, is all we have for millions expended laſt campaign. How far ſuch a conqueſt is advantageous to us, or facilitates the future progreſs of our army, I leave to your Lordſhip to judge from the official diſpatches you have received, and the report of every officer who has arrived from America. From its natural ſituation, Philadelphia is incapable of being fortified. An army muſt be left to defend it; and a fleet to keep open the communication with it by water; the banks of the river are equally hoſtile as before, and difficult to guard; and after all what does it command? is there any natural boundary which can be eſtabliſhed? any important poſt which can be ſeized upon by the poſſeſſion of it? it is divided by the Delaware from the Jerſeys; a ſmall guard of militia on the oppoſite bank watches every motion made in the town with impunity

impunity; and the paſſage for boats is obſtructed near three months in the winter. The country weſtward from Philadelphia is one of the moſt difficult in America. In ſhort, the army is at ſea in that country; the general finds it ſo, and knows not how to proceed; he is at his wit's end.

Gen. Howe at his wits end.

After having taken this review of the proceedings towards conquering America by arms, permit me to call your Lordſhip's attention to the means made uſe of to effect it otherwiſe. A meſſage was ſent by Sir William Howe to Congreſs, offering to treat upon ſuch terms, as could not be juſtified upon any other grounds than abſolute deſpair. The time choſen for this too, was when they were fluſhed with the defeat of General Burgoyne's army. This meſſage was ſent by one Brown, through the medium of Mr. Willing of Philadelphia. Brown was a clerk to the houſe of Willing, Morris and company. Morris is one of the members of Congreſs, has been one of the moſt active, and without whoſe aſſiſtance it is confeſſed that the Congreſs could never have eſtabliſhed a credit in France. His brother, one of the houſe, is now their factor in France, and the Congreſs are ſupplied under the name and credit of Meſſrs. Willing, Morris and Company; though I do not believe that Mr. Willing himſelf has any ſhare in the buſineſs. Happily the Congreſs treated the meſſage with contempt, and impriſoned the meſſenger. I ſay happily, becauſe I aſſert, that had a treaty been diſgracefully concluded with Congreſs upon the terms offered, Great Britain would only have retained the ſhadow of ſovereignty over America; and that even would not have laſted ten years. I aſſert this to be a truth;—the public will comment upon it.

Offers terms to Congreſs diſgraceful to us.

When General Howe landed at Elk river, he publiſhed a declaration, aſſuring thoſe who ſhould remain peaceably in their houſes, protection both in perſon and property. I will not enter into the ſcandalous detail of plundering during the campaign, but ſhall confine myſelf to what has paſſed ſince the troops have been in winter quarters.

The property of loyal ſubjects has been taken at the will of commiſſaries, who have paid or not for it as they pleaſed; flour was purchaſed from ſeveral perſons when the army was in great want of it, before the navigation of the river was cleared, and generous prices were promiſed; yet twenty ſhillings only were paid at a time when the worſt flour was ſold at fifty ſhillings per hundred; and ſome perſons were even threatened with being ſent priſoners to the Provoſt, becauſe they preſumed to aſk for any payment at all. A great and generous ſalary has been ſettled upon a commiſſary to place him above the corruption of his office. It was not conſidered that this man was taken from the ſchool of the India Houſe, and familiariſed to the peculations of the Eaſt. This gentleman too, the friend of the virtuous Duke of

Oppreſſion of Commiſſaries.

One appointed familiarized to the peculations of the Eaſt.

of Grafton, talks of the rights of America, declares himſelf a Whig under the American acceptation of the word: he even preſumes to aſſert, that the General is of the ſame ſentiments! I know it is abſolutely neceſſary that the army ſhould have comfortable quarters; but is it juſt, my Lord, that loyal ſubjects ſhould have their houſes crammed with ſoldiers, while many who have been rebels, and ſtill would be ſo if they dared, are exempted? this I aver is the caſe in too many inſtances; even the houſes of thoſe gentlemen, who are now priſoners in Virginia, have been filled, and none excuſed. Is not this inequitable and impolitic in a high degree? is not this ſhewing, that to have been in rebellion is the beſt road to favour and kind treatment? there is but one way of accounting for ſuch conduct.

Abſurd government at N. York

If we turn our eyes to the city of New York, we ſee the moſt ſingular and abſurd ſyſtem of government imaginable. There we behold the governor of the province acting as a general officer only, while a military governor commands with abſolute power in the city; and the Mayor acting under him, exerciſes a civil authority, under a military controul. Still the government of New York is far preferable to that of Philadelphia.

Great character of the military governor.

The military governor is a man of rank and character, unconnected with provincial party, and uncontaminated with rebellion; it is not neceſſary for him to make a ſhow of too much zeal to cover his paſt miſdeeds. He is a man inferior to none for good judgment and humanity, and a knowledge not only of that town, but of America in general: he acts as a father to the people over whom he preſides.

Remarks on an indolent & diſſipated General.

The luxury and licentiouſneſs of the army have reached your Lordſhip's ears too frequently to make it neceſſary for me to expatiate on that head. What can the nation expect from a luxurious and licentious army, and an indolent and diſſipated general? our affairs abſolutely require the induſtry, œconomy, and regularity of an Amherſt; with the fire and genius of a Wolfe.

A regiment of idle Commiſſar.

A regiment might be formed of idle, uſeleſs commiſſaries, quarter-maſters, agents, and forage maſters; there are twenty of theſe appointments now, where there was one laſt war in America. The rebellion will never be at an end, while there are ſo many idlers fattening upon the ſpoils of England and America. While our Weſt India iſlands are in the utmoſt diſtreſs for lumber, at leaſt five hundred thouſand ſtaves are ſuffered to rot in cellars, and on wharfs at Philadelphia, under pretence of a ſcrupulous adherence to law, though licences are granted to the veſſels of favourites to import cargoes from different places, contrary to all law and good policy. And though no merchant could obtain permiſſion to export theſe ſtaves, yet the commiſſary general was allowed to do it to Corke, under the pretence that it was for the uſe of the contractors. Theſe

Indulgence to favourites & to the Commiſſary General.

were

were hogſhead ſtaves, my Lord, to make beef barrels.—The trick is too glaring!

I have ſpoken freely, my Lord; I have done it from a conviction ariſing from the fulleſt information, and from the moſt hearty and zealous deſire of ſeeing the preſent rebellion in America ſpeedily cruſhed, and law, order, and conſtitutional liberty reſtored to that unhappy and deluded country, under the Britiſh government.

Remarks on Sir Andrew Snape Hammond's Evidence. By a Sea Officer on the Cheſapeak Voyage.

Partiality obſervable.

Reading the other day in the papers, the examination of Sir And. Snape Hammond in the Houſe of Commons, relative to the expedition of the Cheſapeak Bay; I could not help obſerving a certain partiality in the evidence.—Though I have a high opinion of the worthy Knight's abilities as a ſea officer, yet the vulgar proverb of *Aſk my brethren if I am a rogue*, ſtruck me moſt forcibly. Can it be ſuppoſed, that one whom the noble Lord has raiſed to the higheſt pinnacle of honour he could, would not applaud his conduct? if *he* is admitted on one ſide, why not call *ſome* who have felt his implacable reſentment on the other ſide by way of a balance? or to proceed in the faireſt way, call in thoſe who are *above prejudice* (ſeveral of whom were preſent on the expedition,) and they are the only people to give the honourable houſe the moſt ſatisfaction.

From whom to obtain fair evidence.

I could have wiſhed to have heard the opinion of the truly heroic Sir James Wallace on this expedition, and ſeveral others I could point out, but 'tis too late.

The Cheſapeak voyage Sir Andrew's own advice.

'Tis well known in the navy, that Sir Andrew Snape Hammond, in preference to older officers, had the command of the fleet at Philadelphia all the winter. Before this he was Lord Howe's oracle! It was he that adviſed him, very ſagaciouſly, not to attempt landing in the Delaware; he ſays the rebels might have come down with their gallies, and annoyed our landing;—he likewiſe obſerves that they were *only three weeks* longer on the paſſage to Cheſapeak.—The firſt ſuppoſition is impoſſible, provided the fleet were properly diſpoſed of, and the detention by the different places was *full two months*.

I muſt now obſerve that I had the honour to belong to the navy on that expedition, and beg to aſk a few queſtions, and give a plain narrative of ſome facts juſt as they fell out.

His opinion of danger in the Delaw. refuted.

Did not Capt. Lindſay, in his Majeſty's frigate the Pearl, chace the whole force of the rebels from the Capes of Delaware to very near Reedy Iſland?

Did not the Roebuck, Sir Andrew's own ſhip, and Liverpool, when attacked by the gallies, though one was aſtern, oblige them to deſiſt?

Did

Did not the Roebuck, Camilla, Liverpool, and Pearl, keep the advanced poſt for a month at Billingſport, both before the Eagle arrived, and for ſome time after, when the whole formidable rebel navy, with fire ſhips, rafts, &c. were there, and the ſeveral attempts made with fire-rafts, &c. all proved abortive, and only obliged the ſhips to cut once?

Landing at Newcaſtle would have ſaved 2 months.

The rebel army were then ſome on the Jerſey ſhore, and the Eagle at Cheſter, nineteen miles above Newcaſtle.—As we had with us four ſail of the line, two 50 gun ſhips, ſix or ſeven frigates, beſides galleys, armed veſſels, tenders, &c. could not the frigates advance three miles above Newcaſtle, and the army land under cover of the large ſhips and other veſſels, any of which could go within piſtol ſhot of the town, or any parts contiguous to it?—Or, if it was found neceſſary, the large ſhips might have advanced, ſome of them, and left the reſt to cover. Round Newcaſtle is a fine level country.

Here the army would have been within forty miles of Philadelphia, I don't ſay three weeks, but two months ſooner than when they began to march at the head of the Elke, which is more than three times the diſtance.

And 1500 men.

We were three weeks on the paſſage to the Elke, and detained there near a month longer before the army was ready to march; in the courſe of which, by death, ſickneſs, ſeamen, and ſoldiers, taken ſtraggling, deſertion, &c. we were fifteen hundred at leaſt leſs to do duty than when at the Delaware.

We ſailed from New York the latter end of July, were off the Delaware in one week, and before we left Cheſapeak, 'twas the latter end of September; from thence to Delaware again we were twelve days, in ſuch weather, that the fleet was ſeparated; one tranſport foundered, and many of the ſmall armed veſſels were in danger of being loſt. I would then wiſh to leave to any impartial judges, whether the expedition did honour to the two great officers, or credit to the nation.

Whether honour or credit gained.

As the detention of the army, for near a month after the landing in Elke River, may excite curioſity in ſome, and raiſe wonder in others, I ſhall endeavour to give a ſhort account of that politic buſineſs.

Army detained a month.

The tranſports, with the ſmall men of war, anchored about ten miles below the head of the river Elke; and in about an hour and half after they anchored, the whole of the troops were on ſhore. The ſtores, proviſions, &c. were not landed here, but for weighty reaſons, ordered up in the ſmall veſſels to the head of the river; a very ſhoal and intricate paſſage.

I ſhould have ſuppoſed, provided every thing neceſſary had been landed where the troops were at firſt, that a week, or ten days at moſt, might have compleated the army for their march. —As a proof that I cannot be very much out in my judgement, I muſt beg leave to remark, that Sir Henry Clinton, after march-

marching acroſs the Jerſeys, from the time he began at the heights of Naveſink till every matter was compleated, was only a week; but we were not in ſuch haſte! for after the flat boats had carried up tents, tent-poles, heavy baggage, &c. they were very advantageouſly employed another week in bringing them down again. The Commanding Officer by this time having ſettled within himſelf that no heavy baggage ſhould proceed with the army.—As it was ten miles from the tranſports to the head of the river, theſe amuſing orders, and counter orders, muſt of courſe take up ſome time in the executing.

14 days loſt in landing and reſhipping tents.

When the fleet arrived in the Delaware, the Roebuck, Pearl, Camilla, and Liverpool were advanced as far up as Billingſport, a ſtrong poſt, which the rebels had evacuated on the approach of our troops; and as they brought down ſome artillery in the night, and fired on our ſhips, to favour an attempt made by their fire-rafts, it was not only thought, but found very neceſſary to ſecure a poſt here. Some marines with a detachment of the 71ſt regiment were accordingly ſent.

The rebels did not evacuate this poſt without ſome better view, for they were now ſeen to be very buſy throwing up works on a place called Red Bank, a high ſteep place; which not only commanded, and ſecured a communication with Mud-Iſland, but protected their ſhipping, and entirely ſecured them from any attack we could have made. The General might have ſeen this every day himſelf: for it took them ſometime before they compleated it. He was told of it, but it availed nothing! he was determined they ſhould finiſh it before he would attack it! —and they did; for the brave Count Donop, with 2000 Heſſians attempted it, and near four hundred ſoldiers were killed and wounded.—This was not the only loſs we ſuſtained, for Capt. Reynolds who was then lying at Billingſport, perceiving the attack, and fearing the rebel gallies might annoy our troops, weighed immediately, and endeavoured to get as near as poſſible to the fort and gallies to divert their attention from the attack, but unfortunately got on ſhore. The Merlin ſloop of war alſo ſhared the ſame fate; a cannonading began between the Auguſta, Roebuck, and the Mud Fort, which laſted pretty briſkly, for near two hours. The next morning it was renewed, but the Auguſta was not only too far from the fort, but lay in a very diſagreeable ſituation; about eleven o'clock ſhe took fire by the accident of her own wads, and as the lower deck guns were loaded, and going off every minute, it was impoſſible for the boats to go along-ſide; however, every thing was done that could be done to ſave the people; many who could not ſwim periſhed, and all the poor men that were wounded, were blown up in her. There were miſſing above a hundred of her crew;—may we not aſk with propriety if the poſt had been ſecured in a proper time, if we ſhould not only have ſaved

Red Bank fortified before Gen. Howe's face.

But not attacked till compleat.

Heſſians repulſ.

Merlin loſt.

And Auguſta burnt.

Miſconduct of not poſſeſſing Red Bank.

many lives, but have taken Mud Iſland with very little trouble, as it entirely commanded it, and likewiſe ſaved the trouble of often riſking the flat boats with proviſions under the guns of the Mud Fort in the night, to keep the army from ſtarving; as they never were above five or ſix days proviſions before hand, till the Mud Fort was reduced, which was ſix weeks? The reſt of the proceedings for the reduction of the iſland are well known.

GOVERNOR JOHNSTONE'S SPEECH.

On Lord Howe's Conduct in America.

March 22d, 1779.

As I differ from the noble Lord (Howe) who ſpoke laſt in almoſt every thing he has ſaid, I will conſider the heads of his diſcourſe ſeparately, and give my reaſons to the houſe for this diſagreement.

Ld. Howe reinforced with two ſhips.

His Lordſhip firſt alledged that no reinforcement was ſent to him, becauſe of the two line of battle ſhips mentioned by the noble Lord at the Admiralty, one was intended to attend on the Commiſſioners in caſe they thought proper to return immediately, and the other was deſtined to bring his Lordſhip home; ſtill the two ſhips, Trident and Ardent, were there; the Admiralty had a right to reckon upon them, as it could not be ſuppoſed that either the Commiſſioners, who ſailed in the Trident from England a week later than d'Eſtaing ſailed from Toulon, or the Ardent, who ſailed with the convoy a little before them, could poſſibly have left the ports of North America before the packet, which ſailed the 5th of May, would announce the approach of the French ſquadron, and therefore they were ſhips to be conſidered as on the ſpot, to be uſed and depended upon as the event has proved.

Did not collect his force.

The admiralty had further, reaſons to expect that the whole of Lord Howe's force would have been *collected*, eſpecially the two decked ſhips, becauſe they had ſent his Lordſhip very early notice of the ſailing of Monſieur la Motte Piquet, and of the certainty of a war with France: in this caſe his force was far from being deſpicable. *Why* the two decked ſhips were not collected after two months notice, is a queſtion on which I am perſuaded his Lordſhip will be able to give very good reaſons. I can vote upon the ſubject, becauſe I am ſufficiently acquainted with the facts neceſſary to form my judgment, but I queſtion if an hundred members in the houſe know the actual force Lord Howe had under his command, or the confidence the admiralty could have that this force would be collected.

The next point the noble Lord ſtates, and the honourable gentleman who made the motion has inforced the ſame argument, is, that in caſe Monſ. d'Eſtaing had found our army at Philadelphia,

Philadelphia, and our ſhips in the Delaware, that the army would have been ſtarved, and the ſhipping deſtroyed. This opinion is general throughout the nation; it has been favoured by the friends of adminiſtration, to enforce the wiſdom of their meaſure in abandoning Philadelphia ſo opportunely as they did. It has been agreed to by this ſide of the houſe, to magnify the riſk which our fleet and our army run by their bad management. But on this ſubject, as I may probably do on many others, I differ from them both. I maintain, as I always have done, that the abandoning Philadelphia at the moment we did, was moſt fatal to our affairs in North America; and that ſuppoſing no ſuch orders had been given, and Monſ. d'Eſtaing had arrived off the Delaware as he did, that neither the ſhips in that river, nor the army at Philadelphia, run any riſk from that circumſtance, for ſix or eight weeks at leaſt, by which time we muſt have been relieved from any impreſſions of reſtraint, by the navigation of that river being interrupted.

We ſhould have kept Philadelp.

Firſt, I ſay, that the navigation of that river is ſo intricate, that ſuppoſing the buoys cut away, the beſt pilots of the country could not have traced out the channel to have aſcended the river with ſuch ſhips as thoſe under Monſ. d'Eſtaing, in eight or ten days.

Reaſons againſt d'Eſtaing's ſucceeding in the Delaware.

Next I aſſert, that none of the 74 or 80 gun ſhips, without being lightened, could have paſſed the flats, as the Trident went on ground twice at the top of high water, not from miſſing the channel, but from the ſhallowneſs of the water, and this ſhip draws three feet leſs water than any of the French 74 gun ſhips.

Thirdly, I aſſert, that ſuppoſing Monſ. d'Eſtaing, with his whole force, had actually aſcended the Delaware, above the flats, that all our ſhips, both men of war and tranſports, could have been moved into ſafety above the chevaux de frize; or the tranſports could have been removed above the chevaux de frize, and the ſhips of war moored in a half moon below, with flanking batteries on each ſide the river, which was in poſſeſſion of our army. We ſhould alſo have had the advantage of ſending fire ſhips down the ſtream among the enemy. The river is not ſo broad as the Thames at Graveſend, and d'Eſtaing, after paſſing through a hot fire in aſcending, muſt have been repulſed in the ſame manner which experience has demonſtrated we were capable of doing by the late attack at St Lucia, where Admiral Barrington, with a very inferior force indeed, has ſhewn what men, not willing to deſpair, can accompliſh.

Admiral Barrington given as a noble example

For my own part, after conſidering the ſubject on every point, again and again, I really think, ſo far from any danger by the direct application of the force of the enemy in the Delaware, that there was hardly any riſk from any thing that could have been done by them, in that river, againſt the reſiſtance of our ſhips and army; New York would have been the place in

danger. But it is always to be remembered, if orders had not been given for leaving Philadelphia, our great ſhips of war would not have been in the river Delaware, and therefore New York was equally capable of receiving the defence, which they actually did preſent when d'Eſtaing came off that port. So that on every alternative, the operations of his force would have been equally abortive.

But the noble lord ſays, the army would have been ſtarved. To my knowledge, there was five weeks proviſion for the army at Philadelphia, and ſtill greater quantities in the river when we arrived there, though it had been determined to leave the place.

Lord Howe's character lowered with him.

I know how juſtly high the character of the noble lord ſtands for naval reputation; no man could eſteem it in a higher degree than I did myſelf, *before* the tranſaction I am going to ſpeak of. Perhaps my diſappointment was the greater on that account, and the eſtimate I made of the force of the enemy, was leſs from the opinion I had of the vice-admiral who commanded our fleet. I underſtand his conduct has received repeated applauſe from officers of high reputation in this houſe, while I was abſent from ſickneſs; but this ſhall not prevent me from ſpeaking my own opinion freely on this, and every other ſubject. I have been told the two noble admirals (Keppel and Howe) have been pouring incenſe on each others heads in very copious ſtreams. I agree they ſtand in the moſt reſpectable light on account of their *former* ſervices; and I alſo agree with my friend below me, that in caſe any miniſter has been guilty of any improper conduct, that has driven ſuch men from the ſervice of the ſtate at this critical moment, when the exertions of all good men are ſo much wanted to repel the common enemy, that ſuch a miniſter ſhould feel the indignation of this Houſe, and of his country at large. But if it ſhould appear on the other hand, that any ſet of military men, in their ſeveral pretenſions, are become too high for the ſtate, I hope there is ſtill left in the nation, virtue and ſpirit ſufficient to repel ſuch claims, and ability enough to be found in the naval department to reſiſt the power of our enemies, even if the two noble admirals were no more.

Two Admiral's pour copious ſtreams of incenſe upon each other's heads.

They are too high for the State.

Adminiſtration has certainly great credit in diſpatching the two packets from Falmouth, to give the noble lord notice of the ſailing of the Toulon ſquadron, and the packet that did arrive in America having fallen in with that ſquadron, from every particular which the captain related, it was evident to me, beyond a doubt, that they were bound to ſweep the coaſt of America, from Virginia northward.

Lord Howe informed of the French, June 29.

The packet arrived the 29th of June, and certainly gave ſufficient time for every preparation to be made for receiving the enemy, who did not arrive off New York till the 11th of July.

Whether

Whether thoſe preparations were made, or otherwiſe, is a queſtion I ſhall not now enter into.—I mean at preſent only to take notice of ſome aſſertions in a pamphlet that has been circulated with great induſtry, as preparatory to miſlead our judgments in the queſtion of to-day.

This performance I can hardly attribute to the noble lord to whom it relates: it is too fulſome flattery to ſuppoſe he had any ſhare in it, or that he can give it the leaſt countenance now; nor ſhould I have envied his lordſhip any of the praiſes beſtowed by ſo idolatrous an author, if he had not taken notice of ſo inſignificant a perſon as myſelf, and miſrepreſented my opinions. His patron might have enjoyed the glory of making a bridge of boats to paſs the army over the rill that ſeparates Sandy Hook from the main, with the aſſiſtance of all the boats from fifty ſail of pendants, four hundred tranſports, and two hundred flat boats, without any interference. I am willing the Houſe ſhould underſtand this marvellous work was equal to every thing in ancient ſtory, and even ſuperior to Cæſar's bridge over the Rhine; but in that part which reſpects myſelf I cannot ſo eaſily ſubmit.

Fulſomely flattered.

Makes a bridge over a rill, aſſiſted by about 1000 boats.

Now, Sir, I aſſert, before you and the whole world, that what is imputed to me by the author of this pamphlet, is not true. I never obtruded myſelf into the ſociety of any ſet of men; the moment I heard the French fleet had appeared, I thought it my duty to go down to Sandyhook in the night to offer my poor ſervices; neither did I ever bewail our deplorable ſituation from the circumſtance of the French ſquadron coming on the coaſt of America. I thought it a lucky circumſtance. I expreſſed that ſentiment to all with whom I converſed. I am glad I did not know the imminent danger we were in until I came to this city, the centre of all true intelligence, otherwiſe I might have paſſed more uneaſy hours. I alſo deny, that ever I aſſerted Lord Howe had a ſuperiority over the French ſquadron when they appeared off the port of New York. If the noble Lord can remember any thing that paſſed between him and a perſon of ſo little conſequence as myſelf, he muſt know, that ſo far from entertaining that ſentiment, when the noble Lord talked of *going out* of the harbour to *give them battle*, I ſaid that I thought he was not of ſufficient force to hazard an engagement; but I always thought with a proper diſpoſition of his force, he was fully capable of defending the entrance of the harbour. What I ſaid then, and what I aſſert now, is, that after the junction of the Cornwall of 74 guns, the Raiſonable of 64, the Renown of 50, and the Centurion of 50, all heavy metal ſhips, Lord Howe was *equal*, if not *ſuperior*, in force to the French ſquadron. I give it alſo as my opinion, with deference to better judgments, that when his Lordſhip appeared off Rhode Iſland, though he did not take the whole of his force with him, that

Gov. Johnſtone offers his ſervice to Lord Howe in America.

Ld. Howe equal if not ſuperior to d'Eſtaing.

that he was fully equal to Monſieur d'Eſtaing, and I reckon in the following manner:—His fleet was the beſt manned that ever went to ſea, commanded by brave, judicious officers; the French were ill manned and ſickly, and damaged upon entering and returning through the fire of the batteries on Rhode Iſland. I ſhall read the liſt of the two ſquadrons, and the manner I claſs them:

Liſts of Engliſh and French fleet.

	Guns.	*Pounders.*			*Guns.*
I eſteem the Cornwall	74	18 & 32		a match for Cæſar beat by the Iſis of 50 Guns.	74
Eagle of	64	18	24	Languedoc	84
Experiment	50	12	12		
Trident	64	18	24	Tonant	80
Roebuck	44	9	18		
Raiſonable	64	18	24	Guerrier	74
Phœnix	44	9	18		
Somerſet	70	18	32	Hector	74
Nonſuch	64	18	24	Protecteur	74
Richmond	32	12			
St. Albans	64	18	24	Zele	74
Venus	36	12			
Ardent	64	18	24	Marſeilles	74
Pearl	32	12			
Preſton	50	12	24	Valiant	64
Apollo	32	12			
Iſis	50	12	24	Provence	64
Vigilant	20	24			
Centurion	50	12	24	Fantaſque	64
Sphinx	20	9			
Renown	50	12	24	Sagittaire	50
				[9 & 18 pounders.	

Note. *Lord Howe had, beſides theſe, the Nautilus ſloop of* 18 *guns, Carcaſs and Thunder bombs, Strombolo, Sulphur, and Volcano fireſhips, four row-gallies, and two tenders, beſides the Leviathan, capable of mounting* 70 *guns, and actually carrying* 44 *guns, left at Sandy-Hook; and the Nabob and Supply, two old Eaſt-India ſhips, taken into his Majeſty's ſervice, and mounting* 36 *guns each, and* 236 *men, who ſailed with the fleet, but which Lord Howe ſent to the Weſt-Indies. If too weak, why leave the Leviathan behind? Why detach the Nabob and Supply? Will any ſeaman ſay that the ſhips, as they are arranged, can be deemed inferior in any point of the line? But the Languedoc was diſmaſted and loſt her rudder in the ſtorm. The Marſeilles was diſmaſted in the ſtorm. The Cæſar was beaten by the Iſis, and driven into Boſton. The Monmouth of* 64 *guns, another of Byron's Squadron, had joined Lord*

Proofs Lord H. did not think himſelf too weak.

Cæſar a Fr. 74 beaten by the Iſis of 50 guns.

Lord Howe at Sandy-Hook on the 18th, yet d'Eſtaing lay at anchor in the open ſea for eight days, where he raiſed jury-maſts, within twenty leagues of Sandy-Hook. Lord Howe waited from the 17th to the 24th of Auguſt before he followed, though he had then confeſſedly ſo ſuperior a force.

Ld. Howe when ſuperior trifles away 8 days, when d'Eſtaing lay diſmaſted within twenty leagues of him.

But it may be ſaid although Lord Howe had a ſuperiority by the addition of his heavy frigates, yet it was impoſſible they could be brought to act in the diſpoſition in which I have placed them. This I admit, but at the ſame time I contend, that Lord Howe had a complete line of heavy ſhips capable of lying along-ſide the French ſhips, and in half an hour's action, every one knows the line of battle muſt be broken, when all the frigates could have come to have acted to the utmoſt of their force. If this is not admitted, it would be impoſſible for Lord Howe, or any other officer, to have availed himſelf of the advantage of any number of larger ſhips; for ſuppoſing his frigates had all been fifty gun ſhips, ſtill no greater number than the ſhips oppoſed to the enemy's line can act at the beginning, until they are broken and ſcattered, which muſt always happen, as I ſaid before, in half an hour in every ſea engagement. The generality of mankind are confounded in their opinions by the weight of metal, and the number of guns ſtated, without knowing the real circumſtances attending thoſe apparent diſproportions. I reckon an Engliſh 64 gun ſhip a match for any 74 gun ſhip out of France. The difference between the actual force of two ſuch ſhips is not ſo much as people imagine. They generally count the difference of ten guns, but in fact the difference upon the real efficient batteries is only two guns, the reſt ariſes from the guns on the quarter-deck and forecaſtle, which are light and are not of ſuch conſequence, and are often in the way of working the ſhip. Reſpecting the weight of metal, I think the Engliſh 64 has a great advantage over the French 74. Experience has convinced me, that the French 36 pounder (equal to our 42 pounder) is a gun that cannot be managed ſufficiently quick. Whatever gun is above the ſize of being loaded by one man to a ſponge, and breeched about by one man to a handſpike, I eſteem too large for action. I believe the 18 and 24 pounders, which all our 64 gun ſhips carried, to be the fitteſt guns for uſe in a cloſe engagement; the quickneſs of their fire, and the certainty of pointing them well and eaſily, does more than compenſate for the difference of damage when they hit. I do not ſay this will be the caſe in an engagement like Mr. Keppel's, on contrary tacks, where the ſhips came up ſcattered, and the enemy have time to load again before they meet. Here the heavy grape ſhot does great miſchief to the ſails and rigging. I ſpeak of a cloſe engagement on the ſame tack, in the uſual manner. I think

On bringing frigates into a general action.

Engliſh 64 equal to Fr. 74.

French guns unweildy.

Engl. 50 equal to French 64.

think alſo, that one of our new 50 gun ſhips, with 12 and 24 pounders, is nearly a match for a French 64. What happened in this very tranſaction will vindicate my opinion. The Iſis, one of the worſt of the 50 gun ſhips of Lord Howe's ſquadron, fell in with the Cæſar, the fineſt 74 of d'Eſtaing's fleet, and a flag ſhip too, and in a fair engagement the Iſis beat the Cæſar.

Gallant example in Capt. Rayner

Much praiſe is undoubtedly due to the Captain, officers and ſeamen of the Iſis, for this extraordinary gallant action, but it ſhews at the ſame time that my opinions are not extravagant. The

And Capt. Reynolds.

Jupiter, one of our 50 gun ſhips, very ill-manned, has lately had an engagement with the Trident of 64 guns, and the iſſue has been favourable to my opinion. The battle was drawn without any claim to a ſuperiority by the French ſhip. I could give many proofs in the hiſtory of naval engagements, that my opinion is juſtified by experience, nor do I know any inſtance where it can be contradicted upon any trial that has been made. But the Houſe will obſerve by the liſt of ſquadrons which I have read, that no ſuch diſproportion of force exiſted, becauſe any difference that may appear in the ſhips of the line was fully compenſated by the aſſiſtance they would derive from the frigates, three of which were two decks, and one (the Vigilant) an old India ſhip, of 20 twenty-four pounders. All the others, excepting the Sphinx, were heavy metal frigates, of 36 and 32 guns, carrying twelve pounders on their main battery.—Theſe, Sir, are the opinions which I am ready to avow, and I have a certain conviction in my own mind of the truth of what I advance.

Ld. Howe might have beaten d'Eſtaing.

I am ſtill at a loſs to know whether the noble Lord himſelf really thought his ſquadron was inferior in force to that of Monſieur d'Eſtaing. I have never heard this aſſerted by any officer who ſerved in the fleet. I have always heard it alledged, that his Lordſhip was manœuvering for the wind, and meant to give d'Eſtaing battle, but was prevented by the ſtorm. If ſo, I conclude he expected to defeat his opponent, which would have proved his ſuperiority, and I ſincerely believe this would have been the caſe had the two ſquadrons engaged.

No famine nor ſurrender as Ld. Howe feared.

As to all the dreadful conſequences of famine, or ſurrender of the army, which the noble Lord has enumerated, ſuppoſing Monſieur d'Eſtaing had got poſſeſſion of Sandy-Hook, I cannot ſubſcribe to them in the extent he has ſtated. I have been informed, that by driving Long-Iſland there would have been

Six months proviſions on Long Iſland.

found ſix months ſubſiſtence for the troops, beſides the various means of obtaining ſupplies through the Sound, while the blockade of that port could not have continued without relief above ſix or eight weeks at moſt.

Remarks

REMARKS on Gen. Howe's Speech, and Conduct.

The General ſays, "His only view is to juſtify himſelf—that "many ſevere cenſures have been thrown out againſt him, and "miniſters have been ſilent—that when he was calumniated, he "ſhould have been vindicated by the noble Lord." Gen. Howe's Speech.

Let me aſk the honourable general who were the calumniators? where were the cenſures paſt? there has been no charge brought againſt him in parliament; and he expreſsly ſays, "That his "conduct has been approved of, and that the miniſter convey-"ed that approbation." Whatever were his deſerts, he cannot complain of want of ſupport from adminiſtration. The papers before the Houſe are replete with the moſt flattering marks of attention from the noble Lord at the head of the American department; he not only conveys the approbation of the ſovereign, but is himſelf laviſh of praiſe and perſonal civility. Did not the King honour him with a red ribbon unaſked; and can any thing be more ſtrongly marked than the attention that has ever been paid to his recommendations? almoſt all his aid de-camps, who were captains at the beginning of the campaign of 1776, are now lieutenant colonels, and many of them have been promoted by the King, without his even aſking it. He expreſſed his wiſh for particular officers to be ſent out to ſerve upon the ſtaff; they were all ſent as he deſired. He wanted to have Mr. M'Kenzie, his ſecretary, appointed paymaſter to the provincial forces, a very lucrative office; it was done. In ſhort, every thing was done that could be done to keep him in good humour. Flattering attention. Aid de Camps Captains 1776 now Lieut. Cols. Every thing done to keep him in good humour.

But ſays he, "I have been ſeverely cenſured, and miniſters "have been ſilent." Does he allude to anonymous publications? he ſurely could not expect the miniſters to vindicate his character againſt ſuch attacks as theſe! the noble Lord might as well expect the ſame favour from the General. He could not be ſo weak as to ſuppoſe that miniſters could ſtop the mouth of calumny, or influence the public opinion! they would undoubtedly be very glad to be able to exerciſe ſuch a power; it might be often very convenient for them; but the misfortune is, that in this land of liberty, people will ſpeak their ſentiments in ſpite of miniſters, or any body elſe. It is true, the general's conduct has been cenſured—ſeverely cenſured, or rather univerſally condemned. It has not been in news-papers alone, and anonymous publications, that he has been attacked, but his inactivity and his blunders, have been ſubjects of general converſation: people of all ranks and deſcriptions have ſpoken their minds freely upon the matter, and have teſtified their diſapprobation and uneaſineſs without reſerve. But are miniſters to be blamed for this! Miniſters cannot influence the public opinion. His conduct univerſally condemned.

If the general thinks that a vote of the Houſe of Commons will

A vote of the Houſe will not make him a great commander.

whiten him, and convince the world that he is a great commander, he does very right to move for a parliamentary enquiry. Indeed it is the only chance he has left, poor as it is, of reſcuing his character, as an officer, from total perdition. Conſcious as he muſt be that his conduct in America will not bear the ſtrict examination of a military enquiry, and encouraged by the flattering ſucceſs that others in his ſituation have met with, I am not ſurpriſed that he has choſen the ſafer method of laying his caſe before a good natured and indulgent Houſe of Commons, rather than demanding a court-martial when he found himſelf "cenſured" and "calumniated." For though the ſentence of a military court, and that only could acquit him in the eyes of military people, yet as members of parliament are, *ex officio*, competent judges of military operations, as well as of all other matters, whether political or profeſſional, he might think that their approbation might ſtand in lieu of a regular acquittal, and then there would be no riſque; for if he did not ſucceed, he could always impute it to the undue influence of a wicked and corrupt adminiſtration, and his character would not be at all the worſe for his having failed. Oppoſition would always be ready to receive him with open arms, and the merit of having rendered abortive the plans of the preſent miniſtry, however well they might have been contrived for the public good, could not fail to intitle him to a high ſeat among thoſe worthy characters who ſtile themſelves patriots, and the guardians of the liberties of this country.

Meaning of a Parliamentary enquiry inſtead of a court martial.

Sir William's charges diſingenuous.

We ſhall endeavour to anſwer all Sir William Howe's charges againſt adminiſtration, and prove that they are diſingenuous and ill-founded.

He ſays "his orders ſhould have been clear"—not whiſpers acroſs the Atlantic;—"not ſo ambiguouſly expreſſed, that "they might always be explained away." He complains of wanting the confidence and ſupport of his ſuperiors—the want of a plan from Home, &c. yet at the ſame time acknowledges, "that his own plans and meaſures met with ſuch approbation "from the miniſter, that he could juſtify himſelf under it, if "he thought proper."

The King leaves Gen. Howe to his own judgment.

Is it not a ſtrong proof of confidence in a General, when unhampered by inſtructions and uncontrouled by any ſuperior power, he is left intirely at liberty to follow his own plans, and proſecute a war according to his own ideas? and was it ever before a matter of ſerious complaint againſt a miniſter, that he did not furniſh military plans, in detail, to a commander in chief; eſpecially when every plan propoſed by the General was ſure to meet with approbation? The ſecretary of ſtate, in his letter, dated October 22, 1776, expreſsly ſays, "His Majeſty "does not intend that the general ſhould, in his plans of ope-"ration, be confined to any particular province: his choice of

"ſiuation

"ſituation muſt in that reſpect be governed by his own judg-
"ment." How many times in the courſe of a few months did Sir William Howe alter his plan for the campaign of 1777? between the months of November and April, no leſs than four, eſſentially different from each other, were propoſed, and yet by the General's own account, each of them in its turn was approved of. The miniſter, in his letter of the 3d of March, ſays, "I am now commanded to acquaint you, that the King "intirely approves of your deviation from the plan which you "formerly ſuggeſted." And again, May 18, "As you muſt, "from your ſituation and military ſkill, be a competent judge "of the propriety of every plan, his majeſty does not heſitate "to approve the alterations which you propoſe." Indeed the nature of the American ſervice requires that the General ſhould be at liberty to vary his plans of operations, according to the varying circumſtances of the war; and to any, who will take the trouble to caſt his eye over the American correſpondence, it will plainly appear, that the moſt ample and generous confidence was placed in Sir William Howe, from the time he came to the chief command till he aſked leave to return to this country.—He was not only ſupported with the whole weight of government, but was indulged in all his wiſhes both for himſelf and his friends.—Unaſked favours and honours were heaped upon him with the moſt liberal hand—and he was intruſted with every power, both civil and military, that could add weight and dignity to his ſituation, or claim reſpect from thoſe about him, and from the world.

G. Howe changes his plans four times, and each approved.

Generous confidence placed in him.

But though he was left thus entirely at liberty to act as he thought proper, and as exigencies might require, yet he was by no means ignorant of the ideas of adminiſtration reſpecting the future operations of the war. The miniſter did very often take the liberty of humbly propoſing his plans, though he never preſumed ſo far as to give any poſitive orders in conſequence of them. Indeed ſometimes the King went ſo far as to ſuggeſt his ideas, and his royal will and pleaſure has been ſignified by the ſecretary of ſtate. I confeſs that this in any other ſervice would be conſtrued an order, but I hope the General will not complain of it as ſuch, as he never thought proper in any one inſtance to pay the leaſt attention to it, any more than to the plans ſuggeſted by the miniſter. Sir William Howe and his noble brother have the entire merit of every military plan that was executed during his command, not excepting the famous one of the voyage round the capes of Virginia and up Cheſapeak bay, which brought on the loſs of Burgoyne's army, the preſent war with France, and every ſubſequent evil that has ariſen from them to this country.

No attention even to the King's orders.

Has loſt Burgoyne and raiſed a new war.

The General in his ſpeech complains of the miniſter for having ſent him a copy of his Letter to Sir Guy Carleton (containing

taining the arrangements for the Canada expedition) without any inſtructions whatever to himſelf. I am aſtoniſhed that an officer could hazard a charge ſo unmilitary. Could any inſtructions be neceſſary when the copy of the ſecretary of ſtate's diſpatch made him perfectly acquainted with every circumſtance relating to the northern army? Does not the Letter ſay that Sir Guy Carleton was to "detach Lieutenant General Bur-"goyne with direction to proceed with all poſſible expedition "to join (him) General Howe, and to put himſelf under his A junction with "command?" That with a view of quelling the rebellion as Burgoyne. "ſoon as poſſible it is become highly neceſſary that the moſt "ſpeedy junction of the two armies ſhould be effected?" And in another place, "I ſhall write to Sir William Howe from hence "by the firſt packet; but you will nevertheleſs endeavour to "give him the earlieſt intelligence of this meaſure, and alſo "direct Lieut. General Burgoyne, and Lieutenant Colonel "St. Leger, to neglect no opportunity of doing the ſame, "that they may receive inſtructions from Sir William Howe." Surely no order could have been framed that, in the eyes of a military man, could appear more binding upon the General than the copy of this letter to Sir Guy Carleton? it made a part of a general plan, from which he could not deviate without *hazarding* or *devoting* an expedition, whoſe movements he had not time to countermand, and whoſe operations he knew were Anſwerable for begun. The moment theſe troops croſſed the lakes, they be-Burgoyne's loſs. came a part of his army, and their ſubſequent misfortunes, if they aroſe from the want of ſupport and co-operation, are as much to be laid to his charge as the ſurprize and defeat of the Heſſians which he left expoſed and unſupported at Trenton.

Turns accuſer. General Howe, in the beginning of his ſpeech expreſsly declared, he only meant to "juſtify himſelf;" yet we afterwards find him turned the accuſer, and obliquely charging adminiſtration with crimes of the moſt ſerious nature—that of hiding from Parliament the true ſtate of our affairs in America, and promiſing ſucceſs when they knew there was no reaſon to expect it. Mr. Fox's ſpeech This ground Mr. Fox took up after him, and with his uſual virulence charged miniſters directly with having "treacherouſly "and traiterouſly deceived this country." He ſaid they had declared to the Houſe of Commons, "that they had reaſon to "expect a ſucceſsful campaign, when they knew, and when "they had it in their pockets under the General's own hand, "that nothing was to be expected."

Gen. Howe's ſpeech. The General's words were not ſo pointed as thoſe of Mr. Fox, nor did they convey a charge ſo directly; yet their meaning is the ſame. They were as follow: "The noble Lord ſaid "he learned from his intelligence the difficulties the rebels "were under in raiſing troops, that he hoped I ſhould be able "to get a ſufficient force in Pennſylvania for the defence of

"that

" that province; and he ſtill hoped that this campaign would " be the laſt. So that in ſpite of my poſitive aſſurances from the " ſpot, the miniſter's deluſive hopes and conjectures were to " influence him in oppoſition to my certain knowledge."

However deluſive the miniſter's hopes and conjectures may have been, his intelligence does not appear to have been materially different from that of the General, notwithſtanding this round aſſertion to the contrary.——Let us hear what the General's letters ſay upon this ſubject—thoſe very letters which Mr. Fox charges the miniſter with having had in his pocket when he told the Houſe he had reaſon to expect a ſucceſsful campaign. April 2, 1777, he writes from New-York, that " it is his opinion the rebels will not be able to raiſe their army " voted laſt autumn, &c." And again, " I have reaſon to " expect, in caſe of ſucceſs in Pennſylvania, there will be " found a conſiderable part of the inhabitants who may be em- " bodied as militia, and ſome as provincial troops, for the in- " terior defence of the province, which muſt be a great aid in " the further progreſs of the war. " And in the ſame letter he Ill founded pro- " ſays, " Still I think it probable that by the latter end of the miſes of Gen. " campaign we ſhall be in poſſeſſion of the provinces of New Howe. " York, the Jerſeys, and Pennſylvania." In his letter of the of the 20th of December 1776, the General tells the Miniſter, that, " the opinions of people were much changed in Penn- " ſylvania, and their minds in general, from the late progreſs " of the army diſpoſed to peace; in which ſentiment they " would be confirmed by our getting poſſeſſion of Philadelphia." —And he ſays in his Speech, " In the mean time from all the " intelligence I received, the reduction of Pennſylvania ap- " peared very practicable, though I ſhould have but an army " of 19,000 men."

I will not inſiſt upon the fact, that the rebels did actually find difficulties in raiſing troops, but will, for the ſake of the argument, ſuppoſe the miniſter ignorant of what every body elſe knew; nor will I lay any ſtreſs upon the *great abilities* of the General, nor his activity and " impatience to begin the campaign," which are mentioned by the miniſter in his letter of the 18th of May, and are given as reaſons for his hoping for a ſucceſsful campaign. I will confine myſelf ſimply to the information contained in the General's letters, and will then leave it to the world to judge whether the Miniſter's aſſertion is not juſtified in the moſt ample manner even upon this ground.

The noble Lord told the Houſe, " that he had reaſon to ex- Miniſter juſti- " pect a ſucceſsful campaign." The General writes to the no- fied. ble Lord, " that by the latter end of the campaign he expects " to be in poſſeſſion of the provinces of New York, Jerſeys, " and Pennſylvania:" 'tis true he adds, " that this in ſome " meaſure muſt depend upon the ſucceſſes of the northern " army."

" army." In his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, incloſed in the letter to the Miniſter of the 2d of April, Gen. Howe writes,

From G. Howe's own letters.

" that the poſſeſſion of Ticonderoga, would naturally be the " firſt object of the northern army;" and recommended " the " ſecuring Albany and the adjacent country" as the ſecond. " The further progreſs of this corps," ſays he, " depending " ſo much upon the enemy's movements, cannot be foreſeen at " this diſtance of time, ſtill I flatter myſelf, and have reaſon to " expect the friends of government in that part of the country, " will be found ſo numerous and ſo ready to give every aid and " aſſiſtance in their power, that it will prove no difficult taſk to " reduce the more rebellious parts of the province."

The 16th of July the Gen. writes, " the enemy's movements " taking this turn," (viz. Waſhington marching to the defence of Pennſylvania) " I apprehend General Burgoyne will meet " with little interruption, otherwiſe than the difficulties he " muſt encounter in tranſporting ſtores and proviſions for the " ſupply of his army." But let us ſee how far the Miniſter's hopes were authoriſed by his intelligence from that quarter.

And Gen. Burgoyne's.

General Burgoyne, in his letter dated Skeenſborough, July 11, 1777, ſays, " your Lordſhip will pardon me, if I lament that " my orders do not give me the latitude I ventured to propoſe " in my original project for the campaign to make a real effort, " inſtead of a feint upon New England. As things have turned " out, were I at liberty to march in force immediately by my " left, inſtead of my right, I ſhould have little doubt of ſubduing " before winter the provinces where the rebellion originated. " If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I ſtill hope this plan " may be adopted from Albany."

Who would not have imagined from theſe accounts that the rebellion was at an end? Who would have heſitated at promiſing a ſucceſsful campaign? It is true, our expectations were deceived, our hopes were moſt cruelly diſappointed; but ſhall the authors of our misfortunes, thoſe very men who flattered us with the hope of brilliant ſucceſs from operations they themſelves planned, and who afterwards by their delays and blunders waſted the campaign, and ſacrificed our armies, be allowed to call thoſe hopes deluſive, and charge the Miniſter with deceiving Parliament, when they themſelves have been the only deceivers.

The deceivers turn accuſers.

Was the force ſent out from this country equal to the objects of the American war?

The noble Lord at the head of the American department being aſked in the Houſe of Commons, ſoon after he came into office, what force he thought would be ſufficient to reduce the revolted colonies? replied, " That the meaſures of the force " ſhould be the wiſhes of the General."

This truly is a generous method of eſtimating force for military

military operations. And we find that General Howe's wiſhes were not only gratified in this reſpect, but the force that was ſent out in the ſpring of 1776, ſo far exceeded his moſt ſanguine expectations, that he appears to have been ſurprized to a degree of Aſtoniſhment at the amazing efforts that had been made. What he thought of the preparations, and of the miniſter, under whoſe immediate direction they were made, will beſt appear, by his own letter, dated Halifax, 8th June 1776, where he ſays, "I cannot take leave of your Lordſhip without expreſſing my "utter amazement at the deciſive and maſterly ſtrokes for "carrying ſuch extenſive plans into immediate execution, as "have been effected ſince your Lordſhip has aſſumed the conduct "of this war, which is already moſt happily experienced by "thoſe who have the honour of ſerving here under your "auſpices. That you may finally receive the acknowledge-"ments of a grateful country, the laſting glory which ſuch "ſervices merit; and that I may in ſome degree contribute to "the completion of meaſures ſo vigorouſly concerted, is the "fervent wiſh of your Lordſhip's, &c. W. HOWE."

Gen. Howe aſtoniſhed at the force ſent him.

In his letter of the 2d of April 1777, the General acknowledges that the force of 1776 was adequate to its object. It would be therefore prepoſterous in me to adduce a ſingle argument to prove it. I will however beg leave juſt to ſtate the following facts, that General Howe's army, in 1776, exceeded 30,000 regular, effective troops, excluſive of thoſe left at Halifax and of the northern army, and that Waſhington's army did not amount to more than 16,000 men.

In 1776 Gen. Howe 30,000 men, Waſhington 16,000.

By what means ſuch an army, ſo well appointed, ſerved by ſo large a train of artillery, and attended by ſo numerous a fleet, could fail of ſucceſs againſt a divided people, deſtitute of Officers, Soldiers, Magazines, fortified towns, ſhips of war, or any apparent reſources, will be the ſubject of my inquiry.

I follow the General in not entering into the policy or juſtice of the war, nor ſhall I dwell upon the wanton and unparalleled ſacrifice of the braveſt of our troops on Bunker's Hill, but will take up his conduct where he thought proper to do it in his ſpeech, viz. at the time of his receiving orders from the ſecretary of ſtate for evacuating Boſton, and before I follow him to the ſouthward will ſhew—that by his not quitting Boſton when he was ordered to do it, and it might have been effected without any diſgrace, the army remained thro' the winter cooped up in a moſt ignominious ſituation, ſuffering for want of neceſſaries, expoſed to inſult, and were neither the objects of terror or cauſe of diſtreſs to the rebels;—that by abandoning that poſt when he had wrote to government that he ſhould not, and by declaring that Boſton was tenable and then ſuffering the rebels to drive him from it with marks of diſgrace, he did his utmoſt to depreſs the ſpirit of the troops and to raiſe thoſe of the rebels;—that tho' the

Train of Gen. Howe's conduct

invin-

invincible fortitude of Britiſh troops prevented the firſt, the latter had its full effect; the defection from Great Britain was greatly increaſed, and the rebels excited to exertions that otherwiſe they would never have attempted

That by not blockading the Harbour, as the General himſelf had recommended, in caſe Boſton ſhould be evacuated, and leaving that as well as the other ſea ports on the coaſt in every reſpect open and accommodated to their naval efforts, the rebels not only ſupplied themſelves with military ſtores from our own ſtoreſhips, and captured great numbers of our own troops, but were enabled to collect ſuch a marine as to make depredations on our trade in every part of the world, which for ſome time was the ſole ſupport of the rebellion: And that by going northward 600 miles further from the intended ſcene of action, inſtead of going ſouthward as he had been directed, the ſpring and ſummer were waſted away, Waſhington had four or five months leiſure to fortify New York and its dependencies, and to draw the whole force of the continent to the ſpot where he knew our main army was deſtined. So that finally, with an army ſo decidedly ſuperior to the enemy, the General did little more in that campaign than provide winter quarters for the troops.

G. Howe's train of wretched manœuvres and wretched excuſes.

But theſe wretched manœuvres, unequalled but by the wretched excuſes made for them, ſhall now be the ſubject of conſideration.

Having now fully obviated the charges which the General thought proper to inſtitute againſt the miniſter, I will conſider Sir William Howe's vindication of his own conduct.

"The order (ſays he) for evacuating Boſton came too late "for me to execute it when I received it. I did execute it on "the 17th of March, and in a manner, I truſt, that was free "from diſgrace."

It is only neceſſary to conſider what thoſe orders were, and the time and manner in which they were executed, to decide on this part of the General's conduct.

Orders for evacuating Boſton early in winter.

In the beginning of November 1775, Gen. Howe received a letter from the Earl of Dartmouth, wherein, after referring to a former letter which had ſuggeſted the advantages of the army's being removed to New York, and the hazard of continuing at Boſton through the winter, his Lordſhip writes, "The intelli- "gence and information of every day ſince, have ſhewn more "clearly both the one and the other, and the ſituation of the "troops cooped up in a town, expoſed to inſult and annoy- "ance, if not ſurprize, from more places than one, deprived "of the comforts and neceſſaries of life, waſting away by diſ- "eaſe and deſertion faſter than we can recruit, and no longer "the objects of terror or cauſe of diſtreſs to the rebels, is truly "alarming, and demands the moſt ſerious conſideration; and

I am

" I am commanded by the king to ſay, that if no alteration for " the better ſhould have happened before this letter reaches " you, or any unexpected advantages of carrying on the war, " on the ſide of New-England, ſhould have opened themſelves, " it ſeems not only adviſeable but neceſſary to abandon Boſton " before the winter, &c.—and to remove with the troops either " to New York, or ſome other place to the Southward, where " a ſquadron of the king's ſhips may not only lie, but carry " on operations with ſecurity during the winter."

Here is an explicit, practicable order, framed on the real ſituation of affairs in America, by conforming to which, great evils were to be avoided, and advantages of equal magnitude to be obtained. Had the General, immediately on receiving it, gone to New York, he might have effected in 1775 nearly, if not quite as much, as he did in 1776 with 30,000 troops. There was nothing to oppoſe his army, which then conſiſted of 9000 effective men. Staten-Iſland and Long-Iſland would have received him with open arms, and New York, by his own confeſſion, was then in his power. The army would not only have been relieved from the preſſure of an ignominious and moſt diſtreſſing blockade, have abounded with freſh proviſions, and been able to carry on operations during the winter, but what was of ſtill greater moment, the early poſſeſſion of New York would have left the immenſe armament that was ſent to America in 1776, at liberty to act on the extenſive ſcale for which it was calculated, and to which it was adequate, and a total ſuppreſſion of the rebellion have been the neceſſary conſequence.

If done, the good effects.

But whether it is to be imputed to incapacity, to an utter inability to combine circumſtances, to balance probable events, and to improve ſituations and conjunctures, to the ſordid views of thoſe who principally compoſed his cabinet council; to his own love of eaſe, and the reluctance he felt at abandoning the Rotine of pleaſure that had been eſtabliſhed at Boſton for the winter; or to his being wedded to a ſyſtem of politics that favoured the rebellion, I do not pretend to ſay, but certain it is General Howe ſo conducted as to ſuffer all the evil pointed out in his Lordſhip's letter, which accumulated ignominy and diſgrace, as well as to loſe every advantage that had been ſuggeſted.

Conjectures on Gen. Howe's conduct.

The general did not think proper to obey the ſecretary of ſtate's order, and aſſigned for the reaſon of his diſobedience, that he had not ſufficient ſhipping to effect the removal at one embarkation, and going at two would be hazardous. True it is that the tonnage of the ſhipping then at Boſton fell ſhort of the quantity uſually allowed for long voyages; there was, however, a ſufficiency for a ſhort one; for in the March following, when the evacuation took place, there was ſtill leſs

His written excuſe refuted.

ſhipping in the harbour, owing to more veſſels having, within that period, been ſent to Carolina, Georgia, Nova Scotia, the Weſt Indies, and to Europe than had arrived; notwithſtanding which, enough were found to tranſport the army which had been reinforced in the mean time, together with 1100 loyal inhabitants, at one embarkation, beſides near 50 ſail of veſſels that were left at the wharfs, for the uſe of the rebels, many of which were ſoon converted into privateers, and decorated with the thirteen ſtripes.

Leaves fifty ſail to the rebels.

His verbal excuſe refuted.

Theſe are facts, and I adduce them as unequivocal proof of the inſufficiency of the reaſons, given by Sir William, for his continuing at Boſton during the winter. And I allow him ſome credit for ſaying nothing, in the Houſe of Commons, of a want of tranſports, and reſting his defence for diſobeying the order ſolely on its late arrival. But unfortunately for him this ground is equally untenable with that which he abandoned; for the northerly winds, which he tells us in the ſame letter prevail at that ſeaſon, are extremely favourable for a movement ſouthward.

If ſea ports deſtroyed, our trade ſaved.

The cruſhing the privateering buſineſs in its bud was another object worthy the attention of a General. In November 1775, the aſſembly of Maſſachuſetts paſſed an act for granting letters of marque and reprizal, and conſtituting a court of admiralty for the condemnation of Britiſh ſhips. The deſtruction of thoſe neſts of pirates, the ſea ports, where the evil originated, might have been very eaſily effected, and would have rendered the moſt eſſential ſervice to the Britiſh empire, as it would have prevented the depredations on our unſuſpecting trade, and have cut off the only reſources that for a long time enabled the rebels to carry on the war. But this was never once in contemplation. To judge from his letters, Sir William intended neither the one nor the other; but after ſolacing himſelf at Boſton during the Winter, to have gone, at his own leiſure, in a pleaſant ſeaſon of the year—to ſome other place.

On leaving Boſton intends entrenching a battalion.

To quiet the minds of adminiſtration, the general wrote he was not under "the leaſt apprehenſion of any attack from the "rebels by ſurprize or otherwiſe; on the contrary, that it "was to be wiſhed that they would attempt ſo raſh a ſtep;" requeſted inſtructions reſpecting the effects at Boſton; and propoſed that whenever the troops ſhould be withdrawn, a battalion ſhould be entrenched at a place where ſhips could winter with ſafety, for blockading the harbour.

Our confidence in Howe diſappointed.

Government acquieſced in the reaſons he had given, and the aſſurances he had made, and not doubting but their General might be found at Boſton in the ſpring, ſent a large force to that place, and expected him to have put a very different face on the war there before he left it. But in this, as in every o-

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ther inſtance, in which any confidence had been placed in our hero, they were to be diſappointed.

Rebels occupy Dorcheſter neck

The rebels having cannonaded and bombarded the town from Roxburgh and Phipps Farm, three nights ſucceſſively, in the beginning of March, with very little effect however, unleſs it was the amuſing and diverting the attention of the garriſon from the main object, took poſt on the commanding heights of Dorcheſter Neck. Here, as at Bunker's-Hill, the works were in great forwardneſs when diſcovered; with this difference however, that theſe were more extenſive, had ſtrong abbatis round them, and were ſo ſituated as not to admit of the choice of ground for attacking them as the others did. The General tells us they muſt have employed 12,000 men in their conſtruction; we may therefore reaſonably conclude, that they would have been defended by an equal number. A detachment of 2400 only were ordered to diſlodge the rebels, and were embarked in tranſports to fall down the harbour to Caſtle William, from whence the deſcent was to be made. The intervention of a violent ſtorm of wind and rain prevented the attack, and providentially ſaved thoſe devoted troops; and the very next day, without any material change of circumſtances having taken place, (for the ſtorm that had prevented the debarkation of the troops had ſtopt the progreſs of the works) the enterprizes was abandoned, and to the utter aſtoniſhment of all who were not in the General's councils, orders iſſued for evacuating Boſton.

Evacuation.

The favourite Engineer neglects Dorcheſt.

Now, I beg leave to aſk Sir William Howe whether Boſton was tenable or not? he had indeed ſtaked his reputation as a general on the affirmative. If it was not, how could he or his favourite engineer overlook this poſt? Could they ſuppoſe that the rebels, who before winter had made regular approaches to the foot of this hill, would fail as ſoon as the ſeaſon opened to occupy the top of it? why were no precautions taken to prevent it? why was not a poſt eſtabliſhed there as at Bunker's-Hill? or if Boſton was tenable as the General had pledged himſelf, and I confeſs I have not the leaſt doubt of, why in God's name was it ſo ſhamefully abandoned? why were the army and the loyaliſts obliged to combat war, peſtilence, and famine through the winter at Boſton, only to be hurried from it in the ſpring? or why was the town finally evacuated with circumſtances ſo diſpiriting to the troops, and ſo encouraging to the rebels? All the cannon at Charles Town, the greateſt part of thoſe at the lines on the Neck, two thirteen inch mortars, and other ordnance, amounting in the whole to (ſerviceable and unſerviceable) 100 pieces, great quantities of military ſtores, and even proviſions, fell into the hands of the rebels. And as though ſomething was ſtill wanting to ſwell their triumph and make it complete, a convention was entered into with the re-

100 cannon, ſtores, and proviſions left to the rebels.

bels with General Howe's knowledge and approbation, that the town ſhould not be injured in caſe they would ſuffer the troops to embark without interruption. The agreement was religi-

Boſton convention. ouſly kept, as the laſt diviſion of troops embarked at the long wharf, a flag was hoiſted on the ſteeple of a church, and Waſhington entered the town with drums beating, muſic playing, colours flying, and in all the pride and exultation of victory.

Reaſons againſt evacuating it. However forcible the reaſons for evacuating Boſton before the winter had been, thoſe for not doing it at this time were equally ſtrong. The ſeaſon had moderated, ſeveral victuallers had arrived, and the circumſtances of the garriſon were rendered happy to what they had been. The being compelled, or what was equally bad, the appearance of being compelled to ſurrender that long-conteſted town, indeed the only one in the thirteen confederated provinces, that the crown was in poſſeſſion of, could not fail of producing the worſt effects on the minds of the Coloniſts. Beſides it muſt neceſſarily counteract the plans, and derange the meaſures of adminiſtration.

Leaving the harbour open loſt us ſtore ſhips and 1000 men. Had the General only entrenched a battalion on George's Iſland, as he had purpoſed, this with a man of war, who would have been mutual ſecurities for each other, would have prevented our tranſports, victuallers, and ſtoreſhips from running and even fighting their way directly into their enemies port. As this was neglected, a man of war that was left behind, was ſoon compelled to quit her ſtation, and there was at leaſt an equal chance of ſo great a part of our fleet being caught in the ſnare as even to have prevented a campaign.—Fortune was once more our friend, and warded off ſo great a calamity; ſo many ſhips however by this means fell into the hands of the rebels, as to ſupply them with ordnance, a complete aſſortment of military ſtores, and camp equipage, and ſeveral thouſand ſuits of regimentals; articles which were abſolutely neceſſary for them to take the field, and which at that time they could have had by no other means. Beſides, near a thouſand of our beſt troops were made priſoners.

Sails 600 miles out of his way. Had the general gone ſouthward, as he was directed, the conſequences would not have been ſo bad; but in defiance of orders, advice, and even common-ſenſe, he ſailed the oppoſite point of the compaſs, and carried the army to the northern extremity of the continent, ſix hundred miles directly from the intended ſcene of action. Want of proviſion has been ſuggeſted as an excuſe for this extraordinary ſtep; but a moment's reflection will convince us of its inſufficiency; for Nova Scotia, as the General tells us in his letter, had been ſtripped of its proviſions the preceding winter; and the victuallers, on which his ſole dependence was placed, were all deſtined for Boſton: theſe could as well have followed him ſouth as north; and beſides Rhode Iſland, Staten Iſland and Long Iſland, abounded with

proviſions.

proviſions. The only reaſon the General himſelf thought proper to give for this myſterious conduct was, that the tranſports were crouded, and the ſtores diſſorted. This might with propriety have been urged as an example for not going againſt a place, where an enemy was in force to oppoſe him; but ſurely it is not a ſufficient reaſon for his not going to places where there was no enemy, nor poſſibly could be any before his arrival, viz. Staten Iſland, Long Iſland, or even Rhode Iſland. It could not be pretended that a reinforcement was neceſſary; for he finally left Halifax, and took poſſeſſion of Staten Iſland with leſs force than that which he ſailed with from Boſton.

By this delay all the ſpring and ſummer were waſted on our part; the rebels were at liberty to fortify New York and its dependencies, and to collect all the force of the continent to that ſpot where they knew our army would be directed; the diſlodgment of which force occupied our whole army the remainder of the campaign. How this delay hurtful.

Upon a review of General Howe's conduct at the northward, I don't know which part of his generalſhip to admire moſt; his unneceſſary aſſault of the rebels works at Bunker's-Hill, whereby three quarters of the aſſailants were killed and wounded—or after this experience, his ordering two thouſand four hundred troops to diſlodge twelve thouſand rebels ſtill more ſtrongly poſted on the heights of Dorcheſter Neck; his neglecting to evacuate Boſton in the fall, under pretence of his not having ſufficient ſhipping, and yet doing it in the ſpring with more troops and fewer ſhips; his aſſuring the miniſtry that Boſton was tenable, and inducing them to ſend a reinforcement there, and before its arrival ſuffering himſelf to be driven from it at the head of nine thouſand Britiſh troops; his propoſing, in caſe the troops ſhould be withdrawn from Boſton, to entrench a battalion at the entrance of the harbour to blockade it, and afterwards leaving it open to enſnare the unſuſpecting ſhips that were bound there; his going to Halifax when he had been ordered to New York, or his ſaying in his ſpeech, that going northward in the ſpring was executing the ſecretary of State's orders, which was to go ſouthward before winter. Review of Gen. Howe's conduct

It has been the ſingular fortune of this General to efface former miſtakes by ſubſequent blunders of greater magnitude: his northern miſconduct was in this increaſing Ratio; and the whole is forgot when Long Iſland, York, White Plains, Trenton, Quibbleton, Saratoga and Cheſapeak are mentioned. Even reſentment gives place to pity at his ſuffering himſelf to be burleſqued by the Miſchianza, in honour of his leaving America unconquered, and the rebellion ſtronger than he found it. Has left the rebellion ſtronger than he found it.

Strictures

Strictures on Sir William Howe's Miſchianza or Triumph, upon leaving America unconquered; with Extracts from the "American Criſis." In order to ſhew how far the King's enemies think his General deſerving of Public Honours. A flattering Account of this Miſchianza was publiſhed in the Philadelphia Gazette, and copied into the Morning Poſt the 13th of July laſt; and a larger one by a ſtill more flattering panegyriſt, may be found in the Gentleman's Magazine for Auguſt laſt.

A triumph preposterous after perſonal defeat and diſgrace.

If Sir William Howe had thought fit quietly to reſign his command, and been content to enjoy in privacy the fortune he had acquired, till the nation had in ſome meaſure digeſted the diſgraces and loſſes we had ſuffered under his command in America; or till the dangers and calamities, which, in conſequence of them, threaten us here at home, were paſſed over;—he might not then perhaps have been diſturbed in his retirement.

And on national ruin inſulting.

But at a time when the Britiſh empire in America is ſunk, and when thouſands and thouſands of good ſubjects in both countries are ruined by its fall; at a time, when, with the loſs of our Colonies, the empire here in Britain itſelf is ſhaken and endangered; at ſuch a time of public calamity, when every good Engliſhman was trembling for the commonwealth; at ſuch a time of diſtreſs for a General to take to himſelf ovations and triumphs greater than the Duke of Marlborough, or any Engliſh commander ever thought of; to ſuffer himſelf to be crowned with laurels, and to have triumphal arches erected to his honour; is ſuch an inſult offered to our underſtandings, as cannot but raiſe in the mind of every man of ſenſe, the higheſt degree of aſtoniſhment and indignation.

No ſenſe of public calamity.

Could a Commander in Chief, in a war of ſo much importance; after the nation had been put to the expence of ſo many millions to no purpoſe; and when ſo many thouſands of good ſubjects are ruined by the miſcarriage of it—could he think, that we ſhould loſe all ſenſe of the public calamities, becauſe he expreſſes no feelings for them? Did he think we ſhould imagine that America was ſtill ours, becauſe he ſhewed no ſhame, but had a triumph made for him upon the loſs of it? Or that a three years ſeries of perpetual diſgraces would not be ſeen through all his ovations and triumphal arches?

Or perſonal ſhame.

A ſeries of ill conduct and diſgraces.

How much ſoever it may be in a General's power to repreſent his army as greater or leſs, to ſuit any *preſent occaſion* yet one thing at leaſt is certain, that Gen. Howe was furniſhed with a force abundantly ſufficient to have quelled the rebellion. Both friends and foes agree in this, that from the year 1776 he never met Mr. Waſhington but with an army ſuperior in number, as well as in goodneſs, to that of the enemy which

was

was oppoſed to him: yet in the courſe of three campaigns, he never thought proper to fight Mr. Waſhington, but once; and then did not chuſe to purſue the victory which his troops had gained for him. Either, therefore, the Britiſh troops muſt have been the greateſt of all poltroons, who were unable to contend with an inferior number of new-raiſed, half-clothed, and half-armed American militia;—or elſe there muſt have been an extreme deficiency in our Generalſhip. Whichſoever of theſe may have been the caſe, what ground can either of them afford for a triumph? Or upon what foundation could a General, who had ſeen the Britiſh arms endure innumerable diſgraces under his command; who had ſuffered himſelf to be ingloriouſly driven out of Boſton; and who, after having been beaten at Trenton and Prince-Town, was ſtill more ingloriouſly driven out of the Jerſeys; whoſe troops, by bravely beating in the rebel out-poſts, had often pointed out to him the way to victory while he never choſe to follow it; but invariably allowed the Americans to march off unmoleſted, and unpurſued; who had ſuffered himſelf to be ſurprized at German-town, and had ſeen his army thereby brought to the brink of deſtruction, from which it was reſcued by the ſingle bravery and good-conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Muſgrave; who had been baffled and defeated in all his attempts, and out-generaled even by a man that was none; and who now, after three years command, found himſelf much leſs able to ſuppreſs the rebellion, than he was the day he landed on Staten-Iſland?—Upon what pretence, I ſay, could this gentleman ſuffer himſelf to be crowned with laurels which he never won? Or encourage the dedicating a triumphal arch with plumes and military trophies to his honour, without his having once had the honour of a conqueſt? Crowned with laurels never won.

When ſo very extraordinary a method has been taken to perſuade us of the high eſtimation in which he is held for his military abilities, it is a piece of juſtice due to the public, to produce the opinion which even the rebels entertain of him; ſo very different from that which is here given by his flatterers and dependants.

The words of a letter addreſſed to him in the American Criſis; a work which ſome have given to Dr. Franklin. It is known to be written under the patronage of the Congreſs, and under the inſtructions of their capital and beſt informed leaders.

The AMERICAN CRISIS, Number V. addreſſed to General Sir William Howe. By the Author of Common Senſe.

"That a man, whoſe ſoul is abſorbed in the low traffic of "vulgar vice, is incapable of moving in any ſuperior region, is "clearly ſhown in you by the event of every campaign;—your military Congreſs character of Sir W. Howe.

" military exploits have been without plan, object, or decision.
" Can it be poſſible that you or your employers can ſuppoſe the
" poſſeſſion of Philadelphia to be any ways equal to the ex-
" pence or expectations of the nation which ſupports you?
" What advantages does England derive from any atchieve-
" ments of yours?

" If the principal events of the three campaigns be attended
" to, the balance will appear ſtrongly againſt you at the cloſe
" of each; but the laſt, in point of importance to us, hath ex-
" ceeded the former two. At the cloſe of the campaign in
" ſeventy-five you were obliged to retreat from Boſton. In
" the ſummer, ſeventy-ſix, you appeared with a numerous fleet
" and army in the harbour of New York. *By what miracle*
They wonder at their own preſervation. " *the Continent was preſerved in that ſeaſon of danger is a*
" *ſubject of admiration.* If, inſtead of waſting your time againſt
" Long Iſland, you had run up the North River, and landed
" any where above New York, the conſequence muſt have been,
" that either you would have compelled General Waſhington
" to fight you with very unequal numbers, or he muſt have
" ſuddenly evacuated the city, with the loſs of nearly all the
" ſtores of the army, or have ſurrendered for want of provi-
" ſions; the ſituation of the place naturally producing one or
" the other of theſe events.

" You let ſlip the very opportunity which ſeemed to put
" conqueſt in your power. Through the whole of that cam-
" paign you had nearly double the forces which General Waſh-
" ington immediately commanded. The utmoſt hope of A-
Advantages of Gen. Howe. " merica, in the year ſeventy-ſix, reached no higher than that
" ſhe might not then be conquered. She had no expectation of
" defeating you in the campaign. You had then greatly the
" advantage of her; you were formidable; your military know-
" ledge was *ſuppoſed to be complete*; your fleets and forces
" arrived without any accident; you had nothing to do but to
" begin, and your chance lay in the firſt vigorous onſet.

America under many diſadvantages. " America was young and unſkilled. She was obliged to
" truſt her defence to time and practice; and hath, by mere
" dint of preſervance, maintained her cauſe and brought her
" enemy to a condition in which ſhe is now capable of meeting
" him on any ground.

Sarcaſtic remarks on Sir W's movements " Let me aſk, Sir, what great exploits have you performed?
" Through all the variety of changes and opportunities, which
" this war hath produced, I know of no one action of yours
" that can be ſtiled maſterly. You have moved in and out,
" backward and forward, round and round, as if valour con-
" ſiſted in a military jig. The hiſtory and figure of your move-
" ments would be truly ridiculous, could they be juſtly deli-
" neated. They reſemble the labours of a puppy purſuing his
" tail;

" tail; the end is ſtill at the ſame diſtance, and all the turnings round muſt be done over again. ‡ Like the labours of a puppy

" Some weeks after this you likewiſe planned an attack on Gen. Waſhington, while at Whitemarſh; marched out with infinite parade; but on finding him preparing to attack you, the next morning you prudently cut about, and retreated to Philadelphia with all the precipitation of a man conquered in imagination. You was ſurprized at Germantown. Retreats before Waſhington.

" Immediatly after the battle of German-town, the probability of Burgoyne's defeat gave a new policy to affairs in Pennſylvania; and it was judged moſt conſiſtent with the general ſafety of America to wait the iſſue of the northern campaign. Slow and ſure is ſound work. The news of that victory arrived in our camp on the 18th of October, and no ſooner did the ſhout of joy, and the report of the thirteen cannon reach your ears, than you reſolved upon a retreat, and the next day, that is on the 19th, withdrew your drooping army into Philadelphia. This movement was evidently dictated by fear, and carried with it a poſitive confeſſion, that you dreaded a ſecond attack. It was hiding yourſelf among women* and children, and ſleeping away the choiceſt part of a campaign in expenſive inactivity. An army in a city can never be a conquering army. The ſituation admits only of defence. It is mere ſhelter; and every military power in Europe will conclude you to be eventually defeated. To hide among women.

" The time when you made this retreat, was the very time you ought to have fought a battle, in order to put yourſelf in a condition of recovering in Pennſylvania what you had loſt at Saratoga; and the reaſon why you did not, muſt be

‡ *I do not adopt this language of contempt; but if his panegyriſt had not told us, could it have been thought poſſible, that this gentleman, a mouth after this publication, ſhould have had a fame ſpangled with ſtars, ſtuck upon the top of his triumphal arch, blowing from her trumpet in letters of light:* Tes lauriers ſont immortels. *And not content with this earth's being filled with the ſound of his fame, ſhe was even powdered with ſtars, to tell us that it reached up to the heavens.*"

* *Should the reader aſk, what it was that the General at laſt did among them? his panegyriſt has here told us,* " *He bounces off with his bombs and burning hearts, ſet upon the pillars of his triumphal arch, which, at the proper time of the ſhow, burſt out in a ſhower of ſquibs and crackers, and other fire-works, to the delectable amazement of Miſs Craig, Miſs Chew, Miſs Redman, and all the other miſſes, dreſſed out as the fair damſels of the blended roſe, and of the burning mountain, for this farce of knight-errantry.*"

" either prudence or c———c; the former ſuppoſes your in-
" ability, and the latter needs no explanation."

Such are the ſentiments which the Americans entertain of this gentleman, and ſo great the contempt they expreſs of him.

Marlborough

What would have been ſaid of the Duke of Marlborough's vanity, if, after forty thouſand enemies killed and taken at the battle of Blenheim, he had encouraged his officers and dependents to dedicate to him a triumphal arch, and had employed even the enemies ſtandards taken in battle, in forming an avenue for himſelf and fellow conquerors to have walked through?

A romantic triumph

What then are we to think of a beaten General's debaſing the King's enſigns (for he had none of his enemies) by planting all the colours of the army in a grand avenue three hundred feet in length, lined with the King's troops, between two triumphal arches, for himſelf and his brother to march along in pompous proceſſion, followed by a numerous train of attendants, with ſeven ſilken knights of the blended roſe, and ſeven more of the burning mountain, and their fourteen Turkey dreſſed damſels, to an area of 150 yards ſquare, lined alſo with the King's troops, for the exhibition of a tilt and tournament, or mock fight of old chivalry, in honour of this triumphant hero; and all this ſea and land ovation made; not in conſequence of an uninterrupted ſucceſſion of victories, like thoſe of the Duke of Marlborough; not after the conqueſt of Canada by a Wolfe, a Townſhend, and an Amherſt; or after the much more valuable conqueſt of all the French provinces and poſſeſſions in India, under the *wiſe* and *active* General Coote; but after thirteen provinces wretchedly loſt, and a three years ſeries of ruinous diſgraces and defeats.

Not after victories

But after three years diſgraces and defeats.

ÆMILIUS SCAURUS on the Expedition from Canada.

High national expectation from Gen. Burgoyne.

When you received the Command of the Northern expedition, the public expectation was raiſed to the higheſt pitch, by your magnificent harangues in the ſenate, and your liberal promiſes of active and extenſive operation in the field. The Miniſtry were as ſanguine as the mob, and rejoiced beyond meaſure that they had, at laſt, found an Opportunity of employing a confidential General, not only unconnected with oppoſition, but zealous in the cauſe of the ſupremacy of the Britiſh Legiſlature.

Remarks on his proclamation

But it was not ſufficient that our expectations ſhould be raiſed; the fears of the enemy were to be encreaſed in the ſame proportion. To produce this effect, a proclamation was publiſhed at Ticonderoga, which out-thundered all your great guns, numerous and noiſy as they were. You there aſſumed the form of an offended Jupiter. Vengeance and death were in your right hand—Peace and forgiveneſs in your left. The time

ſeemed

ſeemed to be come when rebellion was to be ſwept from the face of the earth, by the irreſiſtible vigour of your out-ſtretched arm, attended as it was to be, in its awful progreſs, by the bleſſing of providence on the one ſide, and the ſavages of Canada on the other. This proclamation, though mighty ſublime, was looked upon by the illiterate Americans as mighty obſcure. You thought proper, therefore, a few months afterwards to elucidate it by a very clear commentary, written at Saratoga. The public admired the happy variety of ſtile that diſtinguiſhed thoſe two performances. They concluded you to be a very good author, but recollected, with ſurprize, that they had once dreamed you were a great General. This illuſion, though vaniſhed from their minds, ſeems ſtill to keep poſſeſſion of yours: for though we are now groaning under the weight of thoſe misfortunes which your defeat has brought upon us, you are not contented, Sir, with eſcaping the indignation of your country, you boldly ſtep forward in the Senate, and inſiſt upon your claim to its applauſe. I think in prudence you ſhould have delayed this claim a little time longer. Engliſh ears are not yet ſufficiently prepared for it. Allow a few more precedents to be eſtabliſhed, and then you may make it with ſafety and ſucceſs: for with an Adminiſtration of cowards, and an Oppoſition of bullies, diſappointment and diſgrace will ſoon become the beſt titles to approbation and reward.

And ſurrender.

You, Sir, took the earlieſt meaſures to obtain the patronage of the latter of thoſe reſpectable bodies; for the moment you ſurrendered your arms to the rebels, you reſolved to ſacrifice your principles to the oppoſition. The ſacrifice met with the moſt propitious acceptance, for it came accompanied with the worſt tidings this country ever heard. You had done a deed that ſecured even the forgiveneſs of Col. Barre for all your paſt offences. In reading the Convention at Saratoga, he forgot that you had once been a ſtickler for the honour of a Britiſh ſoldier.

Sacrifices to oppoſition.

This ſtep being taken, the next conſideration was to determine who ſhould bear the blame of thoſe misfortunes, which, you were reſolved, ſhould not be imputed to you. Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and the American Secretary, preſented themſelves at firſt, as the parties among whom it would be proper to divide the whole. All your letters ſhew, that, for a time, you attributed your want of ſucceſs entirely to the failure of that co-operation which you expected from Gen. Howe's army. This was the language you held to the Miniſter, to your army, and even to Sir William Howe himſelf. You ſpoke it in the moſt clear and unambiguous manner in your meſſage to Sir Henry Clinton, by Capt. Campbell, when you declared that, "you would not have given up your commu-
"nication with Ticonderoga, had you not expected a co-ope-
"rating

Who ſhould bear the blame of his misfortunes.

First fixed on Sir W. Howe.

" rating army at Albany." Now, had you not given up your communication with Ticonderoga, it is clear you could never have been forced to ſurrender your army. The whole of your misfortune, then, if we may believe yourſelf, was entirely owing to Gen. Howe's failure in the expected co-operation.

Strong as this ground of defence might at firſt ſight appear, you were obliged, for prudential reaſons, totally to deſert it, and abandon every advantage you could have derived from it. Sir William Howe had now left the King's ſtandard to its own fortune in America, and had returned to look for laurels under the banners of oppoſition. He was of a weight and ſtanding in the corps, which you, though a hopeful recruit, could not poſſibly pretend to rival: it was therefore neceſſary to give up every idea of criminating him before you could procure the concurrence of the whole party in defending you. With regard to Sir Guy Carleton, it had been given out by your friends that he had been greatly deficient in making the neceſſary preparations for the commencement of your campaign, and ſhamefully dilatory in forwarding to you the ſupplies and aſſiſtance that were afterwards to come from his province. Unfortunately he too was connected with a part of the oppoſition, in ſuch a manner as made it neceſſary to ſuppreſs this charge, for the ſame reaſons that induced you to keep back that againſt Sir William Howe. There now remained nothing to lay the blame upon, but your orders from the Secretary of State. Thoſe hopeleſs orders therefore are now to be cenſured for every thing you did, and every thing that you omitted to do—for your marches and your halts—for lying by while you had a proſpect of ſucceſs, and advancing when you had none—and finally, for that ſtrangeſt of all ſtrange ideas, that when you could proceed no further, it was better to ſurrender than to attempt to retreat.

Then on Sir G. Carleton.

Laſt on the American Secretary.

The firſt charge againſt you in the conduct of your unfortunate expedition, is the carrying with you a quantity of artillery ſo totally incompatible with that celerity of movement, on which your ſucceſs entirely depended. It was neceſſary indeed to carry a train to Ticonderoga, equal to the reduction of the very ſtrong works that we expected to meet with there. So far you could have juſtified yourſelf even without the example of Sir Guy Carleton; but farther, you in vain endeavoured to procure his opinion in your favour.

Quantity of artillery.

You, and your learned friend Captain Money, have informed the committee, that artillery kills men at a diſtance, and that it makes a greater impreſſion on the enemy's defences, than mere muſquetry can effect. Indeed!—It did not require the teſtimony of Moſes and the prophets, much leſs that of two men from Saratoga, to convince the moſt incredulous ſenator of the truth of this allegation. But you ſhould have recollected, Sir, that the very carriage of this artillery created afterwards

wards the neceſſity of employing it. The army was pinned down to attend its motions, and the enormous delays occaſioned, in a great degree, by the ſlowneſs of its progreſs, gave full time to the rebels to recover from their firſt panic, and to collect again that army which had been completely diſperſed. Whereas, had you advanced rapidly without incumbrance or delay, you would neither have found men to oppoſe, nor works to interrupt your progreſs through the country. In point of fact, what works did this artillery of yours ever get the better of? After paſſing Ticonderoga, you met with but one fortified camp of the enemy, and all your boaſted artillery never enabled you to advance a ſingle foot beyond it.

Delayed the army.

But it was not ſufficient to embarraſs yourſelf with every incumbrance that could retard the progreſs of an army; it was neceſſary, in order to complete your plan, to adopt ſuch a route as would add to every difficulty, and augment every delay. Inſtead of the ſtraight and common paſſage by the way of Lake George, which it never would have occurred to any other officer to have departed from, you thought proper, at the expence of much time and incredible labour, to cut a road through a piece of ground the moſt difficult and impracticable that perhaps all America afforded. You ſeem to be convinced, that to the generality of mankind this meaſure would appear altogether inexplicable, and were therefore pleaſed to communicate to us your motives for a movement ſo extremely eccentric. You were apprehenſive, it ſeems, in the firſt place, that the retrograde motion of the army from Skeneſborough to Ticonderoga, would abate the panic of the enemy, and at the ſame time have a bad effect on the ſpirits of your own troops. Your philoſophy ſeems of a piece with your generalſhip. It muſt be in ſome new ſyſtem that you have diſcovered, that a man is moſt terrified when it is leaſt poſſible to overtake him, and that a ſoldier led out of his road in purſuit of an enemy, will feel himſelf dejected or depreſſed, if he returns into it after the purſuit is over. General Frazer's corps made this retrograde motion from Huberton, and yet I profeſs the grenadiers and light infantry never betrayed the ſmalleſt ſymptom of the truth of this ſtrange theory of yours: but you are further pleaſed to expreſs your opinion, that had you gone by the Lake the enemy would have delayed you greatly by making a ſtand at Fort George; and in this opinion all your witneſſes are pleaſed to concur. Now let us ſtate the premiſes from which this concluſion is drawn.

Difficulties and delays augmented by the choice of route.

Reaſon for that choice inſufficient.

The rebels had fled from Ticonderoga, where they had collected all the force it was poſſible for them to aſſemble—where they had works of a moſt amazing ſtrength, and had made every preparation for a long and vigorous defence.

You, therefore, ſuppoſe that thoſe very rebels, panic-ſtruck, beaten

beaten and diſperſed as they were, would make a ſtand at Fort George, where they had no ſtrength, no defence, nor any preparation that indicated an intention of a moment's reſiſtance. Beſides the total abſurdity of ſuch a ſuppoſition, you know perfectly well that in point of fact there was not the ſmalleſt foundation for it; for on the 11th of July you write to Lord George Germain, in your private letter, that the enemy, ſo far from preparing to make a ſtand at Fort George, were even then labouring to remove their magazines both from thence and from Fort Edward. Yet, in direct contradiction to this, you and your friends now ſeriouſly aſſure the committee, that you expected to find the rebels in force at the firſt of thoſe places, and that your march by Skeneſborough was occaſioned chiefly by that expectation.

His letters and evidences in oppoſition.

Army halts a month.

At laſt, Sir, when the ſeaſon was half ſpent you arrived at the banks of the Hudſon's River, where you thought proper to make a dead halt of one entire month. If Mr. Gates himſelf had directed your operations he could not poſſibly have planned meaſures more favourable to his own views. The flight from Ticonderoga had made ſuch an impreſſion on the ſpirits of the rebels, that it was impoſſible immediately to collect an army, or to inſpire them with that confidence which is neceſſary to inſure ſucceſs: but it was certain that in time that impreſſion would wear off, unleſs it were continued or renewed by the rapid movements of the King's troops. When, inſtead of ſuch movements, they ſaw thoſe troops waſting days, weeks, and months without making the ſmalleſt progreſs, it is no wonder that they at laſt got an army to aſſemble—it is rather ſurprizing that they were without one ſo long.

Rebels weak in Auguſt and beginning of September.

I wiſh your friend, Colonel Kingſton, in ſome of his confidential communications with Mr. Gates, had obtained a return of the rebel force not only on the 7th of October, but during the whole of the months of Auguſt and September. If it had anſwered your purpoſe, I make no doubt but it would have been procured and produced. But it would have appeared too clearly from thence that during the whole of the firſt month, and the greateſt part of the ſecond, they had no force that could enter into competition with yours, and that nothing but your monſtrous delays, joined to the misfortune at Bennington, created that formidable army which appeared againſt you in the month of October.

On want of proviſions.

But your excuſe for thoſe delays is the want of proviſions; and to account for this want, the roads from Lake George are ſaid to have been out of repair. This is one of the bleſſed conſequences of the march by the way of Skeneſborough. Had the army come by Lake George, they would of courſe have repaired the roads as they came along. But you contrived juſt to double both the fatigue and the delay; for they had firſt one road

road to make from Skeneſborough, and then they had another to open and repair from Fort George. In the whole of the evidence you have produced, the method is, to ſtate a neceſſity for every one of your meaſures, contriving to ſink this trifling circumſtance, that *that neceſſity* invariably originated from ſome previous blunder or omiſſion of your own. The delay in this caſe, you prove to have been unavoidable, forgetting to inform us that it became ſo, only by the unaccountable whim of departing from the route which any other man would have taken.

Ingenious method of vindicating miſconduct.

I come now to the unhappy affair at Bennington, which being the commencement, and in a great meaſure, the cauſe of all your misfortunes, it will be neceſſary to ſtate at ſome length. Your army, far from being too numerous, you ſay was not even adequate to the enterprize you were ſent upon. It is therefore perfectly clear, that you could not afford to riſk detachments from it, for the execution of any collateral purpoſe whatever. But ſuppoſing an object had preſented itſelf, of ſufficient magnitude, to juſtify a deviation from this rule, the detachment employed ſhould either have been ſtrong enough to maintain itſelf againſt any oppoſition that it could be expected to meet, or it ſhould have had orders to retreat the moment that it was threatened with an attack. Inſtead of proceeding on this clear military principle, you ſent out 600 of your worſt troops, at a diſtance from your army, into the heart of an enemy's country, and ordered them to keep their ground at all events—even though the whole country ſhould riſe againſt them. A detachment thus circumſtanced was not only hazarded; it was clearly and infallibly devoted; for the enemy muſt have wanted common ſenſe, if they did not reduce its deſtruction to an abſolute certainty.

Expedition to Bennington.

When you communicated your intentions to Brigadier Fraſer, he expreſſed his moſt poſitive diſapprobation, not only of ſending Germans, but of ſending ſuch a detachment of any troops, for any purpoſe whatever.

Gen. Fraſer againſt it.

He thought the point of ſo great conſequence, that he did not confine himſelf merely to a verbal diſapprobation—he remonſtrated againſt the meaſure in writing, and predicted the fatal conſequences that it might be expected to produce. This you know to be true. It was the common report of the camp, that this freedom of his diſpleaſed you ſo much, that you declared with ſome warmth, that "you ſhould learn for the future to be more peremptory and leſs communicative."

G. Burgoyne's reply.

Certain it is that you diſregarded his remonſtrances, and proceeded to execute this very ſtrange plan in an equally ſtrange manner. Had you ſought through all the various deſcriptions of men who then received the King's pay, you could not poſſibly have found a corps ſo totally unfit for this kind of ſervice as Reideſel's regiment of dragoons. Beſides that heavineſs and

Improper troops employed.

ſlowneſs which they poſſeſſed in common with other Brunſwick regiments, they were loaded with accoutrements that rendered them additionally clumſy. Their very hats and ſwords weighed more than the whole equipment of one of our ſoldiers, Yet thoſe poor devils did you pitch upon for a flying expedition through the woods, for the ſagacious purpoſe of mounting them on horſes, in a country where cavalry could not be uſed.

Col. Baum's character.

The command of this expedition was given to Colonel Baum, a brave man and good officer in his way, but juſt as much qualified for this ſort of ſervice as an Indian Chief would be for the command of an army in Flanders. He neither had, nor could be expected to have, an idea of the nature of American warfare; he did not even underſtand a ſyllable of the language of the people whoſe affections you ſent him to try. The event was juſt what might be expected from ſuch a plan. The country people finding ſo ſmall a detachment at ſo great a diſtance from the army, flocked in from all quarters to ſurround it, while poor Baum, totally ignorant of the country, the people, and the language, hardly knew whether they were aſſembling as friends or foes. He however diſpatched intelligence of this riſing to you, and you now perceived the conſequences with which your deep-laid ſcheme was about to be attended. The only poſſible chance of retrieving the blunder, and preventing the detachment from being cut off, was to ſend forward the lighteſt and moſt expeditious troops in your army, who by mere dint of quick marching might perhaps arrive before the enemy ſhould find it expedient to commence their attack.

But you ſeem poſitively to have abjured the guidance of reaſon throughout the whole of this tranſaction. For you, a ſecond time made choice of the Germans, who poſſeſſed no one qualification that ſuch a duty required. Did you really believe, Sir, that they would march to Bennington in a ſhorter time

A 2d miſtake.

than any equal number of Britiſh troops in your army? did you not know, on the contrary, that the worſt Britiſh regiment in the ſervice, would with eaſe march two miles for their one? was not the choice of them then a voluntary and a wanton ſacrifice of the detachment which you pretended to ſend them to relieve? the Germans proceeded exactly as every man in the camp knew and expected that they would. They halted ten times an hour to dreſs their ranks, which were liable to be broken at every ſtep in ſuch a road as they had to march by. You knew this to be their conſtant practice, and therefore had no reaſon to be aſtoniſhed at it on this occaſion. The conſequence was, that they arrived juſt time enough to be attacked by the victorious rebels, fluſhed with their conqueſt over the unfortunate Baum. Colonel Breyman made a gallant ſtand, notwithſtanding the advantage the rebels had got by occupying the hills, at the foot of which he was obliged to march. At laſt

laſt both parties ſeemed tired of the conflict—for they both retreated at the ſame inſtant, the Germans leaving behind them their cannon, which the rebels did not take poſſeſſion of till four days after the engagement.

Both parties run away. The German cannon not taken by the rebels for 4 days.

Thus ended this unfortunate affair, which almoſt inſtantaneouſly darkened the proſpect of the whole campaign. We loſt in killed, wounded, and priſoners, little leſs than a thouſand men. The Indians began immediately to deſert. The loyaliſts were diſheartened, while the rebels were elated beyond meaſure, and totally forgot the terror with which you had at firſt inſpired them. They even conceived the moſt contemptible opinion of your talents as an officer, and filled their papers with the moſt ſatirical reflections on your orders to Colonel Baum, which they ſaid betrayed a want of military ſkill that one of their militia colonels would have been aſhamed to diſcover. To all this, what do you and your friends anſwer? why, that it was entirely the fault of the Germans, who did not march ſo faſt as you expected they would have done. Good God! Sir, do you and your witneſſes mean to trifle with the common ſenſe of mankind? we all blame the Germans, but muſt we therefore acquit you, who, with an abſurdity bordering on madneſs, pitched upon thoſe very Germans in preference to all the other troops in your army? that would be to make your crime the inſtrument of your juſtification.

New mode of juſtification.

REVIEW of the WAR.

It is a ſingular and convincing proof of the weak and diſtracted ſtate of our councils, and of the power of the reigning factions, when notorious public delinquents, who have entailed upon us an enormous additional debt, who have loaded us with national diſhonour, who have plunged us into a French and Spaniſh war, not only eſcape with impunity, but are heard with patient ſubmiſſion in the ſenate, declaim on their own merits, and arraign that country for ill treatment, which they, by their baſe and miſerable conduct have undone. Such tameneſs in us, is the laſt and moſt wretched ſtage of national humiliation: In them, to ruin a people, and call for their praiſe, is the higheſt pitch of daring inſult and impudent malignity. But to leave the crowd of delinquents to the conſolations and flatteries of oppoſition, Sir William Howe ſhall be my object.

Effrontery of pub. delinquents.

This man, who has brought a name formerly honoured into contempt, wantonly ſacrificed a thouſand of our braveſt men at Bunker's Hill, by deſpiſing the ſituation of the enemy, and rejecting the ſimpleſt and eaſieſt of all manœuvres, that of landing on their left from Myſtic River, and taking poſt on the heights

Loſs by deſpiſing ſituation.

above their rear, which would have given us their whole army to a man.

Secret history of Boston evacuation.

By neglecting to occupy the heights of Dorchester, which he had constantly before his eyes for ten months, and which he knew from the first * the rebels intended to possess, he was forced to fly with ignominy from Boston; purchasing a quiet retreat by a secret capitulation, never having the candour to own his obligation to the negociator of his safety, but all along disingenuously attempting to impose on the world, "that his "fine military disposition had enchanted the rebels."

100 cannon, 100 ships, &c. abandoned.

From this place he fled with all the precipitation of a man completely discomfited, abandoning an hundred pieces of cannon and mortars, great quantities of military stores, and even provisions, and such a vast assortment of linens and woollens as lasted the New England rebels, who were in great distress for them, no less than two years; together with 100 vessels of various denominations, which were all fitted out against us next summer, and scouring the Western Ocean, nearly ruined for that year our whole West India Trade.

He was repeatedly urged and intreated to issue orders for transporting the linens and woollens to Halifax, that they might be restored to the proper owners, but to no purpose; sullen, indolent and dissipated, he was incapable of doing any business, or of surmounting any difficulty.

The same motives or want of motives prevented his leaving a garrison on George's Island near Nantasket Road, though a proposal of his own to the Minister. A battalion on that Island, which is very defensible, would, with a ship of war, have completely secured Boston Harbour. But for want of the protection that such a garrison could have given to a man of war, and received from her, the rebels soon forced Capt. Banks to leave the Road, in consequence of which, most of our store ships from Europe and the West Indies with near a thousand men in transports, ran directly into Boston Harbour, and were taken.

1000 men lost.

Orders were sent in summer and fall 1775 to evacuate Boston, Ministry being ashamed of the inglorious situation of troops so cooped up, exposed to insult, want, and surprize; and no longer either objects of terror, or cause of distress to the rebels. These orders our commander rejected. The prospect of six months total idleness, was too great a happiness for a sluggish mind to relinquish. In reply, he sent home the following bravado: "that it were to be wished the rebels would hazard "so rash an attempt as to attack him."

Howe wishes to be attacked.

But they did make the attempt, and he sunk under it, without a single effort or struggle, on his part, to make head against them.

* *General Gage had information of this in May* 1775, *at the same time with their intention of occupying at Bunker's Hill.*

them. If his mind had not been of a moſt impenetrable or callous texture how dreadfully mortified muſt he have felt, when juſt as he had commenced his flight, and not yet out of ſight of the ſpires of Boſton, a ſhip of war from England hailed him, and gave him the miniſter's diſpatches applauding his reaſons for *not leaving* Boſton, and juſtifying his reſolution of remaining there, as *an Evacuation* would have been a very unadviſable meaſure. Thus he fled with thoſe praiſes in his pocket, which had been laviſhed upon him, only on the ſuppoſition that he ſtill kept firm in his poſt. There are few minds but would have felt this ſtroke for life.

They do ſo; he flies, & receives mortifying diſpatches.

Though he knew the neceſſity of remaining in Boſton on account of his expected reinforcements, and to keep up an alarm to prevent the rebels from reinforcing their army before Quebec, yet he went to ſhut himſelf up on the inhoſpitable coaſt of Nova Scotia, eight days ſail out of his road, inſtead of going to New-York, which at laſt he thought proper to do three months after. Immediately on our deſerting Boſton the rebels detached a large reinforcement to their army in Canada. As to Quebec, he had left it to its fate, or rather apparently conſigned it to the rebels; on the 10th of October, while ſolacing himſelf at Boſton, General Carleton's letters beſeeching ſuccours arrived, with intelligence he had not an hundred ſoldiers under his command. Our great man, ſo wiſe, ſo active, and zealous, in conſultation with Admiral Graves determined a battalion of marines ſhould be ſent: in three days the tranſports were ready to take them on board: but at that inſtant Admiral Graves receiving a new light, thought fit to declare, that to ſend tranſports up the St. Lawrence was unadviſable and impracticable. People wondered from whence the Admiral had received this ſudden illumination, as he had been quite of another opinion three days before. Then our General undertook the buſineſs; but he came to a quicker deciſion: doing in one day what Graves had taken three to do; that is, coming to a determination to ſend them, and a determination not to ſend them. Sending troops would have been doing ſomething, therefore it went no further than an idea, as we were always better pleaſed when doing nothing. After all this preparation and exertion of wiſdom, the veſſel from Quebec was ſent back expreſs the 13th of October in the evening, to let Gen. Carleton know, that it was the decided opinion of General Howe and Admiral Graves, that it was impracticable for veſſels with *troops* on board to get up the river St. Lawrence; but that veſſels with *expreſſes* without any troops certainly might.

Curious opinions for and againſt reinforcing Quebec.

In his paſſage from Halifax to New York, he might have deſtroyed every thing that could float in all the rebels harbours, and yet have landed when he did, Auguſt 22d, on Long Iſland. By frequent landings on the coaſt, he would have weakened

Rebel ſhipping might have been deſtroyed.

Waſhington's army at New York, by the withdrawing of the New England men. Had this been done, the privateers that in the ſummer commanded the ſeas, would have been deſtroyed in embryo.

It is now neceſſary to bring forward Lord Howe, touching his negociations. The body of the people of America, were loyal to the King, and affectionate to the mother country. Theſe original and habitual diſpoſitions prevailed over two thirds of the people, when Lord and General Howe met as commiſſioners at Staten Iſland. Men of genius and addreſs, would ſoon have brought moſt of the provinces on our ſide. But the Howes for want of qualities to gain, or abilities to negotiate, confirmed all our enemies, and loſt us moſt of our friends. At firſt, even Waſhington's army ſhewed a joy at the proſpect of reuniting with Britain, and the people of the Provinces were praying for our appearance, and preparing to receive us with open arms; but before the campaign 1776 ended, our four manners, our want of capacity, and even of civility; an univerſal and undiſcriminating ſcene of plunder, produced the moſt fatal effects, our enemies were rendered more inveterate, and our friends dreaded the approach of ſoldiers more than of rebels. This aroſe from the contraſted conduct of Generals Howe and Waſhington. Our army plundered. Waſhington retook twenty waggon loads at Trenton, and reſtored the whole to the proper owners without regard to their political creeds. It ſhould be remarked, however, in juſtice to Sir William Howe, that he forbid plundering in orders, but he could not conceal his illiberal hatred to the American name; and officers and men continued a practice, which was thought no ways diſagreeable to the commander in chief. But for this, plundering might have been prevented in the other parts of the army, as well as in the firſt brigade. Such conduct in our two brothers was rather the effect of weakneſs than of vice: they had in common the ſullen family gloom: in one thing they differed: Sir William hated buſineſs, and never did any; my Lord loved buſineſs, dwelt upon it, and never could leave or end it. Their different paſſions and deſires were equally deſtructive to us; all of which, joined to their injudicious, weak, and diſgraceful operations, proved the ruin of the war. Their uniform character through life, has been, and is to this day, haughty, moroſe, hard hearted and inflexible; in general a compoſition of pride and perſonal courage, though this laſt phraſe ought to be expunged for inſenſibility; on their firſt appointment, they were conſidered as the Horatii of the Engliſh ſtate, but now a melancholy reverſe of ſentiment is felt; they are looked upon as our undoers, rather than our ſaviours.

Original diſpoſition of the Americans.

Commander's conduct.

Character of Lord and General Howe.

The moſt ſanguine wiſhers on the ſide of government, never even hoped for half the force to end the rebellion that the preſent

ſent American miniſter employed. General Amherſt's demand of twenty thouſand men, had been conſidered as an extravagancy, and only made to anſwer the purpoſe of a refuſal. General Howe had 40,870 effective men under his command. Let us ſee what uſe he made of them. Gen. Amherſt's demand.

When he landed on Long Iſland, he neglected to ſeize the heights above Flat Buſh; the rebels knew their importance, and took poſſeſſion of them at three in the afternoon, which he might have done at ten in the morning. This neglect might have been fatal to him. He had nearly been induced to attack where he muſt have failed. But the enemy had their neglects too. Waſhington's order for ſecuring the Jamaica road was not obeyed. General Howe, by a night march, occupied that paſs; and unperceived by the enemy, got between their army on the heights and their lines. The rebels fled in the utmoſt diſorder. Sullivan owned, that when he ſaw himſelf ſurrounded, he deſired his men to ſhift for themſelves. This they did with great expedition; and our troops were following the rebel fugitives into their lines, when they were with the utmoſt difficulty called back by the repeated orders of General Howe. Excluſive of the rebels who were routed, there were only 300 men with Putnam in their lines. There is not the leaſt doubt but our ſoldiers would have carried them by ſtorm; and in conſequence, all the enemy's army on Long Iſland, conſiſting of 7000 men, muſt have been killed or taken. Intereſting particulars of battle of Brooklyn.

General Robertſon, in evidence, though he could not deny theſe facts, yet palliated the meaſure, by ſaying, he imagined General Howe could not know theſe circumſtances, and that it was his opinion at the time, that General Howe did right in calling back the troops; but the matter is not what men of middling capacity might think or do. Would a great officer weighing what he might get and what he might loſe, have recalled his troops from lines, which he himſelf was confident they would, had they been permitted, have ſtormed with ſucceſs? Gen. Robertſon palliates Gen. Howe's conduct

Without a ſingle movement we lay three days in the face of theſe lines with 18,000 men eager for battle, and allowed the enemy to ferry themſelves over to New York with all their baggage, though their place of embarkation was only a mile and a half from our camp. Lord Howe was equally ſupine; he lay almoſt within ſight of the ferry, with the moſt numerous fleet ever ſeen in that part of the world, as if he had been ſent to cover, rather than to cut off their retreat. Had the two brothers moſt earneſtly deſired that the rebel army ſhould eſcape, it was impoſſible for them to have acted more properly for the effecting of ſuch a purpoſe. Conduct of Ld. & Gen. Howe.

Though our commander was now in poſſeſſion of the heights that commanded Governor's Iſland, he ſuffered 1500 rebels to go off without the leaſt diſturbance. They retired in ſuch fright Neglect Governor's Iſland.

fright that they abandoned their cannon; but two days after, finding we did not take poſſeſſion, they returned and carried them off to New York. Our chief now compoſed himſelf for more than a fortnight, only amuſing himſelf in erecting a battery againſt a gentleman's houſe on York Iſland, endeavouring to frighten the rebels with the noiſe of his cannon, but without doing them any harm. During this time he ſhould have gone up the Eaſt River and cut off the rebel retreat by King's Bridge, while his Lordſhip with his parade fleet, ſhould have occupied the North and Eaſt Rivers; theſe plain and ſimple movements would *yet* have given us all Waſhington's army, and all the rebel ringleaders almoſt without firing a gun; for they muſt have ſurrendered ſoon for want of proviſions. In this caſe too we ſhould have ſaved the 500 men loſt before Fort Waſhington.

Rebel retreat might have been cut off.

But as we never were to be in the right, after giving the rebels 17 days to run away from New York, we croſſed the ferry with the moſt pompous parade to take poſſeſſion of it. Had we been *wiſe* and *active*, we might *yet* have cut off the retreat of the rebels, but four weeks were ſpent at Haerlem, and the opportunity loſt, the rebels at laſt having diſcovered their dangerous ſituation. After ſo much delay, negligence, and blindneſs, we were now to do, when all opportunity was gone, what we ought to have done ſix weeks before. Our infallible Hero, above all good advice, and taking his own way, landed on Frogs Neck, October 12th, without ever thinking beforehand that it was neceſſary to reconnoitre the ground. The enemy having no intention to diſpute this paltry ſlip of land with him, broke down the bridge that joined it to the main, and looked at him from their entrenchments on the oppoſite ſide with no little ſatisfaction: they had ſhut him out from the continent; he was now fairly blocked up on the land ſide.

Odd ſituation on Frog's neck.

In this odd ſituation he had neither candor nor ſenſe enough to confeſs his blunder, and then endeavour to remedy it. But ſpent another week cooped up on this pleaſant ſpot, trying to convince the army that he was certainly in the right. With their ſituation before their eyes, and a full conviction of the folly that brought them there, all their reſpect for their commander could not make them ſwallow this abſurdity. Heaven knows when he would have moved, had not the ridicule and murmurs of the army overcome for once his obſtinacy, and ſent him to ſea again. Now indeed he landed near New Rochelle, the place he ſhould originally have debarked at.

Ridiculous obſtinacy.

It has been juſtly obſerved, that in following our Hero's progreſs, our aſtoniſhment ſuffers no reſt. Indolence and folly directed all our movements. In ten days we hardly march ten miles, though it was ſuppoſed the rebels were retreating. On the 28th, however, we find them waiting for us on the Brunx.

Slow march.

Two

Two regiments attack a detached corps of the enemy, and gain a material poſt. Another General would have puſhed his good fortune, having an army ſuperior in number, ſuperior in diſcipline, in every point of equipment, and more than all theſe, victorious, againſt a beaten, diſheartened, flying enemy. But we had done *active ſervice* enough for one day. Next day, as at the heights of Dorcheſter laſt year, the enemy's lines *appeared* much ſtrengthened, therefore the attack was deferred, till we were reinforced. Our reinforcement joined us the 30th. Now we were to attack the next day, but it happening to rain in the night and morning, this was ſufficient excuſe for putting it off a third time, though the day proved fair; and then the day after that, November 1ſt, to our *great ſurpriſe*, the enemy were run away. They left a rear guard within two miles of us to cover their retreat. This corps we did not think proper to attack. Such conduct will never put an end to any rebellion. Enemy eſcapes.

We now returned or retreated to York Iſland and ſtormed Fort Waſhington, in which the rebels had left upwards of 2000 men. It coſt us 500. If our operations had been directed with any degree of judgment, we ſhould have had this conqueſt with Waſhington and all his rebels at much leſs expence.

By our march back, or retreat, we abandoned all that part of the province of New York beyond King's Bridge. The rebels whom we had not thought worth purſuing, now purſued us, and ravaged the Cheſter counties, where we had been joyfully received, murdering the clergyman of Rye, for having been aſſiduous in ſtrengthening the loyal principles of the inhabitants. In this reſpect our conduct has been conſtant and uniform, in urging our well wiſhers in America to public declarations of loyalty, and then abandoning them to perſecution and death. Clergyman murdered.

We ſhould have intercepted the ſhattered remnant of the rebel army, by puſhing a detachment over to Elizabeth Town or Amboy: our not doing it could only ariſe from ignorance, indolence, or a dread that the rebellion would be too ſhort. And again Lord Cornwallis's halt at Brunſwick, for want of orders, when in ſight of theſe ſame wretched fugitives, little more than 2000 men, whilſt he had with him the reſerve of our army, the very flower of our troops, nearly double the rebel ſtrength, is a ſtrong inſtance of a deficiency ſomewhere, and another deciſive opportunity rejected. Through indolence of manœuvre our Hero did not come up till ſix days after the enemies eſcape. For ſome days he looked at them acroſs the Delaware, and on December 14th put his troops into winter quarters in an extended line of cantonment of near a 100 miles, in open villages, without a ſingle work to cover them. The pleaſures of New-York now attracted us; and in 12 days we were defeated at Trenton. But the mind cannot dwell on this ſhameful tranſaction; Again the rebels eſcape.

faction; Rhall has been blamed becauſe he is dead; and perhaps, the brave Donop has been cited as a proof of the charge, becauſe he too is dead.

Trenton defeat; the dead blam'd.

The defeats at Trenton and Prince Town broke up our cantonments, and loſt us the whole Jerſeys except three villages. During the remainder of the winter our foraging parties were attacked and ſhot down wherever they preſented themſelves; and theſe petty, diſgraceful conflicts, loſt us more men than a general engagement. Our Commander paid us one viſit and was in great danger of being killed or taken priſoner; he had a very hard ride for his eſcape.

Strong & pointed ſaying of Gen. Vaughan.

This winter Gen. Vaughan, a very gallant officer, and remarkable for his ſtrong and pointed ſayings, being aſked his opinion on the enſuing campaign, replied with great promptitude and conciſeneſs, "*I am for the moſt vigorous meaſures: I "am not for nurſing a rebellion.*" I believe his opinion was never again aſked, and he has been left to amuſe himſelf the beſt way he can at New York.

Deſpondence & execration on deſerting Burgoyne.

In the ſpring and ſummer it is impoſſible for the mind of man to conceive the gloom and reſentment of the army, on the retreat from the Jerſeys, and the ſhipping them to the ſouthward: nothing but being preſent and ſeeing the countenances of the ſoldiers, could give an impreſſion adequate to the ſcene; or paint the aſtoniſhment and deſpair that reigned in New York, when it was found, that the North River was deſerted, and Burgoyne's army abandoned to its fate. All the former opportunities loſt through indolence or rejected through deſign, appeared innocent when compared with compared with this fatal movement. The ruinous and dreadful conſequences were inſtantly foreſeen and foretold; and deſpondence or execration filled every mouth.

Had there been no Canada army to deſert or to ſacrifice, the voyage to the ſouthward could only originate from the moſt profound ignorance or imbecility.

Army in fetters at Philadelphia.

To run away from, and conſequently to ruin the people who had ſubmitted in the Jerſeys, as he had formerly ſerved thoſe of the Cheſter counties, could have no other effect than that of fixing on our ſtandards the character of deſtructive idiotiſm, or knavery: to fly before Waſhington was depreſſing the ſpirit of our own troops, and giving a triumph to the enemy: to fly from the ſcene where he ought to have acted, and with a land army undertake a ſix weeks voyage in the very heart of the campaign, are certainly abſurdities even too extravagant for a fairy tale: Above all, to go to Philadelphia, which every corporal could have told him would be putting his army in fetters.—His conduct has verified this opinion.—He never dared to move a days march from it: it was a cord about his neck.

As to the Brandywine manœuvres ſo much idolized by his partizans,

partizans, any boy at a military academy can repeat them out of Saxes Reveries; and from the ſame ſource can add to them. "That not to proſecute a victory and purſue your enemy to "the *utmoſt* in your power is founded on a falſe principle: that "10,000 men in purſuit are ſufficient to overthrow a 100,000 "in retreat: that no manœuvres can fail but thoſe that take "up *time* and give *reſpite* to the enemy: that a regular retreat "is impracticable, unleſs a conqueror is guilty of *remiſſneſs*; "but that generals *avoid* theſe *deciſive* opportunities, from an "*unwillingneſs* to put an *end* to the war." It is a known truth, people preſent at the engagement rode to Philadelphia that very night; that the rebel congreſs were then aſſembled in that town; and that a ſpirited march of a detachment from the diviſion of our army that paſſed Chad's Ford, and were not fatigued as that part which marched on our left, might have ſurprized the whole rebel conclave: at leaſt would have gained poſſeſſion of all the rebel magazines. Inſtead of a movement ſo very plain and rational, the whole army hardly moved at all, for even our moſt forward detachment was 15 days in reaching Philadelphia. Whereas had a detachment the night of the battle been puſhed forward to Philadelphia; and the army or another ſtrong detachment moved briſkly in purſuit of the fugitive rebels, their army for that year would have been undone. So far from that happening, we ſuffered another blockade in Philadelphia all winter, by a ragged contemptible enemy not half our force. Our Hero has a paſſion for being blockaded. In 1775 we were blockaded in Boſton: in 1776 in New York, and three Jerſey villages: In 1777 in Philadelphia.

Brandywine manœuvres from Saxe's Reveries.

Saxe's opinion of remiſs Gens.

At German Town, Waſhington was forced to ſeek him in his own camp: we were completely ſurprized. He, it is ſaid was not to be ſeen: he was deeply engaged ſomewhere, or with ſomebody: he was not to be diſturbed: and if General Grant had not forced his way to him, he would have known nothing of the battle but by report: yet he could tell his braveſt men, the Britiſh light infantry, who had been fought down by the whole rebel army, with that harſh inſenſibility ſo characteriſtic in him, "that they ought to have remained in their poſt, and "been cut to pieces on the ſpot." In this affair we loſt our baggage, and had not the gallant Muſgrave thrown himſelf into a ſtone houſe, which was very ſtrong, its likely our active Hero might have been ſurprized in bed.

Howe ſurpriſed.

His harſh ſpeech

Such dreadful conduct could operate in no other manner than it did: that is, in bringing deſtruction upon England, and a load of diſgrace upon himſelf. On the 18th of October, the rebel cannon announced the ruin of Burgoyne: appalled, and conſcience-ſtruck, and trembling for himſelf, inſtant orders were given to retreat, and he led us back to hide his head in Philadelphia. There, after three days tumult of mind, he wrote his letter

Hears of Burgoyne's ruin & retreats.

And reſigns.

letter or reſignation; finding THAT, the only reſource left him to parry his ſacrifice of Burgoyne; to extricate himſelf from the unmilitary poſition in which he had involved himſelf; and to ward off from himſelf, if poſſible, under a quarrel with the miniſtry, all blame of the ignominy and ruin he had brought on his country.

Our immenſe loſſes.

The conſequences of this man's unaccountably weak and wretched conduct are, thirty thouſand brave men deſtroyed, thirty millions of money expended; thirteen provinces loſt; and a war with the whole Houſe of Bourbon.

If ſuch miſconduct is to paſs without cenſure or puniſhment, there muſt be a radical weakneſs, either in the conſtitution of the ſtate, or in the minds of the people, and the total diſſolution of this empire muſt be faſt approaching: for the people who ſit in patient ſtupidity, and ſee themſelves become the victims of ignorance or treachery, cannot, and do not deſerve to exiſt as a nation.